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VAN TIEN DUNG ON BUILDING THE PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES

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Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 31 May-10 Aug 77 OW

[Part 1 of address by Sen Gen Van Tien Dung, VCP Central Committee Political Bureau member and chief of VPA General Staff at Higher Military Academy, published in TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, No. 5, 1977: "Build a Powerful People's Armed Forces To Steadily Defend the Socialist Vietnam Fatherland"--date of address not given]

[1430 GMT 31 May 77 OW]

[Text] Our People's Armed Forces are one of the very important, decisive factors in the victory of the revolutionary struggle and revolutionary war in our country under our party's leadership. They are the offspring of our people and a product of the revolution and new regime in our country. The process of development, maturity and victory of our armed forces is part of the process of development and victory of the revolutionary forces and new social system that have been gradually built in our country. It is also part of the process of development and victory of the revolution and revolutionary war in our country under our party's leadership.

Our People's Armed Forces have gone through an extremely glorious development and through many stages of our nation's glorious history: the Nghe Tinh Soviet, the August Revolution, the anti-French resistance, the years of peaceful construction in the north and the anti-U.S. resistance. Originating from the masses' political forces and from the self-defense guerrilla units, they have developed into a powerful People's Armed Forces. This is a large, modern and regular people's army composed of regular and local troops and of ground, air, naval and air defense forces which are provided with increasingly modern equipment. Well organized and trained and endowed with a very high fighting spirit, outstanding military tactics of people's war and an increasingly modern and powerful material-technical network, this army conducted successful large-scale offensive campaigns with the coordination of various armed branches and the participation of many military corps, from the Dien Bien Phu campaign in the 1953-1954 winter-spring offensive to the 1975 spring general offensive and uprisings. This constitutes a very large self-defense militia force comprising millions of intelligent and valiant combatants who have been scientifically organized

into a fighting, combat-support force in all rural and urban bases throughout the country and who are well trained and endowed with increasingly powerful equipment and superb guerrilla warfare tactics that frightened the French and U.S. troops.

Our People's Armed Forces are endowed with a very fine revolutionary nature and very valuable fighting tradition. According to great President Ho's full and profound observation, our armed forces are loyal to the party and faithful to the people, stand ready to fight and sacrifice their lives for the fatherland's independence and freedom and for socialism, and can fulfill any mission, overcome any difficulty and defeat any enemy.

Citing the exploits by our People's Armed Forces, the Fourth National Party Congress declared: The congress commends the cadres and fighters of the heroic People's Armed Forces who fought with great valor decade after decade and who, with bamboo sticks and ordinary rifles, developed into a powerful army, defeated many cruel enemies, achieved glorious feats from Dien Bien Phu to the Ho Chi Minh campaign, enhanced a fine tradition and wrote, together with all our people, a wonderful epic of the Vietnamese revolutionary war.

The great victory of this war is a victory of the talented and creative leadership of the glorious VCP and of great President Ho Chi Minh, the creator, trainer and leader of our People's Armed Forces. It is the victory of the unyielding struggle of the heroic Vietnamese people, the good mother who carefully protected and fostered our People's Armed Forces and created all necessary conditions for them to operate under all circumstances.

This victory has its deep origins in the new social system, in the past people's democratic system and in the present socialist system that our party and people have gradually set up and consolidated in our country.

This victory is the result of sacrifices in struggle and great creativeness of the cadres and combatants of our People's Armed Forces in implementing our party's revolutionary line and all guidelines and policies of our party and state in battle as well as in construction.

This victory is the result of the close militant solidarity and wholehearted, mutual support and assistance among the people and revolutionary armed forces of the three Indochinese countries. This victory is linked with the multisided assistance of the Soviet Union, China and other fraternal socialist countries and with the support of communist parties and the working class of various countries, of the national liberation movement, of nationalist and peace-loving countries, of various international democratic organizations and of all progressive mankind, including U.S. progressives.

The history of the founding and growth of our People's Armed Forces reveals that there is an entire treasury of very abundant experiences which we should fully gather together. Here, we begin by dealing only with major experiences involving principle which reflect the basic problems in our party's line for building the People's Armed Forces.

The experiences mentioned hereafter are those which originate in the fundamental spirit of the great lessons which the Fourth Party Congress decided to apply in gathering together the experiences in building the People's Armed Forces. We should grasp the spirit of the great lessons of the revolution so as to study and accumulate all experiences in building the People's Armed Forces in the past and apply them in building the armed forces at present.

First Experience

In building the People's Armed Forces in any period, we must thoroughly comprehend the correct, independent, sovereign and creative political and military lines of the party so as to contribute in the best way to satisfactorily implementing them.

This is the most basic lesson embracing all spheres of construction and combat of our armed forces. The party's leadership and revolutionary line decide the revolutionary character, direction and content of building the armed forces politically as well as in other aspects: organization, equipment, military science, military tactics and study of military technique.

Our armed forces, organized and led by the party, serve as an instrument of violence for the party and must cooperate with all the people in implementing the party's revolutionary line. All activities of our People's Armed Forces in combat as well as in construction, and in the military as well as political and other fields, must be grasped and aimed at realizing the party's revolutionary line. This is a concentrated manifestation of comprehension of the principle according to which party leadership over the armed forces must be absolute and direct in every aspect and must comply with the party's line for building the armed forces. This also involves the principle of proletarian military science according to which the military must be subordinate to the political.

Thus, in building the People's Armed Forces in any period, the party's revolutionary line must be followed and the revolutionary tasks set forth by the party must be satisfactorily fulfilled. If we do not grasp this problem, or if we grasp it inadequately, we will commit errors regarding direction and principle, and the fighting strength of the People's Armed Forces will be affected.

First of all, our People's Armed Forces must comprehend the party's line of holding high the banner of national independence and socialism. This line reflects the great truth of the present era as pointed out by President Ho Chi Minh: To save the country and liberate the nation there is no way other than the proletarian revolutionary path. Only socialism and communism can liberate the oppressed peoples and laborers in the world from the yoke of slavery. This line is like a red thread running through the entire history of the Vietnamese revolution since the emergence of the party, the ever victorious banner of the Vietnamese revolution. With this basic line, the party has correctly solved a series of strategic and

tactical problems in the people's democratic national revolution as well as in the socialist revolution (political report of the party Central Committee at the Fourth Party Congress).

The party has traced the line of the people's democratic national revolution leading directly to the socialist revolution by bypassing the stage of capitalist development. According to our party's correct and creative revolutionary line, the national liberation task is linked with the class liberation task, the national liberation road is linked with the socialist road and the national tasks are linked with international obligations.

The party's revolutionary line determines our armed forces' objective of struggle: achieving independence and freedom for the Vietnam fatherland and socialism and communism in our country and in the entire world. It determines that the class nature of our armed forces is the nature of the working class, that our armed forces are from and for the people and that our armed forces should develop into a sharp tool of violence with which to realize the aforesaid revolutionary objectives of the party.

The party's revolutionary line is a source of invincible strength for our armed forces because it reflects the objective laws of history and the just and profound aspiration of our working class and laboring people for eliminating the yoke of slavery of the nation, as well as the oppressive yoke of class, and for building a beautiful society in which men no longer exploit men.

Grasping this line in building the armed forces, we made our cadres and combatants from one generation to another comprehend it and have a will to fight and sacrifice to regain independence and freedom for the fatherland and to struggle for socialism and communism. Our armed forces not only have a national awareness but also a class awareness, and they are aware not only of their duties toward the fatherland but also of their internationalist obligations. Our cadres and combatants have constantly heightened their love for the country and socialism, have coordinated genuine patriotism with pure internationalism and have enhanced to thorough-going revolutionary spirit and the will to continuously advance the revolution. At the same time, unsatisfied with past successes, they refuse to stop advancing in the face of new requirements of the revolution and they do not deviate from the direction of the armed forces' advance at this turning point in history.

In the process of building the armed forces politically, militarily and organizationally, and in regard to equipment and fighting methods, we must foresee future developments and the new requirements of the revolution in the process of achieving the long-term objectives of the revolution.

[1430 GMT 1 Jun 77 OW]

[Text] At present, along with the complete success of the cause of national liberation and the entire country's advance to socialism, national independence and socialism have become one and the Vietnam fatherland and socialism have been integrated into one. We must protect and build the socialist Vietnam fatherland, successfully build socialism in our country and continue to contribute to the revolutionary cause of the world's people. We must transform our armed forces into a very sharp tool for the party and state of proletarian dictatorship to eliminate exploitation, to prevail together with the entire people over backwardness and poverty and to steadfastly protect the socialist Vietnam fatherland.

The present invincible strength of our armed forces derives from the struggle for these noble objectives in our country's revolution. Our cadres and combatants must uphold socialist patriotism, resolutely struggle to the end for the complete victory of socialism, continuously heighten the spirit of proletarian internationalism and must outstandingly fulfill all tasks entrusted by the party, the state and the armed forces in the new stage.

With its correct and creative revolutionary line, our party has created and developed the great combined strength of the revolution. This is the combined strength of national independence and socialism, of our nation and of the three revolutionary currents of the era. In the past anti-U.S. resistance, this was the combined strength of our country and the revolutionary movement in the entire world, of the socialist revolution in the north and the democratic national revolution in the south, of the rear and the frontline, of the political forces associated with the armed forces, of the political struggle and the armed struggle in all the three strategic areas, of the three categories of troops, of the military and political struggles and the diplomatic struggle, and of all the factors that create the fighting strength of the People's Armed Forces.

Grasping the party's concept of combined strength, we must constantly and comprehensively build the armed forces in the political, spiritual, ideological and organizational aspects as well as in regard to weapons, military science, military art and military technique. Our armed forces have always closely coordinated the military struggle with the other forms of struggle of the entire people and have striven to contribute to building the combined strength of the revolution and revolutionary war in order to build on this basis a powerful People's Armed Forces.

At present we must strive to contribute to building the combined strength of the socialist revolution and to the socialist construction in our entire country so as to create a steady basis for building the combined strength of the People's Armed Forces in the new stage of our nation.

Revolution means carrying out the offensive, carrying out a continuous offensive and sustaining an offensive to achieve victory. In his poem on how to play chess, President Ho Chi Minh graphically described it as a contest between two opponents each of whom wants to achieve victory: one must look broadly, ponder carefully. He must be determined not to cease his offensive. Comrade Le Duan also pointed out: In the history of our country, each time our people rose up to oppose foreign aggression they always took the offensive and not the defensive position. To attack the aggressors is to defend the independence of one's nation. Taking the offensive is the strategy, whereas taking the defensive position is only a tactic. The offensive idea is the basis of our revolutionary and military strategy.

Not to attack also means not to carry out revolutionary struggle. It will much less mean victory. The victories of our country's revolution in the successive movements, uprisings, and liberation wars were precisely victories of the idea of continuously maintaining the offensive and continuously implementing offensive strategy. We can cite a few examples: In 1959, when the enemy in the south brought their guillotines everywhere to massacre the people, our party launched a powerful struggle movement of the masses. The party correctly answered the question posed by history by saying: The southern revolution must continue to follow the path of revolution and violence if we want to seize administrative power. We must move into the offensive and launch uprisings and a guerrilla war. We must change from simultaneous uprisings to revolutionary war. Imbued with the party line, our ranks were singleminded. We were unanimous both in line and in action. Our whole party, our entire people and all our armed forces acted along this line.

In 1965 the United States sent its troops to massively invade the south; it attacked the north with its air force and navy and repeatedly escalated the war. Our friends worried about us. But we correctly assessed the Americans' strong and weak points and actively and resolutely attacked and defeated them. The lesson here clearly is that we must resort to violence, develop our combined strength, carry out the offensive and solve the question in an independent manner. As early as during the resistance against the French, Comrade Truong Chinh pointed out: To attack is the only effective way to annihilate the enemy. One does not fight the bandits without attacking them.

We have applied the party's idea of strategic offensive in the building and fighting of the People's Armed Forces. In building the armed forces we have ceaselessly instilled the cadres and combatants with an undaunted and brave revolutionary will, organized powerful armed forces in accordance with the requirements for attacking the enemy and formulated an effective military science and military offensive art under the conditions of a revolutionary war waged by our people on our land.

The successive exploits registered by our armed forces and people from the August general uprising to the various campaigns and battles, the different strategic attacks and the general offensive and uprising were all exploits of the revolutionary offensive spirit which had been nurtured ceaselessly. They were exploits of a military organization which had been painstakingly set up in accordance with the offensive idea. They were also exploits of the increasingly improved scientific offensive strategy and military offensive art of the revolution and of revolutionary war in our country.

The lesson learned in offensive strategy and the positive spirit must be creatively applied in the new revolutionary stage. It must be applied in the revolutionary line, the military line, the economic line, in all other areas of endeavor, and in national construction and national defense. That is why we must study military science, military art and military technique in this spirit. We must be imbued with the idea of revolutionary offensive in performing our economic construction tasks to, together with all the people, contribute to the elimination of backwardness and poverty, to the building of the country and to accelerating socialist construction in our country.

Ever since the time the Vietnam revolution was placed under the leadership of the party it has steadily developed along a correct and creative line, through different forms of struggle and methods of waging a revolutionary war, and based on an extremely rich, lively and unique military art. This was the result of the creative application of the theory of revolutionary violence and the revolutionary and military science of Marxism-Leninism in the specific condition of our country. All this developed our ancestors' strategic talent to a new degree.

Our party chose many methods from among the world proletariat's treasure of experience in revolutionary struggle to develop the positive impact of all its own forms of struggle and to coordinate them with one another, thus creating great strength. The party led our people and armed forces to repel step by step and topple bit by bit the enemy forces; to resolutely defeat any type of aggressive war the imperialists launched whether it was the old-type or new-type colonialist war of aggression; to foil all war escalations of the U.S. imperialists while seeking ways to make them deescalate so as to defeat them; to resolutely smash every war strategy and every tactical maneuver of the present imperialist ringleader of the world and to gradually frustrate their military science and modern military technology; and to persevere in their strategy of long-term war while knowing how to create opportunities and surprises and resolutely bringing the resistance forward through different stages of development and to advance in giant strides toward total victory.

It was through their grasp of the lessons in revolutionary methods, in the methods of conducting war and in the military art of revolutionary war that our People's Armed Forces were able to, together with all the people,

triumph over so many cruel enemies, using a small force to defeat a big one and elementary weapons to defeat an enemy equipped with more modern weapons, achieve victory step by step and advance to total victory in their struggle for national liberation over the past few decades. We must study and grasp the characteristics of a future war of national defense to cope with a possible imperialist invasion of our country and to develop the Vietnamese military science and art in the new stage.

[1430 GMT 4 Jun 77 OW]

[Text] The victory of our people's revolution and revolutionary war is the victory of the clever strategic guidance by the Central Party Committee, Political Bureau and Central Military Party Committee. It is the victory of the art of organizing combat of our party organization at all levels and of all military command echelons.

In the process of leading the revolution and revolutionary war, the party Central Committee was well aware of the U.S. imperialists' basic schemes, correctly evaluated the balance of forces between us and the enemy and set forth accurate and vivid strategic guidelines to frustrate the enemy's political and military schemes in each period and to advance to completely foil his aggressive schemes and moves.

Clinging to the party's strategic guidelines, our People's Armed Forces outstandingly fulfilled, together with the entire people, the political and military tasks of the revolution in each period. On the basis of a thorough comprehension of the party's line of building the People's Armed Forces, we paid constant attention to envisaging and solving the key problems generated by the strategic guidance of the party Central Committee and Political Bureau so as to step up the people's war, change the war situation to our advantage and advance to win complete victory.

In the August general uprising the political and military tasks of the Vietnamese revolution consisted of staging a general uprising to win administrative power. For this reason our party endeavored to build a political army of the masses, relied on the powerful political army of the entire people and strove to build numerous self-defense and guerrilla units while setting up a number of concentrated armed units, including the National Salvation Army, the propaganda units of the Vietnam Liberation Army and other full-time guerrilla units.

This way of posing the problem of building the armed forces in the August general uprising is correct because an uprising is generally and basically a rebellion of the masses associated with the armed forces which were organized at a certain level. It is different from the war which is basically a fight between two armed forces.

In the anti-French resistance the political and military tasks of the Vietnamese revolution consisted of defeating the French imperialists' aggressive war to achieve national independence and people's democracy and to advance to socialism. This was a people's war, a self-reliant, protracted and overall nationwide resistance. In this war, armed struggle was coordinated with political struggle and was the main form of struggle. To implement this resistance line, we concentrated on the key task of building three categories of powerful troops: main force troops, local troops and guerrilla militia. We found the source of equipment mainly on the frontline and made positive efforts to gradually build the rear of people's war.

Obviously, if the guerrilla militia and local troops were not built and developed vigorously, we would have been unable to step up guerrilla warfare as well as the conventional war in the anti-French resistance. However, if we did not strive to develop and build the main force troops into powerful and crack mobile army corps, we would have also been unable to stage large-scale annihilating attacks against the enemy's main force troops and mobile troops to liberate our territory, to gradually change the war situation and to advance to defeat the enemy in the 1953-1954 winter-spring offensive, with the historic Dien Bien Phu campaign as its climax, to end the war and liberate half the country.

If we did not find the source of equipment mainly on the frontline and did not struggle for some aid from the fraternal countries during the final war period, we would have also been unable to solve the problem of equipment for the armed forces at that time.

In the anti-U.S. resistance, the Vietnamese revolution had to carry out two simultaneous strategic missions: the socialist revolution in the north and the people's democratic national revolution in the south. At that time the political and military tasks of the Vietnamese revolution consisted in defeating the U.S. imperialists' neocolonialist war of aggression to liberate the south, to steadily protect the north, to advance to peacefully reunify the fatherland and to build a peaceful, independent, unified, democratic, prosperous and powerful Vietnam.

Our people conducted a wide-scale people's war in both zones of the country. In the north we waged an extremely valiant and creative people's war against the U.S. air and naval war of destruction to protect the north and continue to fulfill the large rear area's sacred obligation toward the vast frontline and the internationalist obligations. In the south we developed the uprising into a liberation war, coordinated the uprising with the war and waged the people's war--a wide-scale, overall and all-people revolutionary way to liberate the south, protect the north, topple the lackey puppet administration and defeat the extremely atrocious regional war of aggression of the U.S. imperialists.

We built powerful People's Armed Forces in both zones of the country comprising the modern regular people's army and the broad popular armed forces in accordance with the party's political and military tasks. We relied on the assistance of the Soviet Union, China and other fraternal socialist countries to solve the problem of equipment of our armed forces. In a short time we rapidly developed the modern air defense and air force units of the main force troops and the air defense units of the local troops and self-defense militia force. We strongly developed the strategic military transport force and built steady strategic transport lines to meet all requirements regarding numerical strength, techniques, rear service and the armed forces' increasingly high mobility.

We always grasped the main offensive guideline on the southern great front-line, stepped up both concentrated combat and guerrilla combat, coordinated military struggle with political struggle and staged attacks and uprisings in all the three strategic areas in the south. We continued to intensify the combat strength of the strategic mobile force, local troops and self-defense militia force.

In addition we endeavored to build a rear force, satisfactorily carried out the wartime mobilization task and rapidly developed the People's Armed Forces to meet the requirements of large-scale offensive and achieve decisive victory when opportunities presented themselves.

During the final period of the war we organized army corps and advanced to launch the 1975 spring general offensive and uprisings that put a victorious end to the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance with the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign as its climax.

It is crystal clear that the talented strategic guidance of the party Central Committee and Political Bureau, along with their correct and creative guidelines regarding the building of the People's Armed Forces involving the problems of men and organization, the political and moral aspects, equipment, weapons and military tactics, was a decisive guarantee for our armed forces to outstandingly fulfill all political and military tasks entrusted by the party in the process of the armed uprising, revolutionary war and liberation war over the past several decades.

At present the Vietnamese revolution has shifted to a new stage in which the whole independent country has been reunified and is advancing to socialism. Because the political task has changed, the military task must change too. For this reason the direction of building the armed forces has led to new problems.

We must thoroughly understand the socialist revolutionary line determined by the Fourth Party Congress and the political and military tasks of our country's revolution in the new stage. With the revolutionary offensive spirit, we must be resolved to actively and creatively implement all

guidelines and policies of the party Central Committee and Political Bureau in order to correctly solve all problems concerning the actual building of our armed forces.

If we can do so with regard to all our armed forces in general and to each unit, locality and branch in particular, this implies that we have thoroughly comprehended the party's absolute, direct and comprehensive leadership over the People's Armed Forces involving the most fundamental problems.

[1430 GMT 5 Jun 77 OW]

[Text] Second Experience

The building of the People's Armed Forces must always firmly depend on the strength of all of the people throughout the country and on the combined strength of the new social system.

Our People's Armed Forces are the offspring of the revolutionary movement in our country led by the party. They are also the product of our country's new social system since we regained revolutionary administrative power. The source of strength of our armed forces lies in the great strength of our people and in the combined strength of the people's democratic system and socialist system which has been set up and developed in our country over the past several decades. Thus, to depend on the strength of all of the people, on the political strength of the revolutionary masses led by the working class and on the combined strength of the new social system, to build and develop our armed forces is a conventional requirement. This is the basic difference between the popular nature and revolutionary character of the People's Armed Forces and the unpopular nature and counter-revolutionary character of the armed forces of the reactionary exploiting classes.

It was on the basis of the political strength of the masses in the period prior to the August Revolution that our party gave birth to our People's Armed Forces. When our party emerged and assumed the historic mission of leading our nation in the revolution under the party's banner, our people did not yet have their own armed forces. Our party made great efforts in propagandizing among, and awakening, the masses and in building political strength to lead the masses in waging a political struggle. Only on this basis was it able to gradually organize a revolutionary armed force. The first Red self-defense teams in the Nghe-Tinh soviet movement and the fighting organizations during the period of preparation for the general insurrection--the Bac Son guerrillas, the national salvation troops, the Vietnam liberation propaganda troops, the Ba To guerrillas, the Cochinese guerrillas and other guerrilla teams in many regions--were all formed on the basis of the masses' political strength built and led by our party from its founding to the general insurrection in August 1945.

"The more the revolutionary organizations develop and the more active the masses are in political struggle, the firmer will be the basis for our organization of the armed forces and for our armed struggle." (Truong Chinh: President Ho and the Military Problems of the Vietnam Revolution; Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi 1971, pp 14-15) The constant growth of the political strength of the people is inexhaustible and is the basis for development of the People's Armed Forces in each era. The giant strides made by our People's Armed Forces during the first year after the seizure of administrative power--from August 1945 to nationwide resistance beginning in December 1946--were based on the mighty political forces of the people throughout the country which grew and developed under our party after our people developed from a dominated people to an independent people, and from slaves to masters of the country.

During the resistance against the French the regular troops, regional troops and guerrillas and militia drew their strength from the inexhaustible reserve of all the people throughout the country, mainly the working people in the free zones and even in the zones temporarily occupied by the enemy. During the resistance against the Americans the giant strides made by our People's Armed Forces were based on the powerful political forces built on the strength of socialism in the north, including the new-type socialist men coming from the working class, the collective peasantry and the socialist intelligentsia.

In the south the political strength of the masses in the people's democratic-national revolution grew continuously through different periods and in all of the three strategic regions--mountainous, rural, delta and urban. This was the basis for the rapid and steady development of the armed forces from small to large, from weak to strong and yet not in the same manner as during the anti-French resistance, but by leaps and bounds, because we controlled the socialist north, which was the result of the nationwide revolution after the anti-French resistance.

The political strength behind the People's Armed Forces was the solidarity of all the people. This strength was rooted in the worker-peasant alliance, bolstered by the working class and continuously nurtured by our party and President Ho Chi Minh. These political forces ceaselessly developed in ever greater numbers and their revolutionary consciousness increased with every passing day. Their organization became increasingly stronger and their operating methods richer in the course of the successful development of the revolution and the revolutionary war. Just as the rising of the water level raises a boat higher, each step forward by the political forces created conditions for the further development of the armed forces.

The lesson to be drawn is that the building of a powerful People's Armed Force must be based on the political strength of the masses. The task of building the armed forces must be closely linked to the building of the political strength of the masses. Coming from the people and relying on

them for their existence and development, our People's Armed Forces must devotedly fight and serve for the people's sake. They must pay attention to continuously consolidating and developing their blood-sealed relations with the people, contributing to the building of the political strength of all of the people and firmly linking all of their activities with the political movement of the masses.

The strength of our People's Armed Forces is always closely linked with the strength of the new social regime--the people's democratic and socialist regime--being built and constantly developed in our country. The strength of the new regime is the strength of both production relations and production forces, and both the superstructure and infrastructure. It is the combined strength of the political, moral, organizational, economic, cultural, scientific, material and technical fields. It is the strength of the new-type men led, educated and organized by the party.

In our country the strength of the new regime grew continuously with the successful and gradual development of the revolution and the revolutionary war. As early as its conception by our party in the platform of the revolution, the new social regime--the people's democratic and socialist regime--had made an impact as a banner for mobilizing and rallying the patriotic masses to rise up and carry out the revolution. During the early years the new regime appeared in the form of revolutionary bases. Small at first, these bases gradually grew into liberated areas during the period before the August Revolution. They inspired the confidence and hope of the revolutionary people throughout the country, and became solid offensive bases for the revolutionary forces.

From the beginning, although the new regime was still small, it was able to provide aid to the revolutionary armed forces. It became the main source of manpower, material, money and food for the troops, and supplied some of the weapons used to fight the bandits. These liberated areas were safe bases for the troops to train and rest, and were staging areas for fighting the enemy.

With the success of the August Revolution that led to the birth of the DRV, the people's democratic regime was set up in the entire country. Our people promptly built their new state, making it a sharp tool for developing the new regime. The people's democratic state promulgated revolutionary political, social, economic and cultural policies aimed at the practical interests of the people, smashed the enemy's opposition, and mobilized and organized the people to prepare for a struggle of resistance in defense of the country and the new regime. The people actively supported the state they themselves had set up, a state that worked for their interests.

The potential of the country has gradually developed in an organized manner. The big strides made by the armed forces during the first year of the revolutionary administration were closely linked to the strength of the people's democratic regime being set up on our entire country.

[1430 GMT 6 Jun 77 OW]

[Text] During the anti-French war of resistance our party led our people in waging the war of resistance while building the country, eliminating hunger, wiping out illiteracy, exterminating foreign aggressors and striving to develop the economy during the resistance period so as to strengthen our people's force, bolster the capacity to wage the war and develop the revolutionary armed forces.

Our party gradually carried out the agrarian policy and then conducted agrarian reform during wartime, abolishing the landlords' right to appropriate ricefields and land and giving ricefields and land back to the peasants. It established labor exchanges and cooperative teams, wiped out illiteracy and developed the people's democratic culture. Thus, a large peasants' force was activated, the worker-peasant alliance further strengthened, the people's united front developed and the people-army combat spirit heightened. In addition, production was stepped up and the economy and culture during the resistance period further developed to meet the increasingly greater requirements of the war of resistance. It was on the basis of these changes that our People's Armed Forces enjoyed favorable conditions for vigorously increasing their numerical strength and their quality, received increasingly better supplies that enabled them to wage ever bigger campaigns, vigorously developed both conventional and guerrilla warfare and, together with all our people, brought the anti-French war of resistance to a successful conclusion.

The realities of the people's war waged by our people against the war of aggression carried out by the French colonialists prove that the strength of the people's democratic regime--which was strengthened more and more in accordance with the party's correct revolutionary line--was necessary for successfully building the revolutionary armed forces and for winning the anti-French war of resistance, a victory that led to complete liberation of the north. Therefore, we can say that the victory in the anti-French war of resistance was also a victory of the people's democratic regime.

The great victory in the sacred war of resistance waged for the first time under our party's leadership led to an extremely important event in our people's development, namely the establishment of the socialist regime with a socialist state in the northern part of our country. After completion of the agrarian reform the north entered a period of socialist transformation and construction, exploitation of man by man was abolished and socialist production relations were established. For the first time in our people's history the laboring people in one-half of our country were free of class oppression and became masters in society. The modern socialist economy was gradually built. Patriotism, love for socialism and the laboring people's sense of collective ownership have been constantly heightened. The all-people unity bloc, with a new class structure--the working class, the collectivized peasantry and the socialist intelligentsia--with the

worker-peasant as the basis and under the leadership of the working class, has been strengthened more than ever. Problems involving relationships in the task of building and defending the country, the task of developing the economy and the task of consolidating national defense have been properly solved by our party and government. We have enjoyed more favorable conditions for winning the assistance of the fraternal countries and world progressives.

In the south, increasingly larger liberated areas were formed during the successful development of the anti-U.S. national-salvation struggle. Together with the revolutionary struggle movement of the southern compatriots in the rural and urban areas temporarily controlled by the enemy, the new socialist regime in the southern liberated areas developed its great contribution to the building of our armed forces and the success of the revolution and the revolutionary war in different periods.

These profound changes created the basis for a new, unprecedentedly greater development of our People's Armed Forces. In line with the principles of building a regular and modern people's army, our people's army, which had developed fairly rapidly during the years of peaceful construction after the anti-French war of resistance, advanced by leaps and bounds during the anti-U.S. national salvation war of resistance. Fairly strong numerically and outfitted with modern equipment, our people's army consisted of ground forces, an air defense force and a naval force. In the last period of this war of resistance the army organization included an army corps, its modern material and technical bases were fairly large, its combat ability was very great and its abundant reserve force was satisfactorily and rapidly organized.

The militia and self-defense forces developed in a vigorous, steady and widespread manner in all organizations in the rural and urban areas. Their numerical strength reached the million mark, and their combat spirit was high. They acquired increasingly better technical equipment. Besides the infantry force they had technical units such as the anti-aircraft and coastal artillery and engineering units. They were trained in accordance with the requirements of their combat tasks and they devised excellent combat methods.

A further development was noted in the rear area's ability to meet the demands of the people's war under new conditions. The army's rear was fairly strong, and our country's rear area had close connections with the socialist countries and enjoyed quite strong new capabilities. Therefore, our People's Armed Forces were capable of serving as the core force for our people throughout the country in achieving victory over the brutal war of aggression waged by the U.S. imperialists in both parts of our country. Victorious over the war of destruction waged by the U.S. imperialists, they firmly protected the socialist north, sent increasing numbers of strategic mobile troop units to the battlefield and, together with all the

compatriots and combatants in the south, defeated all war escalation steps of the U.S. imperialists in the local war waged by them in the south, and achieved great victory.

Extremely serious trials in the war have strikingly manifested the superiority and unmatched vitality of socialism. As recognized in the political report of the party Central Committee Political Bureau read at the Fourth Party Congress, the victory in the anti-U.S. national-salvation struggle would have been impossible without the socialist north's assistance. Obviously, in all periods the strength of our People's Armed Forces and the people's war in our country has always been closely related to the overall strength of our country's new social system. This new social system has provided our armed forces with all that is needed to form their combat strength--men, weapons, provisions, combat spirit, technical and cultural knowledge, physical strength and combat skills.

Under the new social system our people have devotedly assisted our troops, who have wholeheartedly supported our people. The masses' political forces and the strength of our social system have had an impact on the development of our armed forces which, in turn, have also developed their strong impact not only in protecting but also in building revolutionary bases and the new social system.

In every revolutionary stage our armed forces have always performed both their fighting tasks and their work and production tasks. While fighting the enemy and defending the revolutionary forces they have also taken part in building the masses' political bases and assisted our people in building the administration, forming revolutionary organizations, stepping up production and building a new life pattern.

We have achieved complete victory in liberating our nation. Our country has become completely independent and unified and is advancing to socialism. It is now waging a great, new revolutionary struggle--successfully building socialism. The socialist system will create for our armed forces new bases and extremely advantageous conditions for vigorously developing their combat strength. Therefore our People's Armed Forces must positively build our country into a wealthy and powerful socialist fatherland having an excellent socialist collective system, a modern economy, industry and agriculture, advanced culture, science and technology, a strong, stable national defense and a decent, civilized and happy people's life. We must build powerful People's Armed Forces on the basis of a prosperous country.

[1430 GMT 7 Jun 77 OW]

[Text] Third Experience

In building the People's Armed Forces in any period we must firmly grasp the viewpoint of arming all the people--building the masses' armed forces while building the People's Armed Forces and organizing three categories

of troops: the main force, the regional force and the militia and self-defense forces.

Our party advanced its first correct view on military organization since its emergence with the organization of the Vietnamese revolution. The party's political thesis of October 1930 pointed out: We must arm the workers and peasants, form a worker-peasant army and organize the worker-peasant self-defense force. The party said: The worker-peasant self-defense force, which is distinguished from the guerrilla force, is not the Red army. We cannot immediately organize the Red army and the guerrilla force whenever we want to. As for the self-defense force, we probably should organize it immediately when a revolutionary campaign is launched, no matter how weak the campaign is. Thus, the party not only determined the class nature of the People's Armed Forces and the leadership of the Communist Party over the People's Armed Forces, but also properly decided on its organizational form--the People's Armed Forces consist of the worker-peasant self-defense force, the guerrilla force and the Red army. It can be said that this was the preliminary viewpoint on the organization of the three categories of troops.

Later on, during the formation of the Vietnamese Liberation Troop Propaganda Unit in December 1944, President Ho Chi Minh clearly stated in his directive: Because our resistance is an all-people's resistance we must mobilize and arm all the people. Therefore, while gathering forces for setting up the first army unit, we must maintain the armed forces in the localities, coordinate their activities and provide every assistance to them. Thus, at a very early date our party made known its views on arming all of the people, having them engage in the war of resistance and building the army and the regional armed forces.

During the process of leading the revolution and the people's war, our party always firmly grasped and creatively applied the rules for organizing the three categories of troops in line with the requirements of the political and military tasks and with the characteristics and situation of the revolution in each period. The fact that the people's war became highly developed and scored extremely glorious victories in our country proves that our party's view on organizing the three categories of troops was absolutely correct. This is the most appropriate form of organization needed for realizing the principle of arming all of the people and involving all of them in a war fought in various forms in all areas of our country in order to create a firm combat posture and effectively carry out our revolutionary methods, our methods of conducting the revolutionary war and our creative and unique military art. The people's war viewpoint is the basic viewpoint in our party's military line. It is the application of the Marxist-Leninist concept, "the masses make the history," in revolutionary struggles, revolutionary wars and revolutionary armed struggles. We must motivate all of the people to rise up and fight the enemy. As the entire nation rises up, all of the people must be organized into appropriate properly equipped military organizations imbued with the correct combat methods. By doing so, we will create an invincible force.

The "Three Categories of Troops" organization is the most effective form for motivating and organizing all of the people to fight the enemy, to militarize all of the people and to turn all of the people into combatants. It enables us to build a highly effective combat organization in the people's war throughout our country. We have both a widespread force everywhere and key forces in important areas. We have both local forces to opportunely fight the enemy anywhere and mobile forces to fight the enemy wherever we choose to fight. With this combat organization we have people to fight the enemy anywhere in our country and can turn our country into a huge battleground, a dragnet in which the enemy will be trapped and attacked. Wherever the enemy launches an attack it will be counterattacked, intercepted, decimated and wiped out.

In the wars of aggression against our country, all the enemies sought ways to concentrate their military forces on wiping out our nerve centers and large main force units in an attempt to crush our people's war of resistance. However, no enemies succeeded in realizing this scheme because their forces were constantly besieged, split up and attacked on the large battlefront of our people's war. They were forced to spread their forces thin everywhere to cope with the attacks by the three categories of troops of our People's Armed Forces and with the varied, multifaceted struggles of our people.

The "Three Categories of Troops" is a form of organization of the armed forces suitable to the requirements of revolutionary methods, the methods of conducting revolutionary wars and the military art of the Vietnamese people's war. With this form of organization we can step up the people's war in the localities and basic-level units, effectively support the political and military tasks of each locality and of all areas throughout the country, opportunely coordinate the armed struggles with our people's political struggle and combine armed attacks with uprisings by the masses and the wiping out of enemy troops with the people's struggle to win back the right to be masters in all three strategic areas. In addition, we can accelerate guerrilla warfare everywhere and conventional warfare on an increasingly larger scale and closely coordinate the various forms of struggle, combat methods and the power of various types of rudimentary, relatively modern and modern weapons, thus creating a comprehensive overall force to decimate and wipe out the enemy. This form of organization of the armed forces is consistent with the special rule of the Vietnamese revolutionary war and with the requirements and general rules of war.

The nature of war consists of armed struggles, a direct confrontation of two military forces, two armies. If we want to achieve victory in war we must have a strong military force with increasingly larger scales of military unit organizations capable of wiping out increasingly larger enemy military units and launching key strategic violent battles with large concentrations of military forces in order to overwhelmingly crush the enemy troops. Such is the practice recorded in the military history of the East and the West, in the past and at present, in the world and in our

country. The same holds true for our people's wars of resistance against the French and the Americans. As the scale of the war of resistance against the Americans grew, the scale of organization of the main force troops and the scale of concentration of the military forces in the last, decisive battles became larger. This is the general rule for all wars. Therefore, we must strive to build the main force troops and organize them into increasingly larger strategic mobile units capable of waging large strategic extermination battles so as to successfully end the war.

In Vietnam armed uprisings developed into a liberation war that was constantly linked to armed uprisings, and that developed the people's war to a higher level. Therefore, not only the main force troops fought the enemy and not only the army--which consisted of the main force and regional force--fought the enemy, but all of our people fought the enemy. We fought the enemy not only on a certain battlefield, but our entire people fought the enemy in many places, on the front and in the rear, in any place in our sacred fatherland where the enemy was. Only by so doing could we mobilize the forces of all of our people and our entire country and create the combat strength of an entire nation to fight and defeat the wars of aggression waged by brutal enemies of great numerical strength equipped with modern weapons. Therefore, in Vietnam today, we must build the main-force troops, the regional force and the militia and self-defense forces so as to meet the requirements of that rule of people's war.

[1430 GMT 8 Jun 77 OW]

[Text] We affirm not only the necessity of organizing the three categories of troops but also the necessity of clearly determining their roles, positions and effects. We must base ourselves on the requirements, the actual conditions, and the development of the actual situation in each period, throughout the country as well as in each locality, to build these troop categories accordingly.

The militia and self-defense forces are the masses' armed forces, the largest force that is not diverted from production and that is organized in all production units, organs, schools, enterprises and cooperatives in all urban and rural areas. A tool to defend the party and the people's administration at the grassroots level, they are placed under the direct, overall leadership of the grassroots party committees and party chapters and directly commanded by grassroots military organs under the guidance of higher military level organs. They form a stable, strong and widespread force throughout the country that is ready to fight the enemy with all types of available weapons from rudimentary to modern. They serve as the core for the people's war at the grassroots level. In the liberation war their role was to launch widespread attacks to decimate and wipe out enemy troops, to serve as a source for replenishing the standing army, to coordinate attacks with and support the combat troops and to support the political struggle movement of the masses at the grassroots level in the areas

temporarily occupied by the enemy in order to topple the puppet administration and win back the right to be masters for the people.

In peacetime the militia and self-defense forces, together with the people's public security forces, maintain political security and social order and protect the party's organizations, the administration, mass organizations and the people's lives and property and the property of the state and army in the localities. They act as a shock force in production and carry out all policies of the party and state. Only if the militia and self-defense forces are strong can they contribute to strengthening the localities militarily, insure a stable combat posture for the people's war and create conditions for the grassroots units to fulfill their tasks and the standing army to perform its duties.

The regional force is part of the standing army in the localities placed under the direct, overall leadership of the party committee echelons and directly commanded by the regional military organs under the guidance of higher level military organs. It is a concentrated mobile force in the localities which, together with the militia and self-defense forces, serves as the core for the people's war in the localities. It is an efficient tool to defend the local administration. Its responsibility is to launch mobile attacks in various areas of each locality. Sometimes it is required to perform combat tasks in areas outside its own locality, depending on its assignment by higher levels. It guides the militia and self-defense forces in their combat and construction tasks; supports the masses in their struggle against the enemy; coordinates attacks with the regular troops and the militia and guerrilla forces; steps up military attacks and the masses' uprisings in the areas temporarily occupied by the enemy; creates conditions for the regular troops to carry out their combat tasks in the localities; protects the party's organizations, administration, and mass organizations in the localities; protects the people and contributes to maintaining political security and social order. Strengthening the regional force is an important condition for strengthening the localities militarily.

The regular troops are the most important part of the standing army, a mobile force, the key force that fulfills strategic tasks on the nationwide scale and on the battlefields. They are placed under the direct, overall leadership of the party Central Committee (through the central military party committee) and directly commanded by the [VPA] High Command. Their organization is a perfected one. Their major task is to conduct conventional warfare and accelerate concentrated attacks with the combined armed branches and services on an increasingly larger scale in order to wipe out increasingly larger enemy units, to liberate important areas of the fatherland, to positively contribute to changing the situation of the war and tilting the balance of forces to our side and to successfully ending the war. They must assist, cooperate and conduct coordinated attacks with the regional, militia and self-defense forces.

Since we are now at peace, a major part of the regular troops is engaged in economic construction to contribute to building the country. The military strength of the socialist state depends on the strength of the regular troops. Each troop category has an important role and its own strategic position, and develops its own functions, thus creating a vigorous, harmonious development for the entire People's Armed Forces.

Only when the militia and self-defense forces were strong were we able to scatter the enemy forces and attack them everywhere, thus creating favorable conditions for fighting by the regional and regular troops. Conversely, only when the regular troops were strong, inflicting big annihilation blows on the enemy, were we able to unsettle them and cause them heavy losses, thus creating conditions for pushing forward the guerrilla warfare and people's warfare in the regions and basic areas. Only when the three categories of troops were strong could we create a seething sea of fire in the people's war, burning any aggressive enemy. That is why we had to build all the three categories of troops in a balanced manner and insure the intensification of both the regular warfare and the guerrilla and people's warfare in the regions and basic areas, incessantly developing the revolutionary war, bringing about great developments in the war situation and advancing toward total victory. We had to insure sufficient replenishment of the regular troops while insuring strong militia and self-defense forces.

During the progress of the war the rapid development of the regular troops was necessary but it was not advisable for us to concentrate all our efforts on building the regular troops at the expense of regional troops and militia and self-defense forces, thus weakening the people's warfare in the regions and basic areas, which would have adversely affected the activities of the regular troops. It was not advisable, either, to be slow in building the regular troops, which would have delayed the advance toward fighting big annihilation battles and prevented us from bringing about a change in the balance of forces and war situation in a manner favorable to us, and this would not have stepped up the activities of the regional troops and militia and self-defense forces.

The organization of each category of troops had to be compatible with the requirements of the tasks in each stage of the revolution, with the characteristics of the situation and with the operating conditions in each area and each period. The organization of the militia and self-defense forces was linked to the organization of production, proceeding in accordance with the development of the organization and scale of production.

According to specific circumstances, the militia and self-defense forces could be enlarged to the size of platoons and companies and even to battalions and regiments. The troops at the district, province, military region and ministry levels had to be appropriately organized according to each period. In the enemy's rear, when the revolutionary base and the militia guerrilla force was still small and the regional troops were still

weak, the regular troops occasionally had to help the regions build up their militia and self-defense forces, push forward the guerrilla warfare and guide the regional troops.

Regular troops had to be organized on an increasingly greater scale. During the war of resistance against the French, we built regular troops up to the level of army corps [daij doanf], and not only did we build the infantry but we also built and developed necessary technical armed services. Toward the end of the fight against the Americans we built our regular forces up to the scale of corps [quaan doanf]. After the resistance against the French and during the resistance against the Americans we gradually built and developed various armed branches in the army while building and developing the air defense corps, the naval corps and strategic transport brigades. The scale of development of these armed services and branches was based on the requirements of the party's political and military tasks, our equipment and weapon strength and our capacity for training cadres and combatants, and not according to any subjective wish.

The three categories of troops are a form of organization that was tested during the 1945-1954 anti-French resistance, during the 1954-1964 peaceful reconstruction period in the north and during the 1964-1975 anti-American resistance, both the fight against the U.S.-puppets in the south and against the war of destruction in the north. Therefore it can be concluded that it is a form of organization of our People's Armed Forces that is compatible both with the requirements for the liberation war and national defense war in our country.

Today we do not defend merely one liberated zone or the north as before, but we have to defend a whole country, the socialist Vietnam fatherland, with long borders, vast territorial waters and continental shelves and many offshore islands. We must defend our political security, social order and our people's peaceful reconstruction of the country. That is why we all the more must have three powerful categories of troops. However, the scale of organization and development of each category of troops must be studied and carried out in an appropriate manner, because there are similarities as well as differences between the war for the defense of the fatherland and the liberation war.

After the anti-American resistance, all of our three categories of troops have grown phenomenally. From this basis we must develop our three categories of troops to a new level compatible with the requirements, possibilities, situation and conditions of our present task of building and defending the country.

[1430 GMT 9 Jun 77 OW]

[Text] Fourth Experience

The building of the People's Armed Forces in each period must be imbued with the comprehensive view of giving importance to all factors that make up the combined fighting strength of the People's Armed Forces.

The fighting strength of the People's Armed Forces is the combined strength of many factors--human, weapon, political, moral, organizational, equipment, military art and troop-training level. These factors are important, closely related to one another and influencing one another. In the course of building the armed forces we must correctly assess the role of each factor and firmly grasp the dialectical unity among these factors. We must guard against and avoid erroneous tendencies such as unilaterally stressing the political and moral factors, considering them decisive and slighting all the other factors, or unilaterally stressing the material and technical factors, considering them decisive and slighting the political and moral factors.

In building the armed forces our party has given top priority to building of the People's Armed Forces in the political aspect. As stated above, the strength of any armed forces is made up of many factors, and this strength depends on the political line of the leading class of the armed forces. Particularly in our situation of waging the just war of a country with backward economy and agriculture against strong aggressive enemies armed with modern weapons, we first of all had to have correct political and military lines, valiant fighting spirit and unparalleled resourcefulness before we could surmount all difficulties and trials to achieve victory. That is why the political and moral factors were extremely important to our armed forces. To give priority to the political aspect, considering the political factor to be the basis for building the armed forces in other aspects, is a matter of principle in building the revolutionary armed forces that must be grasped in any situation.

Here we must distinguish between the political and moral factors and at the same time see the close connection between them. To talk about the political factor means to talk about the leadership of the working class' party, its political line, the just nature of the war, and the revolutionary nature of the armed forces. It was the most fundamental and decisive factor. The moral factor comes from the political factor. The unequalled valiant fighting spirit of our cadres and fighters stemmed from their thorough understanding of the correct political line, the party's unerring leadership, the revolution's noble objective, the war's just nature, and our armed forces' revolutionary nature. It is wrong to divorce the moral factor from the political factor. It was in consideration of this close connection between the moral and political factors that Lenin said: In any war, victory will finally be determined by the moral condition of the masses who shed blood on the battlefield.

In the anti-American resistance, with the party's correct political and military lines and with the firm determination that "as long as there is a single aggressor in our country we must fight on to sweep him away," our armed forces and people, by accepting innumerable sacrifices to defeat the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, upheld revolutionary heroism. They carried out the second sacred resistance with earth-shaking mettle and a phenomenal strength unfathomable to the enemy. This was the fundamental factor that created the invincible strength of the people's war in our country.

To affirm the role of the political and moral factors is also to affirm the role of man in war. Naturally when we speak of man we have to deal with the political, moral and organizational aspects as well as the capacity of using weapons and technique. However, the political factor is always the most basic one to which the moral factor is connected. Man is always a member of a certain class, a certain nation. To examine a man we must first of all consider his political and social aspects according to the viewpoint of historic materialism. To us, man is the revolutionary man. He is the masses of the working people led by the vanguard class. He has revolutionary will and capacity and resolutely fights for the revolutionary cause of the Vietnamese working class and people.

We must correctly understand our party's view on the role of man and the role of the political, moral, material and technical factors. Both the political and moral factors are important in combat as well as in construction, in war as well as in peacetime. In the defense and peaceful reconstruction of our fatherland, our cadres and fighters must ceaselessly uphold their revolutionary consciousness and socialist consciousness, their socialist patriotism, their proletarian internationalism and their combative spirit.

No matter what task we are engaged in--training, maintaining combat readiness, building the economy--we must first of all have correct political orientation, high revolutionary consciousness, firm fighting spirit and a determined-to-fight-and-win will and must manifest these fine political qualities in our actions. We must seek all means to ceaselessly improve our knowledge and develop our intelligence and creativity to successfully fulfill all tasks given to us. This is the view on the position of the political and moral factors as well as of other factors in the close and inseparable connection among all the factors that make up the combined strength of our People's Armed Forces in the past, at present and for always in the future.

[1430 GMT 10 Jun 77 OW]

[Text] Thoroughly comprehending the party's line and viewpoint of building the armed forces, we have scored very great successes in building our armed forces politically. A striking success is that we have:

A--Established and firmly consolidated the absolute, direct and overall leadership of the Communist Party over our People's Armed Forces. This has become the most basic principle in building our People's Armed Forces.

B--Built a stable and strong party organizational system in the army serving as the nucleus in leading the army to fulfill all the party's tasks. There are many good-quality party members within the army throughout the country. Many party members have become heroes--valiant combatants worthy of their role as vanguard combatants. The grassroots party organizations [toor chwcs cow sowr dqangr] are becoming increasingly stable and strong, are highly capable of providing leadership over combat and construction activities, are deeply engaged in all activities of army units and are stalwart fortresses under any circumstances. Party committees have been constantly improved; are capable of providing overall leadership; are gaining an increasingly deeper understanding of military science, art and techniques; and have become the firmly united nuclei of party organizations [dqangr booj] and army units. The internal ranks of the party's organizations within the entire party are constantly united and of one mind and rally closely behind the party Central Committee and the central military party committee. This is a firm basis for unity within the party's internal ranks and coordination in combat.

C--Built a perfected system for organization of political work from top to bottom to carry out ideological and organizational work, educate and motivate the masses within the armed forces, contribute to implementing tasks under the party's leadership and build our armed forces and make them stable and strong politically and spiritually, and develop their greatest strength so that they can successfully fulfill all tasks.

D--Built a contingent of cadres in accordance with the party's cadre policy. Cadres must be carefully selected, numerous, of high quality, and must meet the standards of party cadres in the armed forces. The structure of the contingent of cadres must be increasingly perfected so as to meet the requirements of developing the armed forces. Cadres must be absolutely loyal to the party, have thorough political awareness, have organizational and leadership capabilities, have increasingly higher technical and professional standards and be capable of firmly grasping and successfully implementing all the party's political and military tasks. Our army's cadres, who matured during the anti-French war of resistance, further developed during the anti-U.S. war of resistance. Their activities are closely connected with the socialist revolution in the north. They have high socialist awareness; a high sense of collective ownership; a high sense of organization and discipline; and a certain level of cultural, scientific and technical knowledge.

E--Satisfactorily educated our troops in Marxism-Leninism and the party's lines and policies. We must use the education of revolutionary objectives and the party's political and military lines through various periods to constantly consolidate the working class' stand and increase national and

class awareness, patriotism, love for socialism and the spirit of proletarian internationalism of our cadres and combatants. This education will instill in our armed forces a very high combat spirit, a very high "determined to fight and to win" willpower and a very high revolutionary heroism, so that they will be able to successfully carry out combat and construction tasks.

F--Determined and developed in our People's Armed Forces correct relations with the party, the revolutionary administration and the people, and relations within their own ranks and with our friends in the world.

Therefore, our People's Armed Forces have the excellent revolutionary nature of the working class, of a new-type armed force which is absolutely loyal to the party, wholeheartedly and selflessly fights for the interests of the nation and the class, stands firm through trials, fulfills all tasks and defeats all enemies.

Our armed forces have won the confidence of the party and state, are loved by our people and are admired by our friends in the world. The absolute superiority of our armed forces over all enemies is due to their political and spiritual strength. This success is the result of a creative application of the Marxist-Leninist principles of tailoring the proletarian army to the specific conditions of our country and People's Armed Forces.

On the basis of building the armed forces politically, our party attached very great importance to strengthening the army's material and technical bases and to constantly improving the weapons and equipment of our armed forces. Weapons and equipment are a basic factor of an armed force's combat strength. The more modern the weapons, the greater opportunity we will have for outstandingly increasing our troops' combat strength. If an army is endowed with a high combat spirit and equipped with effective weapons, its combat strength is very great.

Our party has always attached very great importance to weapons and techniques. Under the revolutionary conditions in our country and through various periods of revolutionary development and wars, we had great difficulties regarding weapons. We had no weapons at first. How could we get weapons to equip our armed forces? Some time later, when we first won back power, we had no national defense industry, our economy was backward and we were besieged by the enemy from all directions.

During our anti-U.S. war of resistance we received great assistance from fraternal countries. However, we were technically less equipped than the Americans. In such a situation two key problems had to be resolved--how to secure weapons, that is, to determine the source of weapons supply and how to determine the organization of equipment and the methods of using equipment so as to defeat a better-equipped enemy. Our party correctly determined the source of equipment supply: rely on the people; equip our armed forces with whatever weapons are available; produce part of the

essential items that could be produced; seize enemy weapons to equip our armed forces with; and, at the same time, whenever conditions permitted, take full advantage of the assistance of the fraternal countries.

During the first period we relied on our people and equipped our armed forces with whatever weapons were available. Our equipment at that time was primitive. During the early days of the revolutionary administration following the August Revolution we motivated our people to make contributions so we could buy firearms, and we established a number of military weapons manufacturers to produce mines and grenades.

During the anti-French war of resistance the party clearly decided that we had to seek military equipment supplies on the frontline and seize enemy weapons to fight the enemy. Our main-force and regional troops were primarily equipped with weapons seized from the enemy. Our military weapons manufacturers gradually succeeded in producing a number of relatively modern weapons such as bomb and grenade launchers and recoilless rifles. After 1950 we acquired a number of new weapons that enabled us to organize larger units and move toward victory with the historic Dien Bien Phu campaign.

During the anti-U.S. war of resistance we relied on the assistance of the Soviet Union, China and the other fraternal socialist countries to greatly improve our armed forces' weapons. The improvement of our armed forces' weapons was carried out in two periods: the period of peaceful construction from 1954 to 1964 and the period of conducting the nationwide anti-U.S. war of resistance beginning from 1965. After defeating the U.S.-puppets we seized a lot of enemy weapons and equipment. We now have large amounts of fairly modern technical equipment.

In addition to determining the source of military equipment supplies, we have correctly determined the organization of equipment and the methods of using equipment. We advocated coordinating the use of various types of weapons of different technical levels--modern, relatively modern and rudimentary--while seeking to constantly improve and modernize our weapons so as to create the greatest combined power and to defeat the enemy troops equipped with many modern weapons.

Essentially equipped with modern weapons, our main-force troops also made full use of relatively modern and rudimentary weapons. Our militia and self-defense forces were essentially equipped with rudimentary and improved weapons and utilized some modern weapons that they had secured.

Modern weapons cannot exert their effectiveness if they are not controlled and directed by talented people. A great success of ours was that we succeeded in making our cadres and combatants rapidly understand and then master the use of those types of weapons, which enabled them to win victory in our people's war.

We must now gradually build a modern national defense industry while striving to maintain the continued assistance of fraternal countries so as to solve our armed forces' problems of material and technical bases. To increase the combat strength of our People's Armed Forces, we must also correctly determine the troop organization structure, the scale of this organization and the specific form of organization of our armed forces in each period.

[1430 GMT 11 Jun 77 OW]

[Text] In intensifying the combat strength of our armed forces our party has attached particular importance to creatively developing and building a unique military art of the Vietnamese people's war in the new era. This is of tremendous importance for our People's Armed Forces, because we fought a war in conditions in which our army's numerical strength, military equipment and economic and military potential were inferior to the enemy's. We had to independently and creatively devise our combat methods.

One characteristic of our military art is that it is an art of the proletariat, a Marxist-Leninist military art in Vietnam which was formed and developed in the process of armed uprisings and revolutionary wars in our country.

As Engels predicted, the proletariat's liberation will be manifested militarily. It will lead to the emergence of a new military science, the proletarian military science. Our military art has inherited and developed our people's valuable military heritage to a new level, with a new content. It is a product of the people's democratic and national revolution and the socialist revolution in our country under our party's leadership. It has assimilated the essence of the new era. Our military art has developed on the basis of the correct, independent, sovereign and creative political and military lines of our party.

Our party's political and military lines determine the creative development of our military art which, conversely, insures implementation of our party's political and military lines, helps concretize them in the actual success of armed uprisings and revolutionary wars and helps achieve our party's revolutionary objectives. An example of this is that the line, task and methods of the revolution in the south--coordinating political struggles with armed uprisings and uprisings with warfare in all three strategic areas, and so forth--determined the direction of development of our military art: that is, armed struggles had to be closely coordinated with the masses' uprisings and combat methods had to be devised for the three categories of troops in the mountainous regions, rural areas, the delta and the cities. This creative development of our military art, in turn, exerted its impact to insure the stepping up of the revolution and revolutionary war in accordance with the party's revolutionary methods, and led to success.

Our military art reflected the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy--we had to use small forces to fight larger forces, to pit few against many, and to use fewer modern weapons to fight and defeat an enemy equipped with many more modern weapons. Our war was the just war of a nation whose territory is not vast, whose population is not large, whose agricultural economy is backward and whose army was small and equipped with less modern weapons, a nation that had to fight a war of aggression waged by the imperialists who had large military and economic potential and a large professional army equipped with ultramodern weapons. Under such conditions we had to have a very high revolutionary spirit, a deeply realistic viewpoint and a scientific mentality so as to devise proper combat methods and defeat the enemy. We had to develop our strengths, overcome and limit our weaknesses, hit and exploit the enemy's weaknesses and limit his strengths. We had to strive to win the assistance of the socialist fraternal countries and strengthen the three revolutionary currents of the era, so as to create our own strength and defeat the enemy.

The problem was how to create a posture and force stronger than the enemy's--with our troops and weapons that were inferior to the enemy's--in order to defeat the enemy. We can cite many examples to prove the correctness of this statement. Our sapper troops fought many battles with very high combat efficiency. To a certain extent our sapper armed branch could replace our strategic air force, which we still lacked, to launch attacks on large airfields, harbors, warehouses, nerve centers and other targets located deep in the enemy's rear area. We used everything from rifles to anti-aircraft guns, missiles and jet aircraft to fight and defeat the U.S. imperialists' strategic air force, and we downed many of their assorted modern jet aircraft--B-52's, their trump card, and swing-wing F-111's. We sank or set ablaze many enemy warships on rivers and at sea while they were either underway or moored at well-protected military harbors. We destroyed modern enemy bombs, land mines and underwater mines with unique methods, effectively using both modern and simple methods.

The strategic Ho Chi Minh communications line was a grand achievement in the Vietnamese people's war, an achievement of the marvelous revolutionary heroism, resourcefulness and valor of our armed forces and people. We devised many methods for building, protecting and developing this great strategic communications line, rendered useless many of the enemy's latest technical developments and smashed the enemy's schemes and tricks in his attempt to block our military transportation and cut off the air from our large rear area, the socialist north, to the vast southern front.

We organized in different ways our military campaigns, attacks and violent strategic battles, and we constantly developed their effectiveness. Each of our military attacks, campaigns and general offensives had its distinctive features as regards the art of providing leadership over strategic attacks, military campaigns, tactical fighting and the use of various types of weapons and techniques. Our army's armed services and branches launched independent attacks well and made increasingly greater progress

in their coordinated attacks involving armed services and branches on various scales, including the greatest scale of the Ho Chi Minh campaign.

Our guerrilla combat tactics were extremely lively. We used all types of weapons from rudimentary weapons used in olden times such as spike traps and stone-launching snares to weapons of the 20th century. Our guerrillas were very valiant and resourceful in their attacks. They always held the initiative, maintained secrecy and launched surprise attacks in which the enemy was totally taken unaware. Therefore, no enemy lair was considered to be sacrosanct. Enemy troops and officers were constantly haunted by death.

From these characteristics we can see some essential points that were also key experiences in the military art of our People's Armed Forces. These included thoroughly comprehending the revolutionary line, task and methods and the manner of conducting revolutionary wars set forth by our party in the military-strategic, campaign and tactical fields according to a combined strategy in order to create the largest combined strength of our people's war. This was the most basic, essential factor determining our victory in the last armed struggle. We had to use this as the basis for solving problems regarding our military art. We relied on the entire people's strength, developed the entire nation's strength in the fight against the enemy, formed both local and mobile forces, spread the enemy's forces thin, decimated and wiped out enemy units and moved toward completely defeating the enemy. Not only did our troops fight the enemy but our people also discharged their tasks in the rear by insuring aid to the front-line. Both our troops and people fought the enemy. Therefore, although the enemy had numerous troops and great combat strength, they actually could achieve little and could not cope with an entire nation that stood up in well-organized units to fight the enemy under their vanguard party's leadership. Our army and people thus created a highly effective combat posture in our people's war.

We thoroughly comprehended strategic and offensive rules in carrying out strategic and tactical attacks and in launching military campaigns and closely coordinated counterattacks with attacks after correctly assessing our strengths and weaknesses and those of the enemy. We knew how to positively limit the enemy's strengths and exploit his weaknesses, prevented the enemy from carrying out his favorite combat methods and forced the enemy to face attacks of our own choosing, thus preventing him from developing his combat strengths because of his disadvantages. The enemy had to apply combat methods that were not consistent with his organization, equipment and training. Therefore, we could launch repeated attacks against the enemy although our forces were smaller than the enemy's and equipped with fewer modern weapons.

We should also note the fact that, due to the afore-mentioned balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy, our offensive strategy involved

protracted fighting in which we gradually repelled the enemy, defeated him step by step and moved toward complete victory over him. During the process of protracted fighting we had to strive to make great strides while conducting the war.

We coordinated conventional warfare with guerrilla warfare and combat activities of the main force troops with those of the regional, militia and guerrilla forces on a large, medium and small scale. We coordinated attacks involving the whole armed services and branches with independent attacks by each armed service and branch and with the people's war conducted locally and in basic-level units. We fought the enemy both in the front and rear. We developed the effectiveness of all types of available weapons--modern, relatively modern and rudimentary--and applied many combat methods, many forms of combat tactics and many valiant, resourceful combat tricks that had high combat efficiency and that were highly effective in wiping out enemy troops, according to each situation.

Considering the above, I think that our military art is unique, creative and different from the military art of many other countries. This resulted from our revolution, revolutionary wars and revolutionary armed struggles being conducted under especially complicated objective conditions and situations requiring highly efficient revolutionary activities by our cadres and combatants so they could firmly grasp and apply objective rules and achieve victory. We must develop our military art while building and perfecting our military science in defense of our fatherland.

Comrade Le Duan, general secretary of our party, said: Proceeding from the basic viewpoint of mainly relying on men, our army and people have devised unique tactical methods of using a small force to fight a larger force and pitting our basic strengths against the enemy's basic weaknesses. Sometimes, in combat, we have concentrated a relatively strong force of troops and firepower--using a force and firepower two or three times larger than the enemy's to fight him--but, in many attacks, we used a force just equal to that of the enemy to fight him or a force that was only one-tenth of the enemy's or even smaller. Yet, we scored victories in all the attacks. Thus, our army and people devised combat methods and tactics and developed combat skills suitable to the Vietnamese battlefield and people. We should not underrate foreign weapons and technology, but we must understand the characteristics of weapons and technology and know how to effectively use them in accordance with the situation and characteristics of our country and combat methods.

All of us must think about, firmly grasp and effectively apply the correct and creative military viewpoint of our party.

[1430 GMT 12 Jun 77 OW]

[Text] Our party could not properly solve all problems related to the building of our People's Armed Forces right from the outset. We had to go through an entire process of applying Marxist-Leninist military doctrine to the specific conditions of the revolution and revolutionary wars in our country in order to solve these problems in an independent, sovereign and creative manner. We had to draw experiences from the realities of a protracted struggle throughout different periods and under varied circumstances. One period prepared the ground for the next, which inherited and developed the experiences gained in the preceding period. The success of the August Revolution was the result of the application of the experiences gained in the 1930-31 Nghe Tinh soviet movement, the 1936-39 democratic campaign and the period preceding the August 1945 Revolution. The experiences of the August 1945 Revolution helped us correctly resolve the practical problems of the anti-French war of resistance. Only with the experiences gained in the August Revolution and the anti-French war of resistance could we properly solve the practical problems of the anti-U.S. war of resistance. Our party has successfully solved problems regarding the building of the People's Armed Forces in our country and made positive contributions to further enriching the theories and experiences of Marxism-Leninism and the proletarian military doctrine.

We should also note that the aforesaid experiences derived from the realities in building our People's Armed Forces during the uprisings and liberation wars over the past several decades. These experiences, which are very precious and of tremendous importance and practical value, are a firm support for successfully carrying out the new tasks of building our armed forces in the present period and for defending our fatherland in future people's wars should the imperialists invade our country. This is because of the following reasons:

1. Past experiences. These, which result from inevitable happenings and take on the force of law, are reflected in our party's lines, criteria and principles for building our armed forces. The dialectical relationship between the inevitable and accidental in wars proceeded in a complicated manner. However, the outcome was always decided by the inevitable happenings having the force of law. The more profound studies we conduct for summing up experiences, the better we will grasp what is inevitable and takes on the force of law so as to act correctly and build our forces accordingly.

2. Armed uprisings, liberation wars or wars to defend the fatherland are Vietnamese people's wars conducted under our party's leadership. These wars are revolutionary wars placed under the proletariat's leadership according to the Marxist-Leninist military doctrine and are fought for the noble objectives of the era--national independence and socialism.

3. Armed uprisings, liberation wars or wars to defend the fatherland have a common characteristic: revolutionary armed struggles in our country conform to the general rules of armed struggle. Therefore, in formulating our army's orders, regulations and systems we must base ourselves on these experiences and summarize and further enrich them to meet the requirements of the war to defend the fatherland.

4. In declaring that our experiences have been primarily derived from armed uprisings and liberation wars, we mean that these experiences already include increasingly developing factors from the war for the defense of the fatherland and experiences in building the armed forces while consolidating national defense in peacetime and shifting our nation's peacetime activities to wartime activities, such as the initial experiences gained after the August Revolution and, particularly, the experiences gained during the decade of peaceful construction in the north from 1954 to 1964 and during the recent people's war against the war of destruction waged in the north.

5. Our experiences have been gained under various circumstances in the battles to defeat many imperialist aggressors, including the U.S. arch-imperialists, particularly under the conditions of a modern war in which our enemy used nearly all ultra-modern weapons and means of war of the imperialist camp except nuclear weapons while we used modern and relatively modern weapons and means of war of the socialist countries. Therefore, we have a basis for successfully solving new problems related to a future war.

6. Our experiences are also of tremendous importance in the international arena. They are the experiences of building the armed forces in a former colony and semifeudal country that resorted to revolutionary violence in carrying out armed uprisings and liberation wars to win back national independence and advance toward socialism. During the process of national liberation we established a socialist state in one-half of our country and led the war of resistance throughout the country. Our people and army toppled both the colonialist and neocolonialist ruling yokes of imperialism, including the U.S. imperialist ringleader. In the new era of the society of man, which began with the great Russian October Revolution, we have received increasingly greater international assistance from the socialist countries and increasingly stronger support from the national independence, democracy, peace and social progress movements all over the world, including the progressive forces in the imperialist countries that invaded our country. At the same time, we have positively contributed to the revolutionary undertaking of the world's peoples.

The experiences of our country's revolution in general and the experiences in building our People's Armed Forces in particular are a significant contribution to the revolutionary struggle experiences of the working class and people of the various nations in the world in today's era.

Of course, we must also clearly perceive the limits of our experiences in the face of the new tasks of our country's revolution. We must recognize all new requirements in consolidating national defense in peacetime and in a war to defend our socialist fatherland should such a war occur. We must also perceive the new conditions and situation of our country and the world and the tremendous development of science and technology in general, and military science and technology in particular, in the next several decades.

We must strive to study the advanced experiences of the armies of the fraternal countries and other countries in the world. We will certainly be able to successfully resolve any new problems related to the building of our armed forces in today's era.

[1430 GMT 22 Jun 77 OW]

[Part II, published in TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN issue No 6 of 1977, subtitled: "New Stage of the Revolution, New Stage of Building the People's Armed Forces, a Few Guiding Thoughts That Must Be Grasped"]

[Text] 1. New Tasks of the Revolution, New Tasks of the People's Armed Forces

We all know that the strategic task of our country's current revolution, as stated by the Fourth Party Congress, is to carry out the socialist revolution and socialist construction in the whole country. The military task of our revolution in the new stage, also affirmed by the party congress, is to consolidate national defense; maintain political security and social order; and insure that the country is always ready and capable of smashing all aggressive and counterrevolutionary acts. Due to this shift in political and military duties there have been basic changes in our People's Armed Forces' tasks.

From being People's Armed Forces charged mainly with fighting for national liberation over the past few decades to building itself into People's Armed Forces charged with defending and building an independent, unified and socialist Vietnamese fatherland, our People's Armed Forces must fulfill well the two great tasks entrusted them by the party. They are: to stand combat-ready to defend the fatherland--a political task of foremost importance--and to build the economy and socialism--a very important political task. This is a historic turning point, a very new development for our People's Armed Forces.

Certainly all of us know what these changes mean. We must all understand the new developments, new requirements, new capabilities and new conditions of building the People's Armed Forces. We must grasp the ideas, the strategic policies and the guiding thoughts of the party Central Committee and Political Bureau on building and use of the People's Armed Forces in the new stage. We must be imbued with and fully apply the fundamental spirit

of the resolutions of the Fourth Party Congress in the development of the People's Armed Forces in order to outstandingly fulfill all the tasks entrusted us by the party.

As high-ranking cadres of the party and the armed forces, you should know this more than anyone else. The fundamental change in the cadres' views on shifting the stages of the revolution and shifting the duties of the armed forces and on the new requirements of these duties has a very great and decisive significance in the building of our armed forces in the new stage.

The new requirements of the duties of our armed forces at present are entirely different from those of the past. As far as national defense is concerned, in the past our People's Armed Forces' duties were to fight for national liberation and independence and advance toward socialism. Now that our country is entirely liberated, our fatherland unified and the SRV has emerged, our People's Armed Forces must firmly defend the fatherland's independence and freedom and the nation's sacred sovereignty. We must safeguard all of our land, territorial waters and airspace, from the uplands of Dong Van to Ca Mau Point, from the Truong Son Cordillera to the East China Sea, from the borders and mainland to the offshore islands. We must firmly protect the proletarian dictatorial state, the socialist revolution and socialist construction in our country. We must defend the socialist regime and peaceful labor and construction of our country.

We must be ready to smash all the imperialists' plots and acts which encroach on our sovereignty and territory and all schemes of the reactionaries at home against the revolution. At the same time we must be prepared and capable of defeating the imperialists and their lackey's aggressive war should they wage it against our country on any scale, in any form, with any kind of weapons and under any circumstances.

While building the country, our people are duty bound to contribute to the cause of revolution and peace in Indochina, Southeast Asia and the rest of the world. In the days to come while building large-scale socialist production, new construction projects and new economic and cultural centers will gradually appear, not in small numbers and sizes but in increasingly larger numbers and bigger sizes, and there will be many big industrial areas, many big and small cities and many new province and district capitals in all regions.

These new economic areas and new production establishments will be located not only deep inside the country but also in the border regions and coastal areas, not only on the mainland but also on the sea. These will be the fruits of our people's labor and our country's great economic and national potential. Among these, the major economic centers will exercise a great influence on our entire economy and our people's fighting strength. That is why we must defend them with a most resolute and thoroughgoing spirit and with new strength and knowledge.

In the past, when our country was still an agricultural country with dominant small-scale production and dispersed production installations, even with his fierce attacks on our cities and few industrial areas the enemy could not make any significant impact on our people's resistance. However, the future situation will not be the same. In the future, if the enemy waged a war of aggression against our country he would mobilize large numbers of troops and would certainly use more modern equipment and weapons. That is why we must safeguard our country with the highest and strongest revolutionary offensive spirit. Should the enemy recklessly plunge into aggression against our country, we would have to resolutely annihilate him and defend our entire fatherland.

Confronted with such requirements, not only must we have an extremely resolute revolutionary spirit, a full consciousness of our responsibility and a serious attitude, but we must also have new knowledge in many fields. We must not be contented with old knowledge and existing experiences. We must solve a host of new problems relating to organization, troops' equipment, military science and art, cadres and fighters' training and preparation of the people before we can fulfill these tasks.

The SRV is an inviolable bastion in the southeastern region of the world socialist system. It has an important position in Southeast Asia in particular and in Asia in general. The successful building and firm defense of our beloved socialist Vietnam fatherland has a very great significance for the cause of revolution and peace in this region of the world. Clearly the new stage of the revolution is posing many extremely new and high requirements for our armed forces in their tasks of maintaining combat readiness and defending our fatherland and peace in Indochina, Southeast Asia and the rest of the world. We must see all the wide-ranging complex, firm and thorough requirements of these tasks.

[1430 GMT 23 Jun 77 OW]

[Text] Concerning the task of building the country, in the past the main task of our People's Armed Forces, together with all the people, was to conduct two sacred resistances to defeat two imperialisms--French and American. In the anti-U.S. resistance for national salvation, all our party, people and army simultaneously performed two strategic tasks: to carry out the socialist revolution in the north and to struggle to liberate the south, achieve national reunification and complete independence and democracy throughout the country. Our slogan during the war was: "All for the Front, All for Victory."

Now that our entire country has gained independence and all our people have begun the period of national construction, our People's Armed Forces' task is: to simultaneously defend and build the country. This is a very new task with extremely high requirements for our armed forces in the peaceful reconstruction of the country. We should understand that using our

army to simultaneously defend and build the country is a very great and creative policy and is the strategic determination of our party. This policy stems from the various aspects of the actual situation of our country, from the central task of our party and people in the new stage of the revolution and from the position, role and great capabilities of our armed forces in national reconstruction. This policy is also in the interests of building of the People's Armed Forces and consolidating the all-people national defense, because a prosperous and strong country is a stable base for military and national defense strength. The Fourth Party Congress resolution said: In the conditions of a poor country which has just emerged from a long and fierce war, the armed forces, in addition to their duty of standing constantly ready to defend the fatherland, must actively participate in economic construction, thus contributing their part to the building of a material-technical base for socialism. Only by promoting economic construction and socialist industrialization in our country will we be able to develop national defense industry, build truly regular and modern armed forces and comprehensively develop the country's defense.

In this spirit we must use the military obligation system to draft able-bodied men into the army for economic construction work. In our country, if the army did not join the people in producing material wealth for society, then certainly both the people and the army would meet with difficulties and the activities of the army would be restricted. Using the army in national and economic construction is advantageous for both the economy and national defense, and we are entirely capable of doing this.

The party Central Committee has great confidence in and highly assesses our army's capabilities not only in national defense but also in national construction. Our army is not only a powerful fighting force but also a large labor force consisting mostly of young and strong youths with good political qualities, a spirit of socialist collective mastery, tight organization and extensive capacity to master science and technology. Our army and people's achievements in economic and national construction will influence the socialist revolution and socialist construction, the shift of our country's economy from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production and the tempo and scale of the building of the material-technical base of socialism, national defense and the army itself.

Our army is an armed revolutionary organization that has been painstakingly educated and trained by the party. It has always been absolutely faithful toward the party and the people. It has very great creative capabilities in combat as well as in construction. That is why the party has entrusted and will entrust it with heavy and important tasks on the economic construction front. Naturally, since economic construction is a new task for us, our army will encounter problems and will have shortcomings that must be overcome before it can perform it well, so as to produce much material wealth for society and achieve high economic efficiency.

Our army is a revolutionary and proletarian army. Not only does it have the function of waging combat but it also has the function of mobilizing the masses and engaging in production. The prominence of any function in a given period is determined by the political task of the party and not by the military organization itself. Prior to the August Revolution, during the period of preparation for the armed insurrection, as the function of mobilizing the masses and fighting became prominent, the liberation army units and the other armed units of the party then mobilized and organized the masses while fighting to annihilate the enemy and proselyting among enemy troops. During the resistance against the French and the Americans, when the entire country was fighting, the combat function of the army again became prominent. The army had to concentrate on fighting to liberate the nation while also performing the function of mobilizing the masses and production.

Now that our fatherland is independent and that the central task of the entire party and the entire people is to build a prosperous and strong country, naturally the army cannot merely maintain combat readiness, but it must also produce on a large scale, considering it to be its strategic task and most important political task. At the same time it still has to perform the task of propagandizing among and mobilizing the masses.

This is also Marxism-Leninism's concept on building the armed forces. The founders of Marxism-Leninism gave much thought to combining the building of the proletarian army with production so that is most advantageous for the economy. This question is posed not only for the economic goal but also for the political goal. Its purpose is to constantly link the new-type army of the new social regime to the working class and the laboring masses, with production and the people's life. When conditions exist, such as during peaceful construction, we must strive to link the army with production and must build and use the army in a manner most advantageous to the economy.

The people's army is a part of the state of the proletarian dictatorship. This state has two basic facets, namely, violence on the one hand and organization and construction on the other, in which the organization and construction facet plays a basic and decisive role. Thus, the question of the army maintaining combat readiness while engaging in economic construction is not a temporary affair to be pursued over the next 5 or 6 years, but it is a question that belongs to our army's basic and long-term political task in the period of peaceful construction and defense of the fatherland, a question that pertains to the nature of the revolutionary army. To pose the question in such a manner is compatible with the law of development, maturity and growth of our army, with its nature, function and political task in the new stage, with the situation of our country and with our army's real capabilities.

To pose the question in such a manner is to manifest the revolutionary offensive spirit in the new stage, the spirit of advancing to eliminate

poverty and backwardness and to make our people prosperous and our country strong. Through the practice of properly performing both the task of maintaining combat readiness to defend the fatherland and building the economy and the country, our army must become a big school that contributes to training our youths into new-type socialist men who fight and produce well. This is also a big task that the party and the state have entrusted to our army.

By performing well the aforementioned tasks in the new stage, our army will become not only a sharp tool of violence for the state of the proletarian dictatorship but also an economic organization, a labor force that produces material wealth for society, not only combat and production units but units that educate and train new-type men. Clearly this is a new development in the tasks and functions of our army, reflecting a new concept and a new development of the theory of building the People's Armed Forces in the present period of peaceful construction and national defense.

As army cadres, you must understand this well and must go deeply into and ponder over it. Together with the central military party committee and the Defense Ministry, you comrades must assume responsibility for making the units and organizations throughout our armed forces thoroughly see the party's intentions and become imbued with its concept and theory so as to whip up the highest and strongest revolutionary offensive spirit on the two fronts of combat readiness for national defense and economic and national construction with the same enthusiastic mettle as during the past fight for national salvation.

The troops must consciously and seriously implement the regulations on combat readiness as during the wartime and must carry out the production orders as strictly as they carried out the combat orders. The party organizations in the army and the army cadres at various echelons must lead, command and guide the troops in their training and maintenance of combat readiness as seriously as during the wartime, and must lead, command and guide them in carrying out economic construction as urgently as during combat.

In short, we must understand all the political and military tasks in the new stage of the revolution and our People's Armed Forces' extremely great duties and requirements. We must endeavor to build the People's Armed Forces in a manner compatible with the gravity of the tasks of defending and building our fatherland in the new era of the nation, with the national duty and international position of the Vietnamese revolution in the new stage and with the trust of our party and people.

[1430 GMT 25 Jun 77 OW]

[Text] 2. New Circumstances and Conditions for Building the People's Armed Forces

The political report of the party Central Committee presented at the Fourth Party Congress pointed out the major characteristics of our country's revolution in the new stage. Let us now base ourselves on these characteristics to analyze the new circumstances and conditions related to the building of our People's Armed Forces. We are building our armed forces under circumstances and conditions completely different from those in the past.

A. All our country is independent, unified and advancing toward socialism. With an economy which is predominantly one of small-scale production it is advancing toward large-scale socialist production, bypassing the capitalist development stage. We have very great and advantageous new conditions. We have the clear-sighted leadership of our party, an experienced Marxist-Leninist party loved and trusted by our people. Our party has correctly and creatively determined the socialist revolutionary line in our country for the new stage.

Our independent and unified country is advancing toward socialism with the seething revolutionary impetus of a nation which recently achieved great victory. We have a strong, stable proletarian dictatorship system which has been tested and is being strengthened throughout the country. Our people are very revolutionary, industrious and creative, and cherish independence and socialism. Now that they are masters of their country our people can concentrate their thoughts and energy on building the country and socialism. In the northern part of our country, where socialist revolution has been under way for 20 years, the exploiting class has been eliminated, socialist production relations have been established, initial large-scale socialist production installations have been built, and an ideological and cultural revolution has been carried out. The completely liberated southern provinces of our country, which set an example of stanchness and indomitability for 30 years or more under the aggressors' yoke, have eagerly embarked upon socialist reform and construction. We have an abundant source of manpower needed for the building and defense of our fatherland and plenty of natural resources for developing our economy and building our national defense.

Since liberation of the southern part of our country our people have controlled a large quantity of material-technical bases and have created more conditions for building the material-technical bases of socialism and a modern all-people national defense. Our armed forces have modern supply bases provided by fraternal countries or seized from the enemy. We must recognize all the existing favorable conditions created by the great victories in the past revolutionary stage as well as future favorable conditions for building our People's Armed Forces in the coming years of socialist revolution throughout the country.

However, we also have many great difficulties. Although indications of large-scale production have been noted in certain areas of our national economy, small-scale production is still dominant. In addition, our economy was ravaged by war for several decades. The vestiges of thousands of years of the feudal system, nearly a century of colonialism and in particular the 20 years of the U.S. neocolonialist regime are still very serious. The southern provinces have just embarked on socialist reform and construction. We need time to eliminate discrepancies in our economy, social structure and the level of socialist economic and cultural development throughout our country.

This situation is creating many problems for the consolidation of national defense in general and the building of our armed forces in particular. Of the characteristics of our country, that of advancing from small-scale to large-scale socialist production is the one exerting the greatest influence on the process of advancing toward socialism in our country. Therefore our People's Armed Forces must be used correctly so they can positively contribute to speeding up the process of advancing from small-scale to large-scale socialist production. Through the building of industrial-agricultural-economic bases of socialism, our People's Armed Forces will positively contribute to boosting the state-run economy of our socialist state and to socialism itself, particularly in the southern provinces, to bringing about a redivision of social labor in the national economic sectors and to redistributing the social work force throughout the country.

We must perceive all the difficulties in our country's advance. These difficulties are also exerting an impact on the current building of our armed forces. We must recognize the role and responsibilities of our armed forces in overcoming these difficulties and strive to contribute to accelerating the process of socialist revolution and to building large-scale socialist production. This also helps create the most basic and stable conditions for building a powerful People's Armed Force in the new stage.

Thus, the building of our armed forces in the new stage is closely linked to the socialist revolution throughout our country and to each developmental step of our economy in its advance from small-scale to large-scale socialist production. We must conduct studies and firmly grasp this characteristic in building our People's Armed Forces in the new stage.

B. All our people have entered a period of peaceful national construction. This is a very new condition for our armed forces, which were formed under the situation wherein our people were under foreign domination and which developed in the process of conducting a decades-long, protracted liberation war. In the insurrection and liberation war we started from scratch and had to fight the enemy while building our army, and we had to develop our army through fighting so it would grow increasingly stronger. Due to revolutionary and combat requirements, on several occasions we had to build our armed forces at times when our developing national economy lacked the means

to do so. But nevertheless we had to take such a course of action, which was correct and necessary, because we could not have achieved victory otherwise.

Thanks to the assistance of the Soviet Union, China and other fraternal socialist countries we were able to solve the problem of equipping our army with modern weapons. During the anti-U.S. war of resistance our backward national economy was predominantly one of small-scale production and our material bases were small. However, our army had modern weapons and supply and technological bases, a product of the modern, large-scale production of fraternal socialist countries. Our army made great strides as regards material and technical equipment, whereas our national economy could not develop at such a great pace.

Our country is now advancing toward socialism, and our people are striving to build our country into a prosperous and strong socialist country. Only if we succeed in building a strong socialist economy can we have the material conditions for building a strong national defense, strong armed forces and a strong army. We cannot build our national defense and army without relying on our economy. Therefore we must include the question of building our armed forces within the entire project of national construction. Building the armed forces is for the purpose of protecting and building the country which, in turn, creates the most basic conditions for building the armed forces.

It may be said that if coordinating the task of fighting with the task of building the armed forces was a rule of development for our armed forces in the last war, we must now build a prosperous and strong country as the basis for building powerful People's Armed Forces and coordinate the task of standing combat-ready with the task of economic construction. This is a rule of development of our armed forces in the present peaceful period. This rule affects all activities of our armed forces, from policy to organization and use of forces, and it affects the implementation of tasks from ministerial agencies, military regions, army corps and armed services and branches to grassroots units. The standing army, in discharging the tasks of being combat-ready or the economic construction tasks, must correctly solve problems involving these rules, which take on the force of law consistent with specific duties and situations.

During the last war, because we had to build our armed forces while performing combat tasks and because of urgent combat requirements, we had to build our armed forces according to the most mandatory requirements in the shortest time so as to quickly defeat the enemy. This was a correct and necessary move that we had to adopt at that time. Now that we live in peace we must build our People's Armed Forces not only according to immediate requirements but also according to the long-range requirements of the tasks of protecting and building our fatherland. Therefore we can and must build our armed forces in a basic, comprehensive, systematic and uniform manner.

We also have conditions for making more extensive plans for longer periods, positively examining the situation in a comprehensive manner, and predicting the process of development of the revolution in our country and the rest of the world in the next 5 to 10 years, or even 15 to 20 years. We also enjoy the necessary conditions for building our armed forces in a balanced, uniform and better manner as regards structure, organization, weapons and technical equipment and for training our cadres and educating and training our troops over relatively long periods. Of these tasks some must and can be done right now. We cannot and must not be passively inactive. Considering the present situation, only by building our People's Armed Forces in this direction can we outstandingly increase their strength.

[1430 GMT 26 Jun 77 OW]

[Text] C. Although the current world situation is still developing in a complicated manner, the situation is much more favorable than before. We have entered a period that many people in the world call "the post-Vietnam period." This is an assessment of the victory of historic and epochal significance in the Vietnamese people's anti-U.S. war of resistance for national salvation. It is also an assessment of the new balance of forces between the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces in the world which has changed in favor of the revolution. The victory of the Vietnam revolution has positively contributed to effecting this favorable change.

Our socialist country has a prestigious position in the international arena. World developments have had an increasingly favorable influence on the building and defense of our fatherland, the building of our all-people national defense and the building of our People's Armed Forces.

In the three Indochinese countries--which are completely liberated--people are striving to consolidate the fruits of their revolutions and to build their countries into prosperous nations. This is a very new situation which is completely different from the past when the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys still had a foothold in the three Indochinese countries.

The socialist countries are developing very rapidly and vigorously in the political, economic and national defense fields. As a result, the international socialist network has a combined strength greater than that of the imperialist force and is exerting its ever greater influence, which is a factor deciding mankind's progress. The revolutionary storm of the national liberation and national independence movements is shaking Asia, Africa and Latin America. With an ever stronger posture linked to socialism, the national independence movement is playing a very important role in advancing the world to socialism during the transitional period. In the capitalist countries, workers movements also have made new developments which strikingly reflect the revolutionary capability and organizational characteristic of the working class which, together with other democratic forces, is dealing violent offensive blows to state monopoly capitalism.

A salient feature in the current world situation is that the scientific-technological revolution is developing very rapidly even in the military field. This revolution, which is not a monopoly of capitalism and imperialism, has also affected the socialist countries and is efficiently supporting the building of socialism and communism. It has also created conditions for the developing countries to apply modern scientific and technological achievements so as to rapidly eliminate poverty and backwardness on the basis of firmly maintaining their political independence.

Since their historic setbacks in Vietnam the U.S. imperialists have been further seriously weakened. Although they are inherently stubborn and reactionary, their new situation greatly differs from the old one. Nevertheless, U.S.-led imperialism is still seeking every means possible to counterattack the world's revolutionary movement and is harboring evil schemes against our country and the other Indochinese countries. We must constantly heighten our vigilance and follow up and study the activities of the imperialists and their lackeys and predict their schemes and acts.

The Fourth Party Congress resolution points out: Relying on the strength of the three revolutionary currents and continuing to correctly apply the offensive strategy, the working class and laboring people of the various countries will certainly further advance the revolutionary movement and score yet bigger successes in the struggle for the noble objectives of the times. In the new stage our party, government and people must strive to take advantage of favorable opportunities in the international arena in order to rapidly heal the wounds of war, build our material-technological base of socialism and consolidate our national defense. They must continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with the fraternal socialist countries and all the world's peoples struggling for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism and against U.S.-led imperialism.

Considering the new circumstances and conditions in our country and the world, we must build a People's Armed Force that manifests the great developments of the revolution in our country and the world in the coming years and that reflects the profound changes in our country resulting from the impact of the three revolutions--the revolution in production relations, the scientific-technological revolution and the ideological and cultural revolution. Our People's Armed Forces must have the new qualities of an armed force which is discharging its tasks of defending and building the socialist Vietnam fatherland in the new stage.

[1430 GMT 27 Jun 77 OW]

[Text] 3. Current Situation of Our People's Armed Forces

After several decades of building their forces and fighting the enemy, which extended to the 1975 spring general offensive and uprisings, our People's Armed Forces have become a very strong force, the strongest force

we have ever had in our people's history of fighting against foreign aggressors for national liberation. This has been the common achievement of our entire party, people and armed forces, a proud achievement of the Vietnamese revolution made possible by the assistance of the socialist countries and the sympathy and support of the world revolutionary movement.

Our People's Armed Forces have gone through many stages of development--the period preceding the August Revolution, that of the anti-French war of resistance and particularly that of the anti-U.S. war of resistance, in which they made the most outstanding and biggest strides. Together with all our people they successively defeated one aggressor army after another, including the vast and ultramodern U.S. aggressor army. Obviously, our People's Armed Forces are an invincible, new-type, revolutionary armed force which has defeated its mightiest enemies.

Since their total victory our People's Armed Forces have further gained in strength. We have seized from the enemy a large quantity of modern equipment, weapons, means of war and many warehouses, workshops and military bases. We have further improved the main force as well as the regional force throughout the country and further developed the militia and self-defense forces in the southern provinces, and developed a new strategic posture to defend our fatherland. We have scored initial successes in the past nearly 2 years in building and training our armed forces in combat readiness, in developing the economy and in overcoming the consequences of the last war. Our armed forces have taken part in our people's comprehensive struggle and contributed to building the revolutionary administration, developing mass organizations in the localities and organizing the armed forces at the grassroots level. They have continued to track down and wipe out remnant enemy troops and to suppress counterrevolutionaries. Together with the people's public security force they have firmly maintained political security and social order, consolidated and defended the fruits of the revolution and further strengthened the revolutionary administration. Together with all our people they have continued to advance the revolution.

Thus, we have entered a new stage in building our People's Armed Forces whereby we do not have to start from scratch as we did in the period preceding the August Revolution. Nor do we, in the period of socialist revolution, encounter the difficulties and lack the experience in building our army into a regular and modern force and in building our militia and self-defense forces as we did when we had just ended the anti-French war of resistance.

We can list some of the strong points of our armed forces as follows:

A. Our People's Armed Forces have a tightly organized structure throughout the country. Our system of military organization is uniform throughout the country, from the central level down to the armed services and branches, localities, military regions, provinces, municipalities, districts and grassroots units. We have been able to make an important step

in building our People's Armed Forces into a regular and modern armed force with powerful, mobile main-force units and technological armed services and branches equipped with modern weapons and equipment. The People's Armed Forces have been developed extensively, vigorously and steadily not only in the northern provinces but also in the southern provinces.

B. Our People's Armed Forces are very strong politically and morally because they have been extensively trained in revolution and revolutionary war. Placed under direct, absolute and overall party leadership, they are guided by the party's correct, independent, sovereign and creative political and military lines. This is a source of invincible strength for our People's Armed Forces. Our People's Armed Forces possess very fine revolutionary characteristics and an excellent combat tradition. They have a very high level of solidarity and unity within their ranks. Bound to our people by blood-sealed sentiments, they are imbued with patriotism and love for socialism, a proletarian internationalist spirit, revolutionary heroism and a strong determination to fight and win. They are invariably and absolutely superior over enemy armed forces, politically as well as spiritually. This is the most important factor in the combined strength of our People's Armed Forces. In particular, our People's Armed Forces have a large contingent of qualified cadres with sound political knowledge, excellent combat skills, leadership and command capabilities and vast combat experience. This is a valuable asset of our party and armed forces, the core force in building our armed forces at present and in the coming years.

C. Our People's Armed Forces have a relatively vast and modern material and technological base, which has been gradually built in the course of successfully developing the revolution and revolutionary war and building a new social system in our country. We have enjoyed great assistance from the Soviet Union, China and other fraternal socialist countries, particularly during the anti-U.S. war of resistance. On achieving total victory we seized from the enemy more modern weapons and means of war. Such a relatively vast and modern material and technological base can be and must be used to the fullest extent in defending our fatherland and building socialism.

D. With their rich combat experience our People's Armed Forces have successfully built a unique military science and art for people's war and liberation war.

Having a rich combat experience, as our armed forces do, is something rare. Our armed forces have gained rich combat experience under various conditions and defeated many imperialist aggressors. They gained this experience mostly in armed uprisings, revolutionary wars and liberation wars, in part during the war for the defense of the country; in guerrilla wars, conventional wars and even during our people's war against the aggression launched by the colonialists and neocolonialists.

On the basis of this rich combat experience we have succeeded in building a well-developed military science and art for armed uprisings and liberation wars. This military science and art has been built in the course of protracted wars and been increasingly perfected. It has been tested and developed in combat to defeat vast, mighty and modern imperialist aggressor armies.

These strong points constitute a basis for advantageously developing our armed forces rapidly, vigorously and steadily. On the other hand, our armed forces must strive to surmount their shortcomings so as to meet the requirements of the revolutionary and military tasks in the new stage. We must continue to resolve problems related to the organizational structure of the various types of forces--the ground, air and naval forces, the air defense force and other technological branches. We must consolidate and build the regional, militia, self-defense and reserve forces in a way that reflects the process of development of our national economy from small-scale to large-scale socialist production throughout the country as well as in each locality and at each basic-level unit. We must properly organize and assign tasks to the standing armed force so it can be combat-ready while satisfactorily building the economy.

Due to the long war many of our cadres and combatants have not been trained and have not studied in a basic, systematic and uniform manner and still lack comprehensive knowledge, particularly as regards modern military science and technology and economics. The level of our cadres' knowledge is still uneven in many respects. Therefore, it is now an imperative requirement for all our cadres and combatants to study in a comprehensive manner, particularly as regards modern military science and technology, economics and production. Our schools play a very important role in providing formal training to cadres.

Our People's Armed Forces' present material and technological base is mainly derived from the assistance of fraternal countries and from what we seized from the enemy. Therefore, in reorganizing production and moving toward socialist industrialization, we must strenuously strive to build a socialist material and technological base and a national defense industry that can meet the requirements of our country's defense and development.

Our armed forces' experience in combat and in organizational building has mainly been experience concerning armed uprisings and liberation wars and experience in using weapons and equipment provided by fraternal countries. We must strive to consolidate this experience, study the new actual problems that face us, foresee new developments in the revolution, and step up the study of the experience of fraternal countries and other countries in the world. Only by so doing can we satisfactorily resolve problems concerning the building of our People's Armed Forces on the basis of the socialist system and a modern all-people national defense and satisfactorily resolve new problems concerning modern military science and technology,

develop and build the military science and art of people's warfare, and defend our fatherland with modern weapons and equipment.

We must affirm the strong points of our army so as to gain more confidence and must strive to develop these strong points in order to advance our People's Armed Forces rapidly, vigorously and steadily in the new stage. We must also correctly assess the limited capabilities of our People's Armed Forces and contingent of cadres that prevent us from keeping up with the new tasks and requirements and must do our utmost, follow the correct direction and correctly resolve vital problems so as to further improve the fighting strength of our People's Armed Forces.

[1430 GMT 28 Jun 77 OW]

[Text] The political and military tasks of the revolution, the People's Armed Forces' tasks in the new stage, the specific conditions and circumstances in our country and the rest of the world, including the projected requirements for a possible future war and for the present realities of our People's Armed Forces, constitute a basis on which the tasks, orientations and substance of the building of the People's Armed Forces in the new stage can be determined. By analyzing the aforementioned factors we can briefly provide guidance which must be grasped during the course of building the People's Armed Forces.

A--The task of building the People's Armed Forces must be imbued with the socialist revolutionary line put forth by the Fourth Party Congress. This task must be viewed within the context of national construction and must closely coordinate the tasks of maintaining combat readiness and building the economy. This strongly reflects the working-class nature of our army and the party's understanding of leadership over our armed forces in the new revolutionary stage. We must firmly grasp the party's lines for socialist revolution in the new stage, economic construction, military tasks, scientific and technological development and foreign relations. In building the armed forces, only by grasping the contents of the party's revolutionary lines can we correctly resolve questions concerning political, moral and organizational orientations and substance, and questions on education and training of the new-type man, and build a material-technical base which is compatible with successful development of the socialist revolution and socialist construction throughout the country.

First of all we must grasp the party's line of upholding the banner of national independence and socialism and the party's revolutionary offensive spirit in the new stage. Today, national independence and socialism have merged. Consequently, the objective of our armed forces' struggle must be to protect and build the socialist Vietnamese fatherland and thus contribute to the cause of revolution and peace for the world's people. Our armed forces must develop their victorious mettle and revolutionary offensive spirit so that, together with all the people, they advance the socialist

revolution, eliminate the exploitative regime of man by man, backwardness and poverty, and successfully build a prosperous and strong socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

Only when the country is prosperous and strong and the people are well-fed and happy can there be a strong national defense and a powerful army. Thus we must view the building of the armed forces within the context of building the country. The People's Armed Forces must actively build the country and, consequently, build their own forces. They must successfully perform tasks both in combat readiness and in economic construction.

Therefore, as aforementioned, we must grasp and apply a law of armed forces development during the period of peaceful construction and national defense, namely through building a prosperous and strong country. The armed forces must be ready to fight and defend the fatherland while engaging in productive labor to build the economy; they must closely coordinate combat readiness with economic construction. We must make our army truly become a training ground for the new-type socialist men who fight and produce well. These trainees are youths who have been prepared by society and who will continue their training in the army according to specific military requirements in order to become outstanding armymen in the new revolutionary stage. This is a glorious yet very serious and difficult task, one that can be fulfilled only after a long struggle.

B--The building of the People's Armed Forces must be imbued with the party's concept of all-people national defense. It must be based on the combined strength of the three revolutions in the socialist revolution and on the combined strength of the socialist regime in our country. It must focus on all the factors that comprise the combined strength of our People's Armed Forces.

The all-people national defense concept is fundamental to our party's military line during the period of peaceful construction and defense of the socialist fatherland. Our country's present all-people national defense is a national defense of an independent and sovereign socialist state, a comprehensive and modern national defense built on the basis of the socialist regime. This national defense carries the fullest meaning of being of the people and for the people. Our national defense strength must also reflect the entire strength of the country and the superiority of the socialist regime in all political, moral, economic, military, cultural, scientific and technical aspects. This national defense strength is closely linked to the ever-developing strength of the powerful socialist regime and to the offensive strength of the world's three revolutionary currents.

The combined strength of the all-people national defense and of the People's Armed Forces can be built only on the basis of the combined strength of the three revolutions in our country's socialist revolution--in production relations, in science and technology and in ideology and culture. It must

be a product of the entire process of building the socialist collective ownership system, large-scale socialist production, the new socialist culture and the new-type socialist man; it must also be a product of the process of exercising and developing the working people's right to socialist collective ownership in all respects--political, economic, cultural and social--under the leadership of the party and the state of the proletarian dictatorship. We must build our armed forces in a manner compatible with the process of establishing and perfecting the socialist relations of production--changing our country's economy from small-scale to large-scale socialist production.

Relying on the combined strength of the socialist regime and the all-people national defense, we must focus on developing all the factors that comprise the strength of the People's Armed Forces. For instance, in the political and moral spheres we must insure the party's tight leadership over the army, enhance national and class consciousness, socialist and communist consciousness, and heighten the cadres' and fighters' socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism.

Regarding organization, we must pay heed to the masses' armed forces and the people's army as well as to the regular troops, regional troops and military and self-defense forces, insuring that their numbers, structures and organizational scales are rational and compatible with requirements of the revolutionary tasks in the new stage.

Regarding the material-technical base, our long-term orientation is to proceed on the basis of national industrialization, with a division of labor and cooperation among our state's national economic sectors, in order to gradually build the national defense industry. This undertaking belongs to all our people, the whole army and all the national economic sectors--not just to the army. However, the army must act as the core force, be the vanguard and serve as one of the shock forces.

Regarding military science, art and technique, we must thoroughly study military science, art and technique and organize armed forces' training in accordance with the requirements of the military tasks in the new stage.

[1430 GMT 30 Jun 77 OW]

[Text] C--In building the People's Armed Forces we must continue and develop the traditions and military experiences of our party and people. At the same time we must selectively learn from and creatively apply the experiences and knowledge of the armies of fraternal and other countries in the world. Our People's Armed Forces are new-type forces of the Vietnamese people's working class led by the VCP in the new era of an independent, unified and socialist Vietnam and in the period of worldwide transition from capitalism to socialism.

That is why we must continue the traditions and experiences of armed forces building gained by our nation during its past history of national construction and defense, and gained by our party during the past armed insurrection and liberation war. In addition, we must develop these traditions and experiences in a manner compatible with the tasks, requirements, conditions and circumstances of the present building and defense of the fatherland, with the peacetime consolidation of the all-people national defense, and with a possible people's war for the protection of the socialist fatherland should the enemy invade our country.

Our cadres and fighters, particularly high-ranking army cadres, must study our nation's history, the history of our forefathers' struggle against foreign aggression and the history of armed forces building during peacetime. For instance, we must study the way the Tran Dynasty of the 13th century built its national defense and armed forces that enabled it on three occasions to defend the fatherland, defeating the powerful columns of the Mongolian and Yuan imperialists, then the world's mightiest aggressors. There are many policies of that time that we must deeply study such as the policies of turning peasants into reservists, insuring that soldiers are skillful, and setting up mobile military units that produce their own weapons.

Particularly, you comrades must know well the party history, our country's history of revolution and revolutionary war and our People's Armed Forces' building and fighting history. For decades, together with all the people, our armed forces fought a revolutionary war and liberation war and defeated the cruel imperialist enemies of the era. This struggle constitutes a treasure of extremely rich experiences. We must grasp the lessons of the party conducting the people's war and building the People's Armed Forces and must endeavor to learn from past experiences to creatively apply them in the new circumstances and conditions of the new stage.

From past experiences we must derive appropriate lessons for currently building our armed forces. It is wrong not to know how to continue our traditions and experiences. However, it would also be wrong to continue but not to develop them in a manner that is compatible with new circumstances and conditions and that responds to the new requirements and tasks. Continuation of past experiences according to the dialectical viewpoint means continuation combined with development.

We must also pay sufficient attention to learning from the fraternal and other countries in the world. We must learn from their experiences as well as knowledge. Regarding knowledge, we must primarily learn from their modern military science and technique and their production and economic construction procedures. Regarding experiences, we must mainly learn from their experiences in building modern armies and in conducting wars for national defense under modern conditions.

We must learn all this selectively and with a critical mind. We must know how to apply what we learn creatively and not mechanically.

D--In building the armed forces we must correctly resolve the relationship between the immediate and long-term requirements of the revolutionary tasks on the one hand and the capabilities of the army and the country on the other. We must envisage the impact which gradual development and forward leaps of the revolution has on the building of the armed forces.

The guidelines for building the armed forces and the army at present must respond to both the immediate and long-term requirements. We must be fully aware of these requirements and must know how to skillfully coordinate them in order to meet them now. We will be deluded if we fail to see fully the immediate situation. But if we see only what is in front of us but not what lies ahead, our vision will be restricted. Only by looking at the basic, long-term requirements can we formulate appropriate guidance and methods for immediate tasks.

We have a long-term project which is the orientation for building the country over the next 20 years, and we have an immediate project which is the five-year plan developed by the Fourth Party Congress. We must use these projects to study long-term guidelines for building the army. From these guidelines we will carry out the short-term tasks of each year or each five-year period in building the army.

In building the People's Armed Forces we must consider both our requirements and capabilities. As mentioned above, we must proceed from our requirements and tasks while considering our capabilities. In doing so we must always think of the greatest possible capabilities resulting from our people's, cadres' and fighters' most thoroughgoing revolutionary spirit, strongest offensive will and most positive character. We must not lower the requirements just because of difficulties. Naturally we must not set requirements that exceed our realistic capabilities, either. We shall be able to meet these immediate and future requirements because they stem from the realistic capabilities of our People's Armed Forces and our country's revolution at present and in the coming years.

Our People's Armed Forces now have many strong points which can further strengthen combat readiness for national defense and productive labor for national construction. Our People's Armed Forces still have limited capabilities in certain areas. However, under new circumstances and conditions we will certainly be able to overcome them. We must always grasp the concept of dialectical development. We should not look at things in their stationary condition but must always consider their dynamism.

You comrades must look further ahead and must have a most revolutionary spirit and scientific attitude. You must see the close connection and interrelation between our country's revolution and the revolutionary

movement of the other countries in Indochina, Southeast Asia and the rest of the world. We must envisage the impact of the gradual developments of the socialist revolution in our country and the powerful developments of the world revolution in the future.

We must understand the objective law and the dynamic law of things. At the same time we must fully see the subjective role of man, our party, our people and their armed forces. We must grasp the objective law and apply it to social realities to meet our requirements. One of the differences between the cadres and the masses lies in the fact that the cadres and troops must understand the objective law sooner, fuller and deeper than the latter. From this they would know how to develop their subjective dynamism to a high degree, mobilize the masses and guide them in developing their own dynamism and making it exert a strong impact on the objective law.

In the war our cadres on many occasions showed a keen knowledge of this objective law, developed well their subjective dynamism and successfully performed their tasks. Entering into the new stage, our cadres must make still greater efforts to grasp the new requirements and tasks, the law of development of our country's revolution in the new stage and the laws of combining the economy with national defense and building the People's Armed Forces and people's army in the new era of the nation.

All of our concepts, viewpoints, thoughts and actions in building the People's Armed Forces and people's army must always reflect the party's correct independent, sovereign and creative line. The independent, sovereign and creative spirit was one of our party's and people's greatest and deepest lessons in the past revolutionary stage. Only by holding fast to Marxism-Leninism with an independent, sovereign and creative spirit could we have developed such a great strength to triumph over the enemy, defeating even the strongest imperialists. This spirit is also a salient point that runs through the revolutionary lines and tasks developed by the Fourth Party Congress. Only by being imbued with this spirit can we victoriously fulfill the task of building the People's Armed Forces in the new stage.

[1430 GMT 2 Jul 77 OW]

[Part III, dealing with building "the most powerful People's Armed Force in our national history for the defense of the socialist Vietnam fatherland--some major questions"]

[Text] The Fourth Party Congress resolution sets forth our people's tasks for the next two decades--to basically complete socialist industrialization in our country and to build a powerful socialist country with a modern economy, industry and agriculture; advanced culture, science and technology; a strong, stable national defense; and a civilized, happy life. This congress also mapped out the 1976-80 five-year plan for advancing

our country along this path. To this end we must positively build our People's Armed Forces into the most powerful armed force in our national history--the army of a powerful socialist state, a revolutionary army with a high level of standardization and modernization which steadfastly defends the socialist Vietnam fatherland under any circumstances.

As pointed out in the Fourth Party Congress resolution, our People's Armed Forces have a strong standing force, a widespread, well-trained reserve force, a regular and modern army with the necessary armed services and branches, main force troops, regional troops and large militia, guerrilla and self-defense forces.

Before discussing our task of armed forces building, I would like to explain why we must build them into the most powerful armed force in our national history and to discuss the possibility of fulfilling this task.

We must adopt this course of action because of the important new requirements for the task of defending the socialist Vietnam fatherland in the new stage, as previously pointed out. We must be adequately strong and ready to fight and defeat the enemy in defense of our fatherland should a war of aggression be waged against us on any scale, in any form and with any type of weapon. We will be able to fulfill this task because we have unprecedentedly great, new capabilities in the most glorious era of our nation's development and during the process of building a powerful socialist Vietnam in light of the Fourth Party Congress resolution.

In our long national history, powerful armed forces had existed before whose strength paralleled the strength of our nation at the time. For instance, our armed forces under the Tran Dynasty were very powerful; this strength correlated with the strength of our nation, in the Dai Viet era, which existed under a flourishing feudal system--an era that followed 3 centuries of peaceful construction. The Tran Dynasty's army gloriously defeated the enemy, firmly maintained our national sovereignty and on three occasions smashed the brutal armies of the Mongolian-Yuan imperialists which had invaded most of Asia and Europe and won victories wherever they fought. Another example is the armed forces of Nguyen Hue. Their strength was related to that of the peasants revolutionary movement--which later developed into a national movement and closely coordinated the strengths of the peasants and national movements. Nguyen Hue's army broke the Nguyen-Trinh-le ruling feudal yokes, completely defeated the Siamese and Ching aggressive troops and reunified our fatherland from north to south.

In this era the strength of our People's Armed Forces is closely related to the strength of the Vietnam revolution under our party's correct leadership and the strength of a new social system, the national-democratic system and the socialist system in many countries. With such an armed force our people successively defeated the Japanese fascists, the French colonialists and the U.S. imperialists, ushering in an era of independence, freedom and socialism in our country.

In the current new revolutionary stage all our party and people are continuing to surge forward with a vigorous offensive impetus to victoriously advance socialism throughout the country. On the basis of a superior socialist system we definitely can build and outstandingly develop our People's Armed Forces into the most powerful armed force of our nation's history. Our armed forces building is closely related to the achievements scored during the process in which our country's socialist industrialization is increased and in which our party firmly grasps proletarian dictatorship, develops our laboring people's right to collective ownership, simultaneously carries out the three revolutions--the revolution in production relations, the scientific-technological revolution and the ideological and cultural revolution, with the scientific-technological revolution being the key revolution--and builds a new system, new economy, new culture and new-type socialist men in our country. Consequently, our country's strength will achieve a new quality.

The building of our armed forces is also closely related to the vigorous advance of the network of socialist countries and the three world revolutionary currents. In the next several decades our country and the entire network of socialist countries will certainly have a new strength, considerably greater than at present. We have strong, stable political and social bases, a well-organized and scientific foundation and an increasingly modern material-technological base with which to create more qualified and unprecedentedly strong People's Armed Forces. We also have a treasure of rich experiences gained during more than 30 years of fighting and defeating the enemy. We have a contingent of combat-tested cadres--a very valuable asset. We are confident and determined that we will be able to fulfill this historic task although many difficulties still lie ahead in our country's future. In performing this task we must be very active, positive and creative. Our experiences gained in revolutionary struggles prove that no success was won without difficulties, which were always overcome by our outstanding efforts to achieve success.

The process of building our People's Armed Forces into a powerful People's Armed Forces in the next several decades is basically linked to the gradual development and big leaps forward of our country--basically an agricultural nation where small-scale production prevails--which will become a powerful socialist Vietnam; this process is also linked to the implementation of periodic economic plans and the current 1976-80 five-year plan. We must orient our efforts in the direction of building our armed forces in the next several decades; we must base ourselves on the current actual situation, the overall capabilities of our country during the advance to socialism and the characteristics and situation of the world in each period in order to formulate appropriate plans for gradually building our armed forces.

Now I will present some major questions in regard to the building of our People's Armed Forces in this direction:

- A. Organization of three categories of troops;
- B. Weapons, equipment and the material-technological base;
- C. Development of military science and art and the study of military science and technology;
- D. Training of outstanding revolutionary soldiers and the building of a contingent of cadres;
- E. Military training and combat readiness; and
- F. Building the army politically and organizing leadership and command.

[1430 GMT 3 Jul 77 OW]

[Text] A. Organization of Three Categories of Troops

Organization is of extreme importance. President Ho Chi Minh stated long ago that we must have a very firm, stable organization in order to successfully carry out revolution. (Nguyen Ai Quoc: "The Revolutionary Path") Comrade Le Duan said: Once we have a correct line and policy, organization plays the decisive role. He added: To advance from the theoretical to the practical stage we must experience the organizational stage. Organization is an instrument, a means for translating thought into actions and reality. Therefore, once we have a correct orientation for building the armed forces we must become well-organized in order to carry out our activities in the desired direction. Good organization will create the greatest combined strength. Quality increases in direct proportion with quantity and tremendous progress is expected.

Organization is a science with objective rules which do not depend on any subjectivity. In regard to armed forces, organization is a science combining human strength with the power of weapons and equipment, with the human strength as the decisive factor. We must have an appropriate organization in order to fully develop manpower and arms power and to create the greatest strength to defeat the enemy. The state military apparatus must be organized and its activities must be carried out in accordance with the rules of future armed struggle. Therefore our army's cadres must firmly grasp the objective rules in order to continually make their organizations compatible with these rules and develop the real and potential strength of all their organizations' component factors. We must correctly predict situational developments, resolve specific organizational problems on a timely basis and create a strong organization capable of facing any situation so as to accelerate the development of events. Otherwise, extreme sluggishness and conservatism will result. Thus, it has been said that organization plays the most important role in a revolution as well as in preservation of conservatism. (Le Duan: "Some Questions About Cadres and Organization in Socialist Revolution")

On what basis should we presently build our military organization? We must thoroughly comprehend the revolutionary policies and tasks set forth by the Fourth Party Congress; firmly grasp the party's policy of upholding the banner of national independence and socialism; develop the combined strength and apply the concept of offensive strategy in the new stage. We must use our nation's and the world's conditions and situation at present and in the next several decades as our basis in the process of socialist revolution and socialist building. We must correctly observe the rules of armed struggle and predict combat targets and the enemy's schemes, tricks and methods of waging war. We must use the ever-growing military art and methods of conducting a future people's war as our basis for defending our fatherland should such a war occur. We must also take into account the future development of military science and technology.

I am going to present questions regarding our military organization:

1. National Military Organization System

On the basis of the present military organization we must build a truly scientific and effective military organization system throughout the country from the central level to the military regions, armed services and branches, army units and localities so as to form a unified organizational system under strict leadership and command. Every battlefield and unit must be capable of launching coordinated and independent attacks against the enemy under any war situation. We must organize our military regions into large, well-prepared battlefields and develop the advantages of every battlefield in order to wipe out the enemy and defend our country. We must organize our 35 provinces and three municipalities subordinate to the central level into 38 strategic units of our all-people's national defense in peacetime, units of people's warfare organized under the new conditions for defense of our fatherland on the basis of building the provinces into industrial-agricultural-economic units with large-scale socialist production. We must organize the nearly 500 districts into mighty fortresses on a widespread and firm battleground where they will be able to launch violent attacks against the enemy, defend their own localities and coordinate attacks with other localities (on the basis of building the district into an agricultural-industrial structure and an economic-national defense unit).

We must organize strong detachments in the more than 10,000 villages and form both on-the-spot and mobile forces at the grassroots units capable of launching violent attacks against the enemy and directly protecting production installations and the lives and property of our people and state. The nucleus of this military force is a strong regular, modern standing army consisting of the necessary armed services and branches with great fighting strength. This is a unified, uniform and balanced military organization system under closely coordinated leadership and command combining the strength of all our people throughout the country for strong defense of our fatherland.

2. Armed Services and Branches of the People's Army

During peacetime conditions we must maintain a reasonable number of troops consistent with the current situation in order to fulfill the tasks of both building the economy and being combat-ready to deal violent counterblows against the enemy from the outset should he wage a war of aggression against our country. We must continue to step up the building of our people's army into a regular, modern force and build the necessary armed services and branches (Fourth Party Congress resolution) in accordance with our country's overall capability in the process of carrying out socialist industrialization; we must do this so that the army's level of modernization will increase at the same pace as that of many other countries' armies in order to fulfill the requirements for defending and building our country in peacetime and to be ready to fight and defeat any aggressors under any war situation, even conditions in which the enemy uses ultramodern weapons.

I am not going into details on the question of building our armed services and branches, but will concentrate on the role of a number of our armed services and branches under our national situation.

Army--The army, our main armed service, must continue to modernize, contain the necessary armed branches, have strong firepower, be capable of launching violent attacks and be highly mobile and well trained (on the basis of consolidating and enhancing the fighting strength and combat support capabilities of the armed branches--infantry, artillery, armored, sapper and engineering forces, signal corps, chemical and transportation forces). Our armed branches might develop further in the future. Considering combat requirements in a future war and our capabilities, the organizational scale of our army will certainly be further developed. No matter how large this organizational scale may be, we must attach importance to building strong divisions, companies and grassroots units.

Air force--The air force, a very powerful force, must have a high standard of combat readiness in order to defend our airspace and national sovereignty. Should a future war occur, air force will have to launch coordinated attacks with the other armed services as well as independent attacks. The air force has a very important reconnaissance and transport task, which it is highly capable of rapidly discharging. Although our air force is still young, it gained experience in the fight against the modern U.S. air force and navy and, together with the air-defense force of our three categories of troops and all of our people, fought and defeated both U.S. tactical and strategic air forces under varied complicated circumstances. Our air force's contingent of cadres has matured in combat and gained much valuable experience. Our material-technological means, which we procured ourselves and seized from the enemy, help improve the conditions for developing our air force so it can increase its fighting strength and fulfill all the tasks entrusted to it.

Navy--Our navy plays a very important role. Our coast is more than 3,260 kilometers long, our immense territorial waters are larger than our land and we are very rich in maritime resources. We have another Vietnam on the sea, so to speak. Consequently, our navy must urgently increase its fighting strength and be ready to defend our fatherland's immense territorial waters in peacetime as well as in wartime. In addition, it must, together with all of our people, exploit our undersea resources so as to improve our people's living conditions and build our country.

Air-defense troops--The air-defense troops are responsible for defending our fatherland's airspace. They must be combat-ready in peacetime and make overall preparations for the eventuality of war. Therefore they must raise their capabilities to a much higher level than that attained during the anti-U.S. period so as to meet the requirements of their new tasks under new conditions. There will be some changes in our economic structure in the future, and many large industrial and population centers will have to be defended. Our enemy devoted a great deal of attention to developing its air power and to launching sudden attacks on our important areas. Therefore the air-defense force must be further developed and must become increasingly stronger. Coordination must be achieved among the air force, missile, anti-aircraft and radar troops and the widespread anti-aircraft network of the regional armed forces. If our armed services and branches are harmoniously developed and are gradually and uniformly perfected, the fighting strength of our people's army will take on a new quality.

[1430 GMT 4 Jul 77 OW]

[Text] 3. Regional Forces of the Provinces, Municipalities Subordinate to the Central Level, and Districts

In the new revolutionary stage and in any future war for the defense of our fatherland, the requirements for defending the localities are very great. However, the localities' capabilities will increasingly develop during the course of the socialist revolution and building socialism, and as a result the position of the regional armed forces will develop accordingly.

A province covers a large area, and many have fairly large populations of some 2 million people. The provincial industrial-agricultural economy is gradually taking shape. The municipalities subordinate to the central level are being comprehensively consolidated and developed. The district is occupying an increasingly important position within the national economic system and the national defense system, and is being gradually built into an agricultural-industrial economic unit. Thus the provinces, municipalities and districts will have increasingly greater capabilities for providing the manpower and material resources for building the armed forces in general and the regional force in their own localities, in particular. We can and must build the provinces and the municipalities into

strategic units of the all-people's national defense and build the districts into strong fortresses within the national military organization.

Considering the aforesaid situation, we can and must build the regional forces of the provinces, the municipalities and the districts into comprehensively strong armed forces for defending the localities and positively contributing to national defense. The regional force is part of the standing army, and its building and training must be carried out according to the people's army regulations. This force must be appropriately standardized and modernized. Its main task is to fight locally in defense of the localities, and in many ways it is linked with the localities. We must base ourselves on the characteristics, situation, conditions and position of each locality in building this force while developing all-people's national defense for defending the localities--one of the tasks in the national defense undertaking. We must develop the various localities' advantages as regards their terrain and positions in building the regional forces of the provinces, the municipalities and the districts within the national defense system. These localities are situated in the delta, coastal or mountain areas. Some localities must defend our country's borders while others have to defend our territorial waters and offshore islands. Some districts are situated in strategic positions in the event of a future war. Consequently, in building the regional forces of the provinces, the municipalities and the districts, we must base ourselves on the actual situation and specific duties of each locality so as to organize the units in line with the conditions in each locality. In localities with large maritime areas or numerous waterways to defend, we must conduct studies and form combat forces to fight on rivers and at sea--coastal and river combat forces.

The military training of the regional force must be aimed at turning it into a crack force that can fight well within each locality, fight well independently and satisfactorily launch coordinated attacks with strategic mobile forces. The regional force, which is also an assault force in production in the localities, must positively carry out its economic building task in the localities, contribute to advancing the local economies from small-scale to large-scale socialist production and resolve its own problems step by step as regards food, clothing, housing facilities, repairs of weapons and equipment.

We are confident that, if we have a correct view and an appropriate organization of the regional force and if this force is given satisfactory military and political training and satisfactorily forged during the course of fulfilling the two political tasks of the army, it will develop tremendously, will be endowed with considerable new capabilities and will be able to serve as the firm core of the armed forces of the provinces, municipalities and districts in firmly defending the localities, contribute to developing the local economies and to fulfilling its other duties and tasks.

4. The Militia, Self-Defense and Reserve Forces

We must have a correct viewpoint on the development of our entire country as well as of each locality over the next several decades so as to correctly resolve problems related to the building of our militia and self-defense forces as they are the armed forces of the masses and are closely connected with production and the process of building large-scale socialist production, the socialist collective ownership system and a new culture and the process of building and developing new-type socialist men. Therefore, the building of the militia and self-defense forces must be based on the achievements scored during the course of carrying out three revolutions, the increased population, the shaping of a new economic structure in the entire country as well as in each locality and grassroots unit, the division of labor in the national economic sectors and the redistribution of the work force throughout the country. This work must be aimed at meeting requirements in peacetime as well as in wartime. Any future war for the defense of our socialist fatherland will not be an armed uprising type or like the last liberation war. We must follow closely the developmental steps in carrying out the socialist revolution and building socialism throughout the country in each locality and grassroots unit so that we will constantly be able to positively and promptly resolve new problems arising from the tasks of building the militia, self-defense and reserve forces.

In peacetime, the militia and self-defense forces must be combat-ready to defend the localities and serve as an assault force in production. Therefore, we must develop the strength of military organizations engaged in production so as to achieve high productivity, particularly on the agricultural front where outstanding progress must be made. Many localities have been able to achieve this end. The militia and self-defense forces must take part in maintaining public order and security in the localities and production installations. In wartime these forces, together with the regional force, serve as the core of our entire people's force in the fight to defend the localities. Considering this weighty task, the militia and self-defense forces must be up to proper numerical strength. In the northern provinces, only after a long period of peaceful construction and a long war against the United States under the socialist system do we have a large number of quality militia and self-defense corpsmen. In the southern provinces, the militia and self-defense forces and militia guerrilla force were built during the war for national salvation and since the complete liberation of the south. We are confident that, with our compatriots' patriotism and love of socialism, and after various steps in behalf of socialist reform and construction and the building and consolidation of the political base among the masses in the urban and rural areas, we will be able gradually to enlarge the contingent of our militia and self-defense forces and to improve their quality so as to create the harmonious and uniform development of the armed forces of the masses throughout the country.

If we organize about 10 percent of our population into militia and self-defense forces, we will have an unprecedentedly great militia and self-defense force in our country, a mammoth force of tremendous strength that will be utilized for fighting and wiping out the enemy, defending our grassroots units and maintaining public order and security. This force will serve as an assault force in production in grassroots units and the reserve force for our people's army and, together with a well-trained regular and modern standing army, will form an invincible military force capable of wiping out any aggressor and steadfastly defending the independence and freedom of our socialist fatherland.

At present, agricultural workers make up the majority of our country's workers with a comparatively small number of industrial workers, while the number of militiamen in general is larger than that of the self-defense force. However, in the next several decades, the opposite will be true. Due to our national economic development, the industrial-agricultural structure will gradually be built and the number of industrial workers will gradually increase and work in the agricultural sector and in rural areas as well. In the future, we probably should not differentiate the militia force from the self-defense force, but instead should use the common term "militia" to designate these forces and distinguish them from the army. The organization of the militia and self-defense forces in general must be flexible and go up to the battalion and regimental levels. At present, in a number of localities, village-size cooperatives have organized militia companies with specialized production teams. At the districts' concentrated production units, the organization of the militia force has reached the battalion level. This organizational method has enabled us to have better militia forces capable of assuming more important tasks.

In order to militarize the militia force organizationally and to streamline the leadership and command over production work or to enable the militia force to assume great projects, we can organize the militia force into divisions. This is a method of using military organizations to increase productivity under our country's present conditions.

[1430 GMT 5 Jul 77 OW]

[Text] With the districts reorganizing production and becoming agricultural-industrial or forestry-agricultural-industrial economic units and utilizing machinery in agriculture, there are not only production cooperatives of different trades and crafts in the districts but agricultural and engineering clusters directly supporting agricultural production. Thanks to this, the militia and self-defense forces are growing in number, quality and scale and may be organized into battalions, regiments or larger units.

We must continue to study the organization of forces to make them compatible with large cooperatives and production clusters of districts so that we may be able to set up stronger mobile forces on a district-wide scale.

We can organize large self-defense forces in developing factories, construction sites, state farms, industrial centers and cities to act as the core and assault force in production and in combat readiness for the defense of production installations and the regions. Many factories, enterprises, construction sites and mines have organized self-defense regiments.

The organization of the militia and self-defense forces according to the aforementioned scale not only facilitates their training and use for production during peacetime, but helps their use for combat according to an appropriate scale during wartime. This matter is closely linked to the fighting method of militia and self-defense forces during the War for the Defense of the Fatherland, which we must continue to study. What is important is that we must preserve the militia and self-defense forces' nature of being the armed forces of the masses. That is why we must closely combine the militia and self-defense forces with production in a manner compatible with the structure of production organization and must develop them according to the development of production from small-scale to large-scale socialist production. We must not turn the militia and self-defense forces into regional troops.

With the nationwide reorganization of labor, the militia and self-defense forces will be broadly and rationally organized in all regions of the fatherland--from the borders to the offshore islands, and from the mountainous areas to the deltas, cities and coastal areas. They will be appropriately organized according to different organizational scales to become stable on-the-spot forces to defend the regions.

We must also properly study the equipment for the militia and self-defense forces. Peacetime equipment is different from wartime equipment. Since the different regions--those in the lowlands and highlands, in the coastal and mountainous areas--have different tasks, their equipment must differ. The militia and self-defense forces can utilize mechanical and semimechanical work tools of the provinces and the modern work tools of large and small factories to repair their equipment and weapons.

The fighting strength of the militia and self-defense forces will be greater thanks to their rising numbers, their large-scale and tight organization and their suitable equipment and weapons. Even during peacetime, the militia and self-defense forces will be a major force directly supporting production, particularly in helping agriculture develop thoroughly, powerfully and steadily. For instance, Nam Ninh District has four militia regiments engaged in water conservancy, land improvement, communications and transport and mechanized work.

Well organized, the militia and self-defense forces will become a large reserve force having a scientific organization compatible with the requirements of a future war. Thus, by closely combining the economy with national defense--within the spheres of the districts, provinces and related cities--

we will be able to rely on the militia and self-defense forces and the regional troops of the provinces, cities and districts and on the all-round strength of the agricultural-industrial economy of the districts and the industrial-agricultural economy of the provinces to turn the nearly 500 districts of the whole country into bastions of socialism and turn the country's 35 provinces and 3 municipalities under the central level into strategic units of the all-people national defense in peacetime or in a possible people's war for the defense of the fatherland should the enemy invade our country. These are major problems which we must gradually and creatively resolve in our current regional military tasks in accordance with the development of economic construction and national construction in the regions.

During peacetime, no matter how strong the standing force may be, the reserve force cannot be as large as during wartime. That is why we must have a really powerful reserve force with large numbers and high quality, a force ready to meet the requirements for expanding the armed forces levied by a future war. The reserve force must meet the requirements for expanding the branches and services of the regular and modern people's army. It includes millions of reserve combatants belonging to the militia and self-defense forces in various localities; hundreds of thousands of reserve officers and noncommissioned officers and technical cadres, and personnel belonging to different sectors of the national economy and agencies of the proletarian dictatorship system.

Due to the requirements for expanding the strength of technical branches and services, the composition of technical cadres and personnel and officers, noncommissioned officers and combatants possessing specialized technical knowledge must increase with every passing day. The powerful development of the sectors of the national economy will further increase both the numbers and quality of this contingent and will help it acquire all required skills so that it may be mobilized into the army when necessary.

We must rely on the training by the various sectors of the national economy, state agencies, colleges, vocational middle schools and trade schools to build and organize a reserve force to meet these requirements. The reserve force must be well trained, tightly organized and managed and scientifically recruited so that we will be able to mobilize it as quickly as possible and to use each person according to his specialty and professional skill when the occasion arises. The training, organization and management of the reserve force must be regulated by a system and state law requiring strict compliance by all persons and organizations.

We are applying the system of peacetime military obligation coordinated with the system of the army engaging in economic work. We must study and supplement the military obligation law and the systems and policies necessary for troops recruitment and military discharge, thus further disciplining the implementation of military obligation. On the other hand,

we must institute universal military education among all the people, set up military training in schools and step up the national-defense sports and physical exercise movement in order to prepare all the people for their national defense obligation and incessantly strengthen the abundant reserve force for the people's army.

The consolidation and strengthening of the district and provincial levels in the military field must be carried out at a pressing pace. The military organizations in the regions and state branches are responsible for directing the organization, training and management of the reserve force, acting as staff for party committee echelons and organizing wartime mobilization.

[1430 GMT 6 Jul 77 OW]

[Text] B. Weapons, Equipment and Material-Technical Base

We must strive to build a modern national defense industry to gradually resolve the question of building a material-technical base for the defense of the fatherland. In the immediate future as well as in the years to come we must endeavor to maintain and develop the existing technical equipment to create new fighting strength for our armed forces. In the course of the country's socialist industrialization the Vietnamese People's Armed Forces and the SRV's modern and regular people's army must gradually rely on a modern national defense industry to resolve the question of building a material-technical base. This is a development of historical significance for our troops. This is a reflection of our independent, sovereign and self-reliant spirit in the task of building the army and consolidating our national defense.

1. Building a Modern National Defense Industry in Accordance With the Resolution of the Fourth Party Congress To Resolve the Question of Building a Modern Material-Technical Base for the Defense of the Fatherland

We must exert efforts so that by closely combining the forces inside and outside the army, relying mainly on our own strength and achieving international cooperation, we will build a modern national defense industry within a relatively short period of time. Our task of building a modern national defense industry is closely linked to the task of industrializing the country, as set forth by the Fourth Party Congress: to basically build, within 20 years, the material-technical base of socialism. This is a task of all the people and all state economic sectors. However, the army must make an important contribution and take charge of modernization.

Our modern equipment must be suitable to our terrain, weather, human factors and our highly efficient fighting method. It must help develop to the highest degree the outstanding and skilled Vietnamese combatant's intelligence and bravery in order to create the highest efficiency at the least expense. This equipment and these weapons must aim at gradually increasing our People's Armed Forces' firepower, assault strength and mobility.

Our people have a tradition of producing fine weapons. Our forefathers relied on technical advances in copper smelting to produce copper weapons, for instance the Co Loa copper arrow [legendary weapon of the year 257 BC], and in iron smelting to produce iron weapons. The Tran [13th century king] Dynasty had firearms, the Ho [13th century king] Dynasty its own guns. Nguyen Hue had gunboats of large tonnage, capable of transporting hundreds of elephants and cannons.

In our era, by bringing our country's industry to the modern world's level, we will certainly be able to gradually advance in building our modern national defense industry. Our success in performing this task will be based on the development of our country's economy in the next few decades and on our abundant labor force of tens of millions of people including outstanding scientific and technical cadres and numerous skilled technical workers that we now have or will train. It will also be based on our country's rich and latent resources which we will exploit and on the fraternal socialist countries' assistance and cooperation.

Even during the past war, we did not cease to develop our contingents of well-informed scientific and technical cadres and of technical cadres and workers in the various sectors of the state and the army. If we continue to positively train such contingents through appropriate policies, we will certainly be able, within 15-20 years, to increase both their numbers and quality to meet the requirements for modernizing the economy in general and for modernizing the all-people national defense and our People's Armed Forces in particular. We must rely on our people's positive spirit and creativity and find many ways and means to achieve our objective, and we must do this at all costs. On this matter as well as on many other matters, we must do some good thinking and have a perspective that is compatible with the objective requirements both for the immediate and the distant future. Only by so doing will we succeed in grasping the resolutions of the party congress in our actions.

2. Maintaining Well, Using Properly and Developing the Efficiency of All Existing Kinds of Weapons and Equipment in the Immediate Future

Most of our modern equipment, weapons and material-technical installations were acquired from the fraternal countries during the war or through seizure from the enemy. We must use them well to ensure our training, combat readiness and economic construction. We must recover, assess and classify them in order to formulate plans for their repair, storage and use. We must maintain well everything necessary for combat readiness and daily training, develop its efficiency and use it in a most thrifty manner. We must preserve well everything to be kept for future fighting, making sure it does not get damaged or lose its effectiveness. We must develop the efficiency of any equipment that can be used for economic construction to rapidly produce material wealth for society.

3. Building a Modern Military Material-Technical Base to Effectively Carry Out All Peacetime Activities and To Be Ready To Meet Wartime Requirements

This material-technical base comprises the system of naval, ground, air force and air defense bases; national defense sites and projects; and the system of modern command posts, information and communications centers, strategic roads, installations and warehouses which insure our logistic needs and strategic reserves. To a certain extent we already have such a base. Proceeding from the requirements of defending the fatherland now and in the future and on the basis of the achievements made in developing the national economy and the relationship between the economy and national defense, we must utilize to the fullest, readjust, supplement and reform the old base and build a new one with a view to creating a unified, rational and perfect system of material-technical bases throughout the country. This is a major problem and a very important task which we must positively study and gradually fulfill.

[1430 GMT 7 Jul 77 OW]

[Text] C. Development of Military Science and Art and the Study of Military Science and Technology

Our political and military tasks in the new stage demand that we raise the development of military science and art to a new level and, at the same time, pay attention to studying and developing military science and technology.

Under the party's correct leadership--during 30 years of armed uprisings and liberation wars--we have succeeded in building a superior revolutionary military science and art in Vietnam: Marxist-Leninist military science and art. Its tremendous strength was strikingly manifested in the great victories we scored in the two wars of resistance against the French and Americans. This was mainly a military science and art of armed uprisings and liberation wars waged to win back the independence and reunification of our fatherland and pave the way for our entire country to advance to socialism. Today, faced with the political and military tasks in the new stage, we must develop military science and art to a new level, positively study the latest inventions of modern military science and technology and build a military science and art to defend our independent, reunified and socialist Vietnam fatherland. This is a great task involving many new questions that we need time to study before reaching a conclusion.

This military science and art must also be constantly developed so that we can keep up with the development of the situation in our country and the world. It must contribute to resolving from a theoretical aspect problems involving some basic objectives, such as the theories about building a strong, stable all-people's national defense in the socialist Vietnam

fatherland; about building a People's Armed Force on the basis of socialism; and about the preparations for and conduct of a people's war under modern conditions to protect the socialist Vietnam fatherland. All of this is aimed at enabling us to be ready to frustrate all sabotage and aggressive schemes of our internal and external enemies; to steadfastly defend the socialist Vietnam fatherland during the period of peaceful national construction as well as any time the enemy wages a war of aggression against our country; and to contribute to the revolutionary undertaking of the world's people. In order to satisfactorily resolve these problems, we must thoroughly comprehend the party's political and military lines in the new revolutionary stage set forth by the Fourth Party Congress. We must conduct studies to firmly grasp the combat targets and the overall situation of our country. We must base our actions on our consolidated experiences and, at the same time, selectively study the experiences in building national defense and in conducting wars for the defense of the socialist fatherland by fraternal socialist countries, as well as the experiences of the rest of the world's people.

As in previous people's wars, while developing the theory of our all-people's national defense and war for defense of our socialist fatherland, we must uphold the spirit of independence and sovereignty and must be very creative. The military science and art used in defense of our socialist Vietnam fatherland definitely must be a product of the wisdom of our party, our people, our armed forces and our contingent of cadres engaged in the study of military science.

One of the important aspects of the task of consolidating experiences is to find the similarities and differences between the liberation war and the war for defense of the fatherland in our country. Only by so doing can we vividly recognize experiences of lasting significance, which take on the force of law, and strive to take full advantage of and develop them to resolve problems arising from new tasks. We must also realize more vividly the new requirements and objectives in the new stage.

The past national liberation wars or future wars waged to defend our fatherland, although conducted under modern conditions, are people's wars carried on under our party's leadership. The Vietnam people's war has common rules that also apply to the liberation war and the war for defense of the country, such as the rule on developing the strength of all of the people and the entire country; the rule of mainly relying on one's own strength while striving to gain international support and assistance; the rule of fighting the enemy wherever he appears, fighting him with all suitable methods and on all levels, coordinating conventional warfare with guerrilla warfare, thoroughly understanding the strategic offensive spirit and so forth.

Although the liberation war and the war for defense of the socialist fatherland are just wars, they differ from each other in certain ways. Marxism-Leninism analyzes not only the nature of war, the characteristics of war--

both just and unjust--but also different types of wars--national liberation war, revolutionary civil war, a combination of national liberation war and revolutionary civil war, war for defense of the fatherland and war waged among the imperialists. In differentiating among the different types of war, we want to further determine in a more specific manner the nature and characteristics of war and determine our specific attitude toward a specific war so as to apply a specific method of conducting war and a specific art of leadership compatible with this type of war. We can enumerate the following differences between the liberation war and the war for defense of the fatherland:

With regard to specific objectives, the liberation war is waged to win back the independence of a country occupied and dominated by the enemy and to liberate the nation. The war for defense of the country is waged in defense of the independence of a country in which the people are masters against a war of aggression waged by the enemy. We should note that the defense of the socialist state differs in nature from that of the feudal state in the past--notably, the defense of a socialist state within the system of socialist countries. We have an advanced social system under which our laboring people exert their mastership rights under the party's leadership in defense of our country's sovereignty and territory.

[1712 GMT 9 Jul 77 OW]

[Text] Regarding the force used in conducting a war, in the liberation war we began building a political force of revolutionary masses and then gradually moved to building the armed forces. Consisting of guerrilla cells and teams at first, the armed forces gradually became increasingly greater concentrated army units, and the main force gradually took shape. Our armed forces had to fight the enemy while developing their strength. In building our armed forces, we had to start from scratch, to constantly develop their numerical strength and to gradually increase their fighting capabilities.

In any future war for the defense of the socialist fatherland, our forces will have been well prepared in every aspect during peacetime. Under the superior socialist system, we will have a strong force at the outset to fight the enemy from a position of strength. This strength will be that of our entire people who have been prepared for the defense of the fatherland and that of millions of militiamen and self-defense corpsmen and numerous units of the regional force and a well-trained modern main force which will have a tremendous fighting strength. The military regions will become well-prepared battlefields and will be very strong from the outset in fighting the enemy. As a result of our correct leadership and unified, strict and effective command, our consolidated fighting strength will increase considerably. No matter how strong the enemy may be and no matter what combat method he may use, he will certainly be defeated.

As for the method of conducting a war, in the past liberation war we fought an enemy who had already gained a foothold in our country and subjected all of our people to his yoke of domination. Therefore, we had to carry out propaganda to make the masses understand the situation; organize them to wage political struggle and stage uprisings; coordinate political struggle with armed struggle, offensives with uprisings, and wars of resurgence with revolutionary war; and coordinate the fight to wipe out the enemy with the struggle to win back our people's rights.

In a war for national defense, we will fight any enemy who invades our country. We will have to exterminate the enemy and defend our entire socialist fatherland. Therefore, the method of conducting a war will not be similar to the way we did it before. However, we will apply proper experiences gained during the past liberation war to suit specific situations.

I have just offered some ideas about the similarities and differences between the liberation war and a war for the defense of the fatherland so we will realize that in applying our present military science and art, we must know how to utilize past experiences and, at the same time, must try to develop our military science and art and move ahead. If we fail to make progress, we will be left behind in the ever-changing world. We must further advance, closely follow the development of the situation, and discover things that take on the force of law regarding the war for the defense of our fatherland so as to contribute to effectively exercising leadership over the building of our all-people's socialist national defense now as well as over the conduct of a future people's war under modern conditions for the defense of our socialist fatherland, should such a war occur.

At this juncture I would like to mention another point: to correctly handle questions involving our present military science and art, our army's cadres must have a correct political insight and a comprehensive understanding of the situation at home and abroad and must have a correct political direction compatible with our party's ideological viewpoint as reflected in the Fourth Party Congress resolution. First of all, we must realize the strength of our country, our armed forces and the world revolutionary movement.

Since Vietnam's victory, the revolutionary offensive of the world revolution has advanced a step further. The imperialists have been weakened, and the U.S. imperialists' strength is declining. We must clearly realize this common strength of the world revolution. Our country's strength in the course of building and defending socialism is closely linked to the ever-growing strength of the system of socialist countries and three revolutionary currents. Our country's strength in the coming years will be a combined strength of our entire country advancing to large-scale socialist production under the Fourth Party Congress resolution. In the next several decades the strength of our country and the world revolutionary movement will greatly change and develop considerably.

[1430 GMT 10 Jul 77 OW]

[Text] Another noteworthy point is that we must know how to apply offensive strategy in defending and building our fatherland. Upon entering a new revolutionary stage following their latest victory, our people must take advantage of their victories to advance, launch an offensive against and eliminate poverty and backwardness, build a prosperous and strong country and continue making positive contributions to the world people's revolutionary undertaking.

Our people's great revolutionary undertaking in the struggle to eliminate poverty and backwardness and to build a prosperous and strong country is closely related to our military tasks--a prosperous country with a strong, stable national defense and powerful armed force is a deterrent to any aggressive power. Only if our country is prosperous and strong can we contribute to increasing the strength of the socialist system and of the three revolutionary currents which are vigorously developing their offensive against imperialism.

In the past liberation war, we creatively applied the offensive strategy concept--fighting even though barehanded, building our armed forces on a political base, and advancing from revolutionary struggle to armed struggle. As our country was under foreign domination and our national economy was poor and backward, our armed forces and people conducted a protracted war under extremely harsh conditions and suffered considerable losses and sacrifices in order to achieve victory. We must clearly perceive our country's poverty and backwardness so as to--together with all of our people--positively build a prosperous and strong country, which will serve as the basis for the building of our People's Armed Forces.

Many important questions--ones to which we must apply our military science and art--regarding the task of consolidating our national defense and the war for the defense of our fatherland are closely related to our economy, economic construction, and the increase of our country's potential in every field. We know that the state of production forces, industry and science and the expansion of the population have an impact on the production of equipment, weapons and on the army's numerical strength, thereby influencing the army organization and military art. Engels said: All the army's organizations and combat methods or, in other words, the victories and defeats in war, obviously depend on material conditions--that is, on economic matters.

In the next several decades, with increasing progress in the struggle to eliminate poverty and backwardness, we will have a different economy from that of the present. Therefore, all of our scientific predictions about the methods of conducting a war and strategic principles must be made on this new basis. In order to build a military service and art for defending our fatherland, we must make accurate predictions about the enemy's schemes

and acts in a future war and any possible war situation. These predictions, which must be made after extensive scientific research, are of practical value in guiding all present preparations by our armed forces and people. In order to positively defend our fatherland, we must carry out many tasks including building a modern all-people's national defense and closely coordinating the economy with national defense; this must be reflected in the strategies regarding the national defense, economy, division of labor and building of projects. We must form a clear concept and begin our work promptly to avoid onerous expenses and passivity in the future.

We must make preparations for all of our people so they can take part in the defense of our fatherland in a practical and concrete manner. This very great task must be correctly carried out throughout the country. Practical preparations for all of our people, our armed forces and our economy must be effectively carried out. Preparations must be made for a large number of youths, who must have a certain military training level, so they will be able to rapidly replenish the army according to requirements in a modern war. Our economy must be well protected and continuously run and developed even under fierce war conditions so as to meet all the requirements of national defense. All of our armed forces must be combat ready. Under normal conditions, thanks to their combat readiness, they can promptly help in controlling natural calamities such as floods, typhoons and so forth.

We must strive to effectively apply our military science and art so as to contribute to resolving the aforesaid practical questions; to protecting our people, our economy and our armed forces; and to maintaining our strength in the fight to defeat any enemy in any war situation.

In the new stage, we must concentrate our military science and art on correctly performing the following major tasks:

1. Strive to satisfactorily summarize war experience in the shortest time--experience in wars against both the French and the Americans. The review of past experience must be closely coordinated with the study, development and application of experience under new conditions so as to fulfill new tasks. Satisfactory performance of this task will have great significance for the development of our military science and art in the new stage and for educating cadres, training troops and compiling ordinances. This can also help us make contributions to the treasure of experiences of revolutionary movements in other countries.
2. Make pressing and penetrating studies of fundamental questions involving the building of our all-people's national defense and the war in defense of our socialist fatherland, such as the study of firmly grasping our country's overall situation--the strength of our system and country, men, traditions, history and geography. We must coordinate with the state sectors in conducting studies and fundamentally assessing our country's overall

situation, thereby creating a firm basis for building our national defense force; study the characteristics of the wars that may occur in our country and determine the nature and major causes of these wars as well as the conditions in which they may occur; and find out their major characteristics and promptly resolve questions arising during the course of building our all-people's national defense and our People's Armed Forces.

3. Attach importance to studying questions of military science and technology. Follow the current development of the scientific-technological revolution in the world--particularly in the field of military science and technology--in order to resolve questions involving the immediate and long-range tasks of building a national defense industry and, at the same time, contribute to the tasks of building the national economy. We must formulate and perfect a long-range plan for studying military science and technology.

4. Compile combat ordinances and regulations involving the staff, political, logistic, technological and economic tasks of the army and of each armed service and branch and documents regarding the regional military tasks and the building of and combat tasks of the militia and self-defense forces.

In order to insure satisfactory fulfillment of the aforesaid tasks of military science study, we must accord the right position to the task of studying military science; exercise a more concentrated leadership over this task; and streamline and strengthen the agencies for studying military science and art at all levels, sectors, and armed services and branches, to make them compatible with the position of the military science task in the new stage. We must develop the mandatory subjects and step by step build and perfect such military science and art subjects as those concerning general discourses about the people's war in defense of the fatherland, military science, economy, history and geography, leadership science and military pedagogy science. We must attach importance to building and training a contingent of military science cadres who have a basic theoretical knowledge, firmly grasp the party's political and military lines and have a penetrating professional knowledge about the essential sectors. We must positively train and foster the existing cadre force and, at the same time, take measures for urgently training the next batch of cadres. We must apply many methods for effectively inducing the army's cadres and combatants and the cadres of scientific sectors outside the army to contribute to developing military science and art and studying military technology.

[1430 GMT 21 Jul 77]

[Text] Elementary and Advanced Training of Outstanding Revolutionary Military Men and the Shaping of a Contingent of Cadres

In shaping a new type of men in the army--that is, outstanding revolutionary men--it must be remembered that men are the most precious asset and

the most basic of the two basic factors--human beings and weapons--that constitute the armed forces. The socialist system and the socialist state's armed forces need new socialist men and outstanding revolutionary military men who are suitable to this system and armed forces. Modern weapons and the armed struggle under the conditions of modern warfare also place new demands on the bearers of these weapons. Since our armed forces have emerged from the people, the new men in the armed forces--the outstanding revolutionary military men--cannot be divorced from the new men in society who have been shaped during the socialist revolution process in our country.

Concerning the characteristics of the new socialist Vietnamese and the measures to be taken to shape this type of men, the Fourth Party Congress resolution indicates: We must satisfactorily carry out an important task entrusted by the party and state to the army which must become a great school to help train youths into new socialist men and skillful combatants and laborers. After fully realizing the party resolution on the formation of new men, what criteria should we set to shape new men for the People's Armed Forces--that is, outstanding revolutionary military men? This is an important problem requiring a great deal of thought. However, I should like to venture some suggestions.

The new men in the People's Armed Forces--that is, our outstanding revolutionary military men--must be men with the following characteristics: enlightenment with communist ideals; socialist patriotism; proletarian internationalism; the socialist collective ownership spirit; a sense of organization and discipline; absolute loyalty to the fatherland and the party and people's revolutionary cause; full awareness of one's position and duties in national defense; readiness to fight and make sacrifices for independence, freedom, socialism and communism; deep love for work; belief that to work is a duty and honor inherent in the nature of the People's Armed Forces and that labor must be performed with a deep self-awareness and heroism equal to that displayed when fighting the enemy, with discipline, according to technical regulations and with high productivity; love for study and progress; increasingly high cultural standards; understanding of literature and fine arts; continuous endeavor to firmly grasp military, economic, scientific, technical and specialized knowledge and ability to use this knowledge in training, combat and production; a civilized and wholesome life style in conformity with new socialist ethics and the good traditions of our Vietnamese nation; pure and lofty revolutionary sentiments coupled with solidarity with and deep love for the laboring people and one's comrades; full understanding and application of the socialist cooperation relationships in carrying out all activities; respect for public property and public life; love and loyalty in family relation; urgent, versatile and accurate working skills suitable to the combat and labor circumstances and activities of a modern army and a large-scale socialist production; an aesthetic mind sensitive to the correct, pure and wholesome beauty found in all aspects of life in the army, society and household; and a strong body able to overcome all difficulties and tensions in training, combat and production.

To shape such men for the armed forces is to shape comprehensively developed men who have a sense of being masters, who are qualified for mastery, who have communist ideals and a high political enlightenment; who have a sufficient standard of military, economic, scientific, technical and cultural knowledge; who have an aesthetic sense; whose manners befit outstanding socialist citizens and outstanding revolutionary military men and who are strong physically.

To successfully shape such a new type of men for the armed forces, it is absolutely necessary to base oneself on the achievements of the three revolutions and on the result of the shaping, through various methods, of new men in society until they reach the age of military service. At the same time, the army must really become a great school to actively contribute to continuously training youth into outstanding revolutionary military men and new socialist men throughout the period they serve in the army. To this end, our army must consider it its duty to train new men in the armed forces, correlate this training with the general training of new men in society; draw up scientific plans and programs to comprehensively shape combatants during the period they serve in the army from the viewpoints of political qualities; military, technical, cultural and professional standards; behavior, physical strength and life style; and develop appropriate organizational methods to satisfactorily carry out these programs. New combatants' training centers must be set up in various military regions and armed branches since these centers are useful in many respects in training new combatants during the initial period of their stay in the army. Afterwards, the greatest attention must be paid to training combatants (?assigned) to various units to fully acquaint them with army life. It is also necessary to teach them various occupations according to requirements of economic construction. We must consider it important to give elementary and advanced training to a body of basic-level cadres having skills and a high sense of responsibility, and capable of and experienced in educating, training and managing combatants.

It is necessary to heighten the political task to a new standard to more effectively educate, train and shape new men; to eagerly apply achievements of the scientific, educational, pedagogic and psychological branches; and to attentively build good collectives in which new men will be shaped. If these collectives are strong and continuously achieve good results in study, production and task execution, the combatants therein will be permeated by the atmosphere of common enthusiasm and eagerness, feel proud of their collectives and endeavor to be worthy of their collectives. Good collectives are thus a very important factor in shaping good men because there are close relations between collectives and individuals.

Therefore, we must closely manage units and satisfactorily organize the troops' material and cultural life because it beneficially affects the shaping of a new type of man. In other words, it is necessary to closely manage combatants 24 hours a day with full awareness of the need to educate

men during training, combat readiness, productive labor, task execution, study, diversified activities and entertainments.

Attention must also be paid to the private life, state of mind, feelings, aspirations, needs and hobbies of combatants in order to formulate correct methods to educate them constructively. If a barracks is well organized, it will greatly influence the shaping of the military men's behavior. At present, our barracks must be orderly and neatly arranged because if this is done, it will contribute to a good education of combatants. In the future when the economy has been developed, we will have to build barracks more satisfactorily, with adequate facilities, in order to improve the troops' material and cultural life, thus contributing to training and shaping new men. We must try to make youths, on joining the army, immediately take a liking to the material, cultural and moral life in the army and not just give them responsibilities and duties.

[1430 GMT 22 Jul 77]

[Text] The fundamental task of forming new type men in the armed forces must be carried out immediately. This very difficult task involving very high requirements calls upon us to make great efforts and to have some scientific knowledge. Through the practical accomplishment of all armed forces tasks new type men are formed. The new men in the People's Armed Forces can be constantly formed only through practical acts, labor and a struggle to fulfill all duties. For this reason, we must firmly grasp the following essential method of forming new men in the People's Armed Forces: train new men amidst the hardships of military training, in the realities of combat and in the struggle to overcome all difficulties so as to satisfactorily fulfill all tasks and stand ready to fight and defend the fatherland and build the economy and the country.

Our revolutionary military organization is endowed with many capabilities for continuing to create new men. Such men are inherent to our society, but these capabilities must be turned into reality. During their period of military service we must help our combatants make clear progress in all fields; reach a high level of political awareness; acquire a spirit of collective mastership, a sense of organization and discipline and good military ability; learn technical professions and adopt a civilized and healthy relationship with their families, loved ones and friends. On this basis, our combatants should satisfactorily carry out the tasks on the productive labor and socialist construction front while properly fulfilling their mission as a reserve force of the People's Armed Forces who enjoy the affection and confidence of their families, the production installations and the mass organizations. In this way, our people and the parents, who sympathize with the armed forces, can be confident in sending their sons for training in the People's Armed Forces--a great school.

A significant factor in educating and forming new men in our armed forces is the promotion of mutual affection and protection. This affection must

be based on the ideological stand of the working class. It is the class affection among the laboring people that has progressed toward a new level, a new quality and an ethical value of the Vietnamese nation manifested in the following proverbs: "As countrymen, we must love one another," "Let us love our neighbors as ourselves." These are great motives in the struggle for the noble objectives of the revolution, in the struggle to fulfill the great and glorious missions of the armed forces. Marx always linked love with the struggle in that way. Cadres must love the combatants and other cadres in the lower ranks. President Ho Chi Minh taught: The unit commander or political officer must be a brother, sister or friend of his unit members. Failure to behave in such a way means failure to fulfill one's obligation. Only when a cadre remains as intimate with his unit members as their hands and feet can they love him as if he were their kith and kin and implement all directives, orders and plans from the upper echelons in a positive and scrupulous manner. With the prevalence of a sense of organization, discipline and mutual affection, there will be no militaristic attitude and acts on the part of cadres toward combatants and there will be no negative actions on the part of combatants. If there is mutual love, there are many ways to properly solve problems in an army unit. Regrettable incidents will not happen and there will be a collective life in solidarity, harmony, comfort and impartiality. Such a life can have a great impact on the promotion of fine qualities, pure sentiments and optimistic behavior among cadres and combatants.

Regarding the building of a contingent of cadres, we must promote the formation and improvement of cadres, raise the level of knowledge of cadres in all aspects and set up a contingent of cadres typifying the political line set forth by the Fourth Party Congress. To this end, the People's Armed Forces must meet the requirements of their two tasks in the new stage.

The cadre contingent in the People's Armed Forces must be carefully selected. It must have a perfect, balanced structure comprising commanding cadres, political, rear service, technical, professional, research, teaching, economic, main force, local, regular force and reserve force cadres. This cadre contingent must include a fixed nucleus, a reserve force and a vast successor force which can meet the requirements not only in peacetime but in wartime as well.

The quality of cadres resides in the coordination between political quality and capacity for work and is manifested through the successful implementation of tasks. The requirements of political quality must not be detached from those of capacity for work because failure to meet any of these requirements means the failure to meet the qualifications of a cadre.

As pointed out in the Fourth Party Congress resolution, a cadre's political quality resides in his loyalty to the party, his revolutionary will, his sacrifice, his close ties to the masses, his positiveness and his very high spirit of responsibility in the performance of his duties. At the same

time, a cadre must have a general knowledge and the ability to organize the implementation of all tasks set forth by the party.

In the new stage of the revolution, cadres must unceasingly heighten their knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory, profoundly understand the party's line and policies, further improve their military, technical, economic and cultural knowledge and be capable of organizing the implementation of tasks.

The People's Armed Forces cadres, regardless of rank, must pay particular attention to improving their military knowledge in modern warfare to fulfill their missions. At present, since we are prepared to implement the system of unit leaders in accordance with the party Central Committee's regulations, the formation of cadres endowed with all-round ability has become more important. We must resort to numerous forms and measures to educate the cadres in theory and to further improve and strengthen them militarily, politically, technically, professionally, economically and culturally. We must positively develop the formation and improvement of cadres in schools in accordance with a regular, fundamental, comprehensive and unified policy while paying attention to organizing systematic on-the-job training to improve their skills. In order to have a policy for forming and fostering cadres, we must rapidly standardize the requirements governing various aspects of a cadre's knowledge at all levels and in all branches. In this way, we can take an active part in forming and fostering cadres and in creating a basis for promoting cadre-related tasks. We must strive to improve and increase the quality of the present contingent of cadres who have undergone trial by combat. At the same time, we must urgently form numerous additional young cadres especially selected from among those trained and tested in combat from the classes of workers, peasants, laborers and revolutionary intellectuals. We must increase the worker component among the contingent of leading and commanding cadres. Cadres must be formed in accordance with a regular, unified systematic, fundamental and comprehensive policy.

It is our party's policy to advocate the coordination of the older people's experience with the young people's ability to progress. We must highly value the cadres who underwent trials and matured in the revolutionary movement, in the anti-French and anti-U.S. resistances and from the lower ranks upward. They must be employed in the right places and their talents and experience developed to the highest degree.

At present, it is necessary to enhance the contingent of intermediate and high-ranking cadres with a view to fostering leading cadres and keeping them in reserve. It is also necessary to increase the number of cadres in charge of conducting research in science, social science, military science and technical science and the number of teachers in the schools. As a leader, each cadre is responsible for forming reserve cadres and must contribute to preparing cadres to replace him.

It is necessary to correctly value the strengths and abilities of youth; to boldly place those in worthy positions who have undergone trials and who are endowed with qualities, capabilities and prospects; to overcome conservative thoughts, narrowmindedness, parochialism and cliquishness; and to avoid prejudices and favoritism in the implementation of tasks concerning cadres. If we fail to do so, we will be unable to perfect and renew the cadre contingent and rapidly increase its quality so as to create a new energetic force in the process of organizing the implementation of the party's revolutionary line and policies on the armed forces.

As for those cadres whose qualities, abilities and health are unsuitable for their functions and who are incapable of assuming responsibility, they must be rationally reassigned.

[1430 GMT 23 Jul 77]

[Text] High-ranking cadres are very important in the cadre contingent. For this reason, our party and the Central Military Party Committee have advocated the founding of a higher military academy specializing in forming and fostering high-ranking cadres. Let all of our comrades endeavor to study and be worthy of their positions and functions. Their tasks are very difficult, including the formation of new socialist men for our People's Armed Forces.

To build such a cadre force, it is necessary to thoroughly comprehend the party's line and policies regarding cadres in the new stage and to create a comprehensive plan for forming and fostering a contingent of armed forces cadres now and in the future. We must determine the objectives, criteria, requirements and major measures in this long-term plan. At the same time, there must be 5-year plans with the aim of realizing specific objectives in each period.

It is necessary to resolutely form cadres in accordance with a regular, unified, systematic, fundamental and comprehensive policy. As regards the cadres' conditions for completing their basic studies, it is necessary to pay attention to complementing and improving their basic theoretical studies and their cultural, technical and economic knowledge and to strengthening their ability to organize the implementation of tasks. As far as our armed forces are concerned, another matter of important significance is the need to overcome the differences in cadres' skills and military knowledge resulting from different battlefields and the protracted war of the past. Within 5 years we must strive to raise the cadres' skills to the same level and help them acquire the deeper knowledge required in their branches, professions and positions.

Schools play a very important role in forming and improving cadres. At the same time, on-the-job study and self-study are also important. At present, the formation and improvement of cadres must be based on the

concept of a large-scale, long-term strategy. We must urgently improve the network of schools to make it a perfect, uniform, regular, fundamental and unified network of schools specializing in forming additional high-ranking cadres, intermediary-rank cadres and primary-rank cadres; of schools in charge of training military, political, rear service, technical, specialized, professional and economic noncommissioned officers; and of schools of the Defense Ministry, military zones, regiments, armed branches and armed services.

We must train additional cadres for the local armed forces, cadres for the self-defense militia force, cadres for the reserve force and cadres for economic construction, capital construction and the national defense industry. All schools must be closely and scientifically coordinated into a unified network having separate assignments but under the unified guidance of the defense ministry. Schools must be improved in every aspect. First of all, we must make great efforts to develop and improve the contingent of teachers, improve the study program and training content, compile a list of textbooks, augment training materials and equipment, promulgate regulations on school work, step up the building of schools and pay adequate attention to the recruitment of students. We must resolutely consolidate a number of major schools, determine the responsibilities of various general departments regarding school work and insure that the teaching program is properly carried out and the standards for teachers and the regulations regarding learning, inspection, examination and the issuance of graduation certificates by the schools in the armed forces are properly implemented in accordance with the general statutes of the state.

We must build a very good on-the-job study system. This system is very important because not all of our cadres can go to school at the same time and because they should continue to complement their studies during their work after leaving school. On-the-job study must be organized and requires a definite program and timetable, rigorous study discipline, a contingent of good teachers, good teaching and learning methods and effective control measures.

We must pay attention to increasing the quality of the on-the-job study system and to practically improving the cadres' skills. Our cadres must consider self-study a duty and responsibility. Each cadre must have a high level of determination to conduct self-study and must work out a proper study program in order to constantly improve his knowledge. The more numerous his tasks are, the greater effort he will have to make in self-study because this is the best way for him to satisfactorily carry out all his tasks.

In his talk to the high-ranking cadres of the armed forces on 11 May 1969, President Ho Chi Minh cordially recommended: You must endeavor to study and must always set a good example of revolutionary ethics.

At present, there are a number of cadres, including high-ranking cadres, who still have an inadequate understanding of this problem. Our party and armed forces are very concerned with the formation and improvement of cadres. However, each cadre must have a high level of determination to train and improve himself so as to be able to fulfill all the tasks they assign.

As for the organizational aspect, we must have a plan and create conditions for all cadres to conduct self-study. This must be regarded as a responsibility of the organization, upper echelons and various organs. In addition, it is necessary to develop other forms of study, including correspondence courses, in order to raise the cadres' level of knowledge.

The more our armed forces advance toward a regular, modern army, the more the specialized and technical branches will have to develop and the greater the need for technical cadres will be. Thus we must develop the training capability of armed forces schools while depending on the assistance of the state colleges for training specialized and technical cadres for the armed forces.

The armed forces schools must perform research so as to form cadres able to satisfactorily implement their tasks in the armed forces, worthy of being the party's cadres in the armed forces and ready to assume other tasks entrusted by the party.

We should study the proposed amendment to the law governing officers' military service so that it will be consistent with the situation and tasks in the new revolutionary stage. We must pay attention to building a very good contingent of reserve cadres in compliance with the requirements for complementing and enlarging the forces of a regular, modern army. To this end, we must properly manage the demobilization of military personnel, coordinate the colleges and vocational middle schools with the various economic sectors, properly build the reserve cadre contingent and attach importance to the contingent of scientific cadres and workers and specialized and technical personnel. We must have proper systems of registration, management, training and mobilization so as to insure that mobilization work is achieved in the fastest time possible when necessary.

We must positively concern ourselves with the cadres' material and spiritual life. The armed forces' cadres as well as the contingent of cadres in general are a valuable asset of the party and state. The cadres' tasks are very great. Due to two fierce wars, the majority of our cadres' health has deteriorated, so we must concentrate on improving their health and create favorable conditions for them to enjoy better food, housing, travel and recreation in accordance with the capability for economic development. We must make positive efforts in organizational work to help our cadres save time in their daily activities so that they can further their studies. We must have a correct and rational policy regarding retired cadres.

[1430 GMT 24 Jul 77]

[Text] Military Training and Combat Readiness

With regard to the nation as a whole, standing combat ready implies developing all potentialities of the country; building a strong economy, a powerful national defense and armed forces--comprised of regular and reserve forces supported by a steadfast rear service; and devising a plan for rapid transfer of the whole country from a peacetime to wartime status.

As far as the armed forces are concerned, standing combat-ready means enhancing the fighting strength and combat readiness of various units in many aspects; improving in political and organizational spheres, military science and art, military training and construction of material and technical bases; insuring the support of the rear service; and being prepared to frustrate all counterrevolutionary and aggressive activities. Let us now discuss military training and the insurance of a combat-ready People's Armed Force:

Military training must be properly carried out and become substantively and qualitatively better on the basis of political and ideological education. This must be achieved with the aim of creating an increasingly steady combat capacity for each individual and unit, increasing the armed forces' fighting strength and insuring that the armed forces maintain a position of high combat readiness in order to defeat the enemy under all circumstances. In this way the armed forces' combat strength and combat readiness will remain steadfast.

Training is a very important subject--a central task in building the armed forces during peacetime. In peacetime we must rapidly regularize and systematize the training task and achieve training in a basic, systematic and comprehensive manner in order to insure combat readiness. We should not think that combat readiness cannot be insured when we approach the training task in a basic, systematic way and according to the regulations of a regular army. When we carry out the training task in this way, we must know how to keep it consistent with present combat readiness requirements. Basic training must be coordinated with combat readiness training.

Because our army is rapidly developing into a regular and modern army, and in order to be able to cope with future modern warfare, we must pay attention to new requirements and characteristics of training. Because the training of cadres and combatants in mastering modern equipment and techniques has become a major problem, we must place high value on technical training and closely coordinate technical training with tactical training, with technical training as the basis. Since we must continue modernization of our army, we must train and improve a large number of technical cadres and personnel.

Training must become more scientific and less time-consuming; it must lean towards a more advanced program, broader knowledge and more proficient skills. If the quality of training is high, the length of military training can be reduced and the time for productive labor and economic construction can be increased for those combatants who are fulfilling their military obligation. If the quality of training is high, we can gradually achieve a reduced length in military service, insure combat readiness and conduct business more economically. When length of military service is reduced, we can increase the number of youths engaged in military service and, consequently, we can make preparations for enabling the youths to fulfill the task of protecting the fatherland and raise the combat readiness level of the country. In addition, national defense expenses will yield better results.

To achieve these results, we must immediately create a training curriculum that includes scientific subjects such as military psychology and Vietnamese military pedagogy. At present, we must insure that all armed forces participate in an increasingly improved, unified military training program and that all combatants who are fulfilling their military obligation undergo a suitable military training program, no matter whether they are permanent members of the forces engaged in implementing the combat readiness tasks or involved in economic construction work.

The purpose of military training is to make all individuals, units, echelons and sectors fully aware of their responsibilities and tasks, to give them a basis for developing their resourcefulness and creativeness, and to fulfill the combat task in the most effective way, thus enhancing the combat strength of all the armed forces.

The combat-ready standing forces must be trained properly. Low-level detachments and combatants must acquire basic technical knowledge, strive to become all powerful and aware of detachment tactics and join other armed branches, including the tank, armored vehicles and artillery branches, in a joint military training program. Basic tactical corps must be skilled in coordinated regimental and divisional tactics. Campaign corps must train commanders and staffs who command large-scale coordinated battles. Attention must be paid to training commanders and commanding organs. All the armed forces technical services and branches must study technology and undergo joint training with other branches in the armed services. It is necessary to organize joint maneuvers of the armed branches and services in accordance with modern warfare requirements in order to gain experience and constantly improve training quality.

At present, local forces must pay attention to technical training and to training of grassroots units, under conditions of local terrain, in order to advance large-scale training according to the predetermined provincial and district combat plans. The self-defense militia and reserve forces must attain required technical levels and grasp individual combat drills

so that they can rapidly perform the assigned tasks within the armed forces technical branches and services when they are drafted into the army during wartime.

As for the high-ranking commanding cadres, special attention must be given to developing their strategic knowledge and the art of conducting a military campaign. The intermediate-level cadres must concentrate on tactics and combat organization capabilities. Young cadres must attach great importance to complicated military technology.

The training of commanders and commanding organs is a basic and important aspect of the new requirements for advancing the modernization and standardization of our army. It helps to insure adequate implementation of combat readiness systems, the combat readiness of an army composed of many armed branches and services in peacetime, and the successful coordination of armed branches and services during combat in modern warfare in case the enemy launches an invasion against our country.

We must continue to improve the command task and strive to utilize scientific and technical accomplishments for insuring rapid effectiveness of unified command for various forces on many vast terrains. We must, by surveying the enemy's front line, constantly improve the command capability of cadres in order to insure good command of organs at all levels.

We must insure that the necessary time is given for training, especially field training and tactical maneuvers involving coordinated combat by various forces, so that our cadres and combatants can learn to apply theory and to train themselves in acquiring combat resourcefulness and boldness.

Standing forces specializing in economic construction must also attach importance to military training and devote proper time to military studies, especially technical training and the training of grassroots units, so as to insure combat readiness. Concerning these units, special attention must be paid to training in technical skills, in specialized and professional skills and in economic construction.

We must scrupulously implement all training orders of the Defense Ministry which considers the training task as a combat task. Supervision of the implementation of training orders and of the combat readiness attitude and posture of units must be carried out according to plan and must attain the aim of improving the training quality and their combat readiness posture.

The training plan must be carefully designed and detailed in many aspects. Units at various levels are not free to modify the training plan or program. If a change of schedule is needed, they must submit a report and request instructions. They must strictly maintain all training systems in order to systematize and regularize the training task. To this end, they must

adopt a unified, substantive training program and must resolutely and carefully implement it so that the set criteria for troop training can be attained annually. Teaching materials must be unified on the basis of the regulations and rules which will be promulgated. We must strengthen training organs at all levels so that training guidance can embrace all the armed forces and closer leadership over the technical and specialized branches and services of the armed forces can be achieved.

At present, the consolidation of material bases for the training task is a major problem. Consolidation is aimed at insuring that the training task meets the requirements of a modern army and modern warfare. Military training must be practical, realistic and in line with modern combat requirements. If the material bases remain rudimentary, training cannot be consistent with modern combat realities.

We must strive to overcome difficulties in building, perfecting and consolidating the training centers. Attention must be paid to the immediate requirements as well as to their development so that they can be expanded when necessary. We must consider the organization of training centers for new combatants to provide basic military training before sending them to the units specializing in economic construction or we can organize the training of new combatants for these units. Training centers, auditoriums and so forth must be gradually modernized, mechanized and supplied with electricity; clay models of these centers should be erected. We must establish organs and workshops in charge of producing training tools for the armed forces in order to promptly and effectively serve training work.

[1430 GMT 26 Jul 77]

[Text] Combat Readiness

In time of peace, our whole country concentrates on economic construction. The armed forces, which must stand combat-ready while engaging in economic work, have a different task throughout the country. Only by looking at the problem of combat readiness against this background can we see it in all its complexity and can we attempt to satisfactorily resolve it. Combat readiness reflects an understanding of the class viewpoint and struggle and the spirit of revolutionary vigilance on the part of our cadres and combatants under the present conditions. This viewpoint must be reflected in concrete activities and organization so as to insure that all the units are constantly at a high level of combat readiness. Only by maintaining a high level of combat readiness can we develop our combat strength, promptly annihilate the enemy, defend ourselves and achieve victory.

Under present conditions, the matter of protecting the army and the country's potentials in all fields so as to be able to strike back at and defeat the enemy is of very great significance. For this reason, more than ever before, our People's Armed Forces must constantly maintain a high level of combat readiness, constantly improve that level, and be able to

rapidly and bravely fight at any time to annihilate the enemy and defend themselves. This is an extremely important matter for the country and a principled requirement of the standing army during peacetime.

As stated above, fighting skill developed through military training constitutes a basis for achieving a state of combat readiness. However, in this connection, the army must have regulations, systems and discipline for combat readiness and must strictly adopt various measures and organizational procedures before it can insure combat readiness. Specifically, we must make sure that we successfully resolve such matters as grasping the enemy situation in all aspects, everywhere and at all times. All levels, from the strategic organs down to the military regions, army corps and units, are responsible for constantly learning about the enemy situation according to each level's sphere and function. This is the first requirement of the task of insuring combat readiness.

We must determine the degree of combat readiness for each unit and armed branch in each region and so forth to create a system of combat readiness according to a unified plan for safeguarding the country during peacetime and deploying forces when necessary. The military regions and army corps must determine which units have a high level of combat readiness. These units must be fully combat-ready, enforce stern discipline and be trained, inspected and continuously improved in terms of combat readiness. The alert and guard system in these units must be strictly implemented. Any violation of the combat-readiness discipline in these units must be considered a violation not only of army discipline but of the state regulations and law as well.

Those units which are engaged in economic construction work must have appropriate regulations on combat readiness. Naturally, we cannot impose on them the same requirements as on those units which must maintain constant combat readiness, but we must insure that they retain their character of being standing forces rather than reserve forces.

We must build combat readiness through many uniform measures, from formulating plans to deploying and arranging forces, means and so forth. In big military regions and army corps, we must have detailed plans for combat readiness. We must prepare battlefield plans, forces' plans, command plans and mobile and coordinated combat plans. We must gradually strengthen and perfect our defense arrangements in important areas.

In small units, we must have plans for combat readiness and conduct regular training to gradually shorten the time needed to make the troops combat-ready. We must guard our weapons and other fighting means well, set up procedures for managing and cleaning weapons, and systematize and strictly carry out inspection of combat readiness in units and of weapons and technical means--firearms, vehicles and communications means.

All this must be put down in writing. We must organize periodical as well as irregular combat-readiness inspection drives which should be coupled with appropriate surveys. We must constantly study to insure the highest level of preparations so that we can promptly deploy the units to carry out their tasks. We must constantly instill our cadres and our fighters with the spirit of revolutionary offensive, strengthen their eagerness to study and train them to acquire military skills. All our cadres at all levels must always consider and study the best measures to hold the initiative under all circumstances.

Build the Army Politically and Organize Leadership and Command

Priority should be given to building the army politically as this is the basic principle of our party policy in building the people's army. Building the army politically aims at insuring the party's comprehensive, absolute and direct leadership over the army and the party Central Committee and Political Bureau's constant control over the army. It aims at insuring our army's continued and absolute loyalty to the party, the fatherland and the people, and that it fully place itself under the party's leadership, scrupulously implement the party's revolutionary line and tasks and satisfactorily complete all tasks entrusted by the party and state. In the new revolutionary stage, all this is a fundamental guarantee for our army to become a really socialist one and an effective tool of the party and state of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the era of independence, freedom and socialism of the Vietnamese nation.

Led, educated and trained by the party, our army will always remain politically steadfast; thoroughly understand the party's revolutionary line; firmly adhere to the working class stand; display growing political awareness, revolutionary characteristics and fine combat traditions; possess a strong and steady leadership, command and mass organization and maintain internal solidarity, people-army unity, internationalist solidarity and strict and proper self-discipline.

In the new revolutionary stage, we must strive to strengthen and develop these basic strongpoints and pay more attention to building the army politically. The political general department will study the major problems in building the army politically in the new stage. Let me express some of my views here.

The most basic and central point in actually building the army in the political aspect is the need to make the entire army thoroughly understand the socialist revolutionary line and tasks, the military line and tasks, the economic construction line and the foreign policy set forth by the Fourth Party Congress.

We must make all party members, cadres and fighters, and especially the leading cadres at all levels and of all branches, thoroughly comprehend

the resolutions of the Fourth Party Congress; heighten their political awareness and self-consciousness in all activities and proudly, trustfully and resolutely translate these resolutions into specific and practical acts, into a widespread revolutionary mass movement and into a realistic success in defending and building the nation. We must make our troops deeply aware of the tasks of the People's Armed Forces in the new stage and of the new requirements for the entire army in the new historic phase of the revolution. In particular, they must be aware of the actual and major political tasks of our armed forces: to stand ready to defend the fatherland, to build the economy and the country and to cooperate with the entire people in making positive contributions to the world's people's cause of revolution and peace.

We must bring about a big change in the ideology, organization and behavior and must advance to keep pace with the situation and tasks of the revolution and armed forces. We must step up the education of party members and cadres in Marxist-Leninist theory to enable them to grasp scientific methods and a world concept as well as historic law, economic law and the law of class struggle under the condition of the party assuming leadership of administration and of socialist transformation and socialist construction in our country.

As army cadres, we must also grasp the law of building an all-people national defense in the socialist revolution, the law of building an armed forces at a time that our entire people are engaged in national construction and in socialist revolution and construction and the law of wars for protecting the socialist fatherland under the present conditions.

[1430 GMT 29 Jul 77]

[Text] While insuring thorough comprehension of the party's revolutionary line and tasks and the armed forces' tasks and mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory and methodology, we must consolidate the working class stand of all party members, cadres and combatants, enhance their awareness of socialism and communism, heighten their socialist patriotism and spirit of proletarian internationalism, and strengthen their spirit of revolutionary offensive, sense of responsibility, their concept of collective ownership and sense of organization and discipline. We must constantly strengthen and develop the revolutionary nature and tradition of our armed forces; turn revolutionary heroism in the struggle for national liberation into revolutionary heroism in protecting and building the fatherland; and whip up a surging, vigorous, widespread, steady, continuous and effective determined-to-win emulation drive throughout the army to successfully complete all present People's Armed Forces' tasks.

Building the socialist collective ownership system is a very big factor in insuring implementation of our party's socialist revolutionary line. We must study it carefully and realize it satisfactorily within our armed

forces. In this connection, I would like to make a few suggestions here. First of all, we must make all our cadres and combatants fully understand the significance and substance of the socialist collective ownership system as formulated by our party. Collective ownership involves both duties as well as interests. We must make all our cadres and combatants deeply aware of the armed forces' great responsibility for protecting the fatherland and building the country as well. Everybody must display a high sense of responsibility, take the initiative in all revolutionary matters, demonstrate a sense of strict and proper self-discipline and scrupulously implement all orders and regulations of the armed forces and all state laws.

In our armed forces, rigorous unity, broad democracy and strict and proper discipline and efforts to properly fulfill all armed forces' tasks are manifestations of our cadres' and combatants' spirit of collective ownership as well as of the socialist collective ownership system.

Cadres must share the people's viewpoint, realize that the people are the real masters of history, love and respect the lower-level echelons and combatants, have a sense of democracy and must vigorously develop democracy within the armed forces and in their respective units. Cadres must refrain from inflicting punishments on combatants as they please and against regulations. They must not violate the combatants' dignity. They must comply with President Ho Chi Minh's teaching: Without their units and without the masses, cadres and leaders can achieve nothing. Therefore, cadres must love members of their unit while combatants must respect the cadres and upper echelons, scrupulously implement all orders and instructions from the upper echelons and enthusiastically create innovations in fulfilling their functions and tasks.

Merely holding a correct view on collective ownership is not sufficient. There must also be a structure or organization to insure such a system. Only by having such a structure or organization can we gradually get into the habit of translating thoughts into actions and develop and strengthen self-discipline. Therefore, we must base ourselves on the requirements of the law of building and struggle of our armed forces to determine system and rules or legislate regulations and orders pertaining to the armed forces. Our armed forces' systems, rules, regulations and orders reflect the objective requirements of armed struggle and of the use of modern weapons and equipment. But first of all, they reflect the revolutionary nature of the armed forces and are manifestations of the socialist collective ownership system and the laboring people's right of collective ownership under the party's leadership.

All aspects of our armed forces' relations--solidarity, democracy, discipline, relations between upper and lower echelons, relations between cadres and combatants, relations between the army and people, and relations between our country's armed forces and those of fraternal socialist countries--are based on political and ideological foundations such as the party's

revolutionary line, love for one's class, affection for one's comrades and companions in struggle, equality and mutual respect. These relations must be insured organizationally and their underlying principles reaffirmed in orders and regulations, which therefore have legal force and must be adhered to and implemented by everyone.

Socialist collective ownership calls for socialist new men and for a corps of cadres as the nucleus. The socialist new men and the corps of cadres must be built in an overall manner as mentioned earlier. Permit me to say a few words here about building socialist new men and cadres politically.

As the political aspect is regarded as basic in the building of the army and of organizations, this must be the same in building the corps of cadres. The socialist new men, cadres of the socialist armed forces, must acquire the necessary political qualities and the necessary political trust. Of course, these political qualities should not preclude effective power of action.

Educated, trained and tested in the protracted revolutionary war, our armed forces' corps of cadres is very good politically. Our contingent of combatants at present and in the future is educated under the socialist new regime and in socialist schools and is trained in the realities of socialist construction and socialist transformation. Their outlook and their way of life develop with the growth of the new social system in our country and their political qualities are constantly tempered and enhanced.

During the previous revolutionary stage, our armed forces' well-trained cadres' corps outstandingly fulfilled its tasks and won the confidence of the party and the love of the masses. However, unless it continues making efforts in study and training, it will be unable to discharge its very weighty and difficult tasks in the new stage.

In carrying out the troop recruiting task, we have selected recruits according to the set standards. However, during their service in the army, unless the youth are constantly educated, trained and fostered, they will fail to grasp the precious nature and traditions of our people's army, make no progress, and be unable to become outstanding combatants.

During the first phase of training recruits in the newly liberated provinces, we must devote much more time to political training. We must strive to provide political training and advanced political training to all categories of troops, to both the standing army as well as the militia and self-defense forces and to both the troops standing combat-ready as well as those troops engaged in economic activities. With regard to the standing army, it must be provided with adequate political training. Political and ideological training must be coordinated with the implementation of other tasks and must be carried out at all times and in all places. With regard to the militia and self-defense forces, which are closely related to production

and have certain limitations in terms of conditions for political and military training, we must provide even better guidance in study and training. We must coordinate with mass organizations, general schools, colleges and vocational middle schools in providing political training for the militia and self-defense forces. In the newly liberated provinces, political and military training for these forces must be rapidly regulated. We must constantly bear in mind that under any circumstances, our armed forces must be trustworthy forces, be stable and strong politically, and be worthy of being the instrument of force of our party and people.

In order to thoroughly comprehend the party's direct, absolute and comprehensive leadership over the army, we must attach particular importance to building party organizations within the army and correctly and scrupulously implement the party statutes approved by the Fourth Party Congress. We must firmly grasp the essential lessons in party building reviewed by the party congress and firmly grasp the working-class nature of our party and the party-building criteria so as to achieve high quality and efficiency in the task of developing the party organizations within the army. We must firmly grasp the duties and policies concerning the party-building task in the new stage; correctly apply them in accordance with the requirements and characteristics of building the party within the army; enhance the quality of political leadership of party organizations; develop party organizations; insure proper leadership so as to successfully fulfill all tasks of the People's Armed Forces; insure vigorous development of party organizations throughout the army from the level of the party committees down to that of party grassroots cells and from (?organizations) to the corps of party members and cadres.

We must constantly and thoroughly understand that collective leadership is the party's most basic principle of leadership and, at the same time, closely coordinate collective leadership with individual responsibilities while fostering the individual's sense of responsibility. Our army must advance toward building in the most satisfactory manner the party committee echelons along with realizing the hierarchic system [chees dqooj thur trwowngr] according to the party Central Committee's regulations (report summarizing the party-building task and amending the party statutes presented at the Fourth Party Congress). We must insure the realization of the party's leadership system by taking into account the set principles and the conditions and situations of fierce and decisive combat of modern warfare as may be faced by the modern technical armed branches and services and of coordinated attacks involving various armed services and branches. We must view the successful fulfillment of all tasks entrusted by the party as the highest objective. We must base ourselves on the regulations of the party congress and the party Central Committee in building party organizations within the army. The party organizations within the army must carry out their work in such a way that the party's line and policies are thoroughly understood in army units, that all party committee echelons' resolutions and orders and the directives of higher echelons are strictly

implemented and that the entire army is closely united around the party Central Committee, is absolutely loyal to the revolutionary cause of the party and people and successfully fulfills all tasks entrusted to it. We must firmly grasp the requirements of increasing the party members' qualifications and the quality of the corps of party members and base ourselves on actual situations in building the corps of party members within the army and making it increasingly stable and strong. Party members within the army must carry out all the party members' five duties and symbolize the new socialist man in the army and the outstanding revolutionary soldier. We must closely coordinate the building of the corps of party members with the building of the new-type man, the party's grassroots organizations, the corps of cadres and army units and agencies in all aspects. We must constantly improve the meetings and activities of party organizations and assign party members to combat and leadership positions, and to positions of vanguard fighters in the revolutionary mass movement, thus helping them to mature through training.

We must enhance the party members' qualities in all aspects, satisfactorily perform the task of admitting new members to the party and resolutely and promptly expel from the party those who fail to meet party members' qualifications.

We must vigorously develop the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union's organizations within the army. Almost all combatants and grassroots cadres in our army are youths. The Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union is an efficient arm and trustworthy reserve force of the party, a school of communism for the youth. We must strengthen in all aspects the organizations of the Youth Union within the army, develop their activities and enable them to organize youth into a shock force, which will take the lead in all fields of activity throughout the whole army and will successfully implement all our party's tasks in the new stage.

[1430 GMT 30 Jul 77]

[Text] In building our army politically, we must develop the political task and build political agencies and a political cadres' corps in accordance with the new situation and tasks. With the development of revolutionary tasks and the army's tasks, the building of political agencies and a political cadres' corps and the methods of carrying out the political task must also develop. We must review our armed forces' extremely rich experiences in performing political tasks over the past several decades and, at the same time, study and apply them and develop the efficient implementation of the political task under the new conditions. The political task must be developed in line with our armed forces' new developments in structure and organizational scale, weapons and technical equipment, and military science and art. We must carry out the political task in all activities of our troops, in military training, in combat readiness training, as well as in productive labor and economic construction. In doing so we must go into the daily life of the masses and the thoughts, sentiments, aspirations and practical deeds of cadres and combatants.

The political task must be regulated and standardized. Functions, responsibilities and rules of activities must be clearly defined for each echelon and for each cadre and combatant performing political tasks. We must complete and perfect the regulations pertaining to the political task and satisfactorily organize their implementation so as to effectively and uniformly implement the political task in the entire army and to gear it to all the activities of the people's army.

We are in a better situation now to further develop the execution of political tasks. We must take full advantage of modern technological facilities to vigorously develop artistic activities so as to meet the ever greater requirements in the spiritual life of our cadres and combatants. We must base ourselves on the new requirements of the political task in building political agencies and training and fostering the corps of cadres performing political tasks at all levels. Political cadres must be trained in a basic, comprehensive, systematic and uniform manner. They must not only possess political knowledge but military, economic and technological knowledge. They must possess knowledge not only about social science but about the natural sciences. They must have extensive knowledge of their own armed services and branches and sound knowledge of the other armed services and branches.

Regarding organized command, we must always observe the principle of collective leadership and that of the army unit chiefs' responsibility for organizing the implementation of tasks so as to insure both collective leadership by the party committee echelons as well as effective command by the army unit concerned. Only by so doing can we insure close party leadership over the army, insure rapid and timely command from the upper to the lower echelons, insure unity in will and action throughout the army and fulfillment of all tasks entrusted by the party and state regardless of circumstances.

In order to increase the efficiency of organized command, our army must advance toward realizing the hierarchic system according to the party Central Committee's regulations. This is a new task for our army. Therefore, proper preparations must be made and, particularly, better preparations must be made concerning the corps of cadres and the fostering of cadres' qualities and skills in the military, political, logistic, cultural, scientific and technical fields. We must understand that any cadre commanding an army unit is not merely the chief of this unit in the military aspect, but must be a commander responsible for his unit's activities in all fields--military, political, logistic and technical. He must exercise leadership in combat, military training, political training as well as economic construction. Of course, he must be assisted by the comrades in charge of each respective field.

We must continue to regulate our army's activities in all fields according to a uniform system of rules and regulations. This is one of the pressing questions in stepping up our army's standardization. It is also a firm

guarantee for increasing the efficiency of our army's organized command. We must urgently and definitely resolve in a relatively short time such urgent questions as supplementing, perfecting and completing the compilation of our army's system of official regulations and get them promulgated so they will be carried out throughout the army. We must educate our cadres and combatants fully and extensively so they will correctly observe the regulations. We must insure the material conditions necessary for their implementation, conduct strict control and correctly carry out rewarding and punitive measures.

Another major question related to increasing the efficiency of organized command is to build, streamline and perfect the army's agencies at all levels and develop their effectiveness. We must systematically and effectively build our army's agencies. Agencies must be places which bring together cadres with extensive specialized skills in specific fields and branches, who are capable of making studies and reviews, detecting new developments and providing guidance in organizing the implementation of tasks.

Cadres of agencies dealing with strategic and campaign matters must have a broad vision of strategic nature, bring out strategic matters and assist their leaders and commanders in building an army which can be combat-ready while engaged in economic activities.

I have just mentioned some major questions that we must resolve over a long period in order to build our People's Armed Forces into the most powerful People's Armed Forces in our nation's history. We must build the Vietnamese People's Army into a socialist army with a steadily rising level of standardization and modernization, which reflects the overall strength of an independent, reunified and socialist Vietnam.

As an immediate goal, our people throughout the country are striving to successfully fulfill the norms of the 1976-1980 Five-Year Plan set forth by the Fourth Party Congress. The People's Armed Forces must closely correlate the building of their forces with the fulfillment of this state plan. We must positively contribute to implementing this plan and must satisfactorily resolve the following pressing issues:

We must continue to strengthen national defense; increase the combat readiness posture of our armed force so they can meet requirements in all situations; improve organization; further increase the quality of the standing army; and properly assign troops that should stand combat-ready and troops that should engage in economic construction. We must push ahead in implementing the regional military task; strengthen the building of the militia and the self-defense and reserve forces; standardize the training of the cadres' corps; rapidly complete the review of the war experience; accelerate ideological studies; build an all-people's national defense; build the People's Armed Forces in the new stage; and build military science, art

and technology related to modern people's warfare in order to defend the socialist fatherland. We must accelerate implementation of the logistic task, suiting it to the new situation. We must further strengthen the material-technological base so it can support both the task of standing combat-ready and that of economic construction. We must stabilize the troops' activities in all fields, gradually improve the living conditions of cadres and combatants, and actively resolve the remaining questions in the postwar period.

By satisfactorily performing these pressing tasks, we will actually further raise the quality of our People's Armed Forces to a new level and implement the task of building the People's Armed Forces in this new era of our nation.

[1430 GMT 31 Jul 77]

[Part IV of Sen Gen Van Tien Dung address published in TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, No 7, 1977: "Build a Powerful People's Armed Forces To Steadily Defend the Socialist Vietnam Fatherland"; this part subtitled: "The People's Armed Forces and the Task of Building the Country and the Rear and Consolidating National Defense"]

[Text] In this part, I shall deal with four points: 1--thoroughly grasp party policy, develop the strength of military organization in national construction; 2--the immediate and long-term objectives of our army's economic construction task; 3--our army's method of economic construction: utilize and develop the experiences gained in leadership in combat and command in production leadership and management; and 4--our army must be a big school that contributes to training the youth into new socialist men who fight and produce well.

1. Thoroughly Grasp Party Policy, Develop the Strength of Military Organization in National Construction

The Fourth Party National Congress of Delegates, the party Central Committee and the Political Bureau advocated the use of the People's Armed Forces in economic tasks in order to develop the strength of military organization in building the country and consolidating national defense, thus contributing to rapidly bringing our country's economy directly from small-scale to large-scale socialist production, bypassing the stage of capitalist development and turning our country into a prosperous and strong socialist one. The fact that our People's Armed Forces are as big and strong as they are today is one of the great achievements of our country's revolution, party and people.

In past wars, our army has proved to be worthy of being the entire people's core force in fighting bandits, defeating one aggressor army after another and brilliantly fulfilling its combat task in the national liberation war.

Today, during the period of peaceful national construction, it must be the key force of the country and people in defending peace and the socialist fatherland and at the same time one of the party and state's shock forces on the economic and national construction front.

As one of the powerful forces of the state of proletarian dictatorship and of socialist revolution in our country, our People's Armed Forces have the advantage of having a revolutionary military organization that can be developed in economic construction. They are in the best position to coordinate economic development with national defense consolidation. They are large in number, of high quality, tightly organized and of a fine revolutionary nature, and share a glorious fighting tradition and a high sense of organization and discipline.

They comprise three categories of troops, which are deployed in all regions throughout the country and in all production installations of society. They can exercise a positive influence on central and regional economies and on production at the grassroots level. They have organizational structures and operational procedures of various scales--big, medium and small--not unlike those found in the operational procedures of large-scale socialist production and big industry.

They are experienced in leading, motivating and organizing the masses in carrying out complex tasks under many different circumstances. They have a definite material-technical base and managerial skill and have mastered many types of relatively modern equipment. Moreover, they are being replenished yearly with young, healthy and enthusiastic youths who have been trained under the new regime.

These are strong points that can be developed in economic construction, thus contributing to creating an economic structure of large-scale socialist production in our country.

By using the armed forces in economic work, our party and state can rely on a large and powerful labor force with a revolutionary military organization which can be concentrated in important and key branches and enterprises in difficult and vital areas so as to bring about a powerful development in economic construction. For instance, if we should urgently have to solve pressing problems on the agricultural production front, rapidly increase the crop acreage or resolve food and foodstuff problems, we could use a large force of troops to clear tens of thousands, and even hundreds of thousands, of hectares of virgin land that would otherwise present many difficulties or where we would not yet be able to send our people.

Within the sphere of one region--a province or a district--if we should have to rapidly complete some key project, such as a water conservancy project, we could gather provincial or district regional troops and militia and self-defense forces to finish it within a short time.

The economic installations built by the armed forces belong to the state-run sector and are owned by all the people. The more vigorously the armed forces take part in economic work, the more they contribute to strengthening the state-run economy, expanding the ownership of all the people, and reinforcing the sector of socialism in the fierce and complex struggle between the socialist and capitalist paths, thus further insuring complete victory for socialism.

As the number of large-scale state farms, forest farms, fishing fleets and production installations of high economic productivity and efficiency and run by the state and army economic sectors increases, the state can control larger quantities of food, foodstuffs, raw materials, materials and many other strategic products and can better hold the initiative in the development of agriculture, forestry, fishery and industry. In order to build large-scale socialist production we must simultaneously carry out three revolutions, among which the scientific-technological revolution is the key one.

Our armed forces are capable of rapidly assimilating scientific and technological knowledge and have already had some experience in this matter. During the war years in the past, especially during the anti-U.S. resistance war, our armed forces actually carried out a scientific-technological revolution in the military field. They mastered modern technical equipment to triumph over the enemy who was superior in modern material and technical equipment. Today, while engaging in economic work, our armed forces are in a position to, together with the state economic and technical sectors, contribute to pushing forward the scientific-technological revolution in our country in all fields--industrial, agricultural, forest, fishing, capital construction, communications and transportation and consumer goods production.

The large-scale socialist production that we are building must be rooted in big industry which is capable of reequipping all the branches of the national economy on the basis of modern technology. Naturally, to bring the economy from small-scale to large-scale socialist production, we must succeed in gradually building our country's heavy industry. By engaging in economic work and entering technical fields, particularly by building a modern national defense in our country, our armed forces actually contribute, together with the state sectors, to resolving this great task of historical significance.

[1430 GMT 1 Aug 77]

[Text] Our country's workers now number more than 20 million. Our country's work force continues to increase. The problem is how to fully use this plentiful resource, the work force. A foremost and decisive question is that we must redistribute and redivide the work force throughout the country and in each branch, locality and installation. Our army is responsible for and capable of making positive contributions to this question.

One of the important tasks in the Second Five-Year Plan and subsequent plans is that we must redistribute the work force throughout the country and send millions of workers from urban areas and populated delta areas to sparsely populated mountain areas in order to build new economic zones. Remote, rugged, wild and sparsely populated forest and mountain areas usually are strategic areas which are important to the economy and national defense. As countless difficulties and hardships emerge during the initial pioneering period, we must dispatch army units to these areas and strengthen the development of revolutionary armed organizations so as to contribute to solving problems related to this very difficult task. The fact that hundreds of thousands of our troops are engaged in the reclamation of vast areas of wasteland and building new economic zones is in itself a redistribution of the work force. However, more important is the fact that our troops should take the lead in reclaiming wasteland in order to prepare conditions so that hundreds of thousands and even millions of people can gradually be sent from the delta to newly reclaimed areas. Moreover, large numbers of our troops engaged in production in economic sectors should also contribute to redistributing the work force in various sectors of our national economy.

In line with economic developments, industry and agriculture will develop on a large scale. The number of industrial workers increase in highly developed countries which have large-scale production, and they usually account for 70 percent or more of the total work force. As an immediate goal, our army must concentrate on the agricultural front, but in the long range, it must concentrate on industry and capital construction. Thus, our army's large work force, which will be concentrated in industry and capital construction, will make a large contribution in redistributing the work force and building a comprehensively developed industrial and agricultural structure for our country's large-scale socialist production.

Along with reorganizing the work force and satisfactorily organizing and managing the economy, we must renovate our labor tools. This is a basic factor which leads to big leaps forward in labor productivity. Our people and army must fully utilize all labor tools of different technical levels--from rudimentary to improved and modern tools--so as to produce a large quantity of products for society. However, our renovation must be planned. While striving to conduct a scientific-technological revolution and performing economic activities, our army will gradually contribute to renovating labor tools and proceed from work in which manual labor is prevalent to work with mechanized and automated machinery. This is also a requirement in building large-scale socialist production. In our People's Armed Forces, this process is correlated with results achieved by our army's agencies for scientific and technological research, with the level of skills and capabilities in producing labor tools by the national defense enterprises and enterprises of the military regions, military corps, and armed services and branches, and with the cooperation between the army and the state economic sectors.

In developing the advantages of the Revolutionary Army's organizations, gradually increasing the level of economic knowledge, gathering additional production experiences, and gradually renovating labor tools, our army will certainly be capable of making positive contributions to accelerating the increase of the social work force's productivity. In the recent past, despite the fact that they still encountered difficulties and lacked experience, several army units achieved high productivity and were recognized by various ministries and sectors.

Being an important work force, our army can produce annually large quantities of goods for society. In particular, by motivating youth to join the army according to the military obligation system which carries out productive labor in coordination with military training and combat readiness training, our army is capable of producing a large quantity of surplus goods. This combatant force is discharging its military obligations; it is made up of vigorous youths who earn in accordance with their duties and enjoy only subsistence expenses and allowances commensurate with the level of arduousness or complexity of their work or the degree of unwholesomeness of the areas where they are assigned; and they do not work directly for themselves or their families but for society--of course, they and their families are a part of society. In a sense, we can say that this is the communist-type of labor. Lenin said: Communism begins when common workers concern themselves, in a spirit of sacrifice and regardless of arduousness, with increasing labor productivity and safeguarding small amounts of wheat, coal, iron and other products, which do not go into their own hands or those of their close relatives, but into the hands of their distant relatives--that is, the hands of the entire society, the tens and even hundreds of millions of people who are united in a socialist country.

Our army labors to develop a communist-type economy. This type of labor creates a large quantity of surplus goods for society. Here lies the advantage of the revolutionary armed organization performing economic activities. It is a goal that we can attain, if we follow the examples of the very valuable experience of many fraternal socialist countries.

In implementing the military obligation system, a fairly large group of youths will join the army every year and will be trained and fostered so they will become not only stalwart combatants but excellent socialist workers--that is, outstanding workers of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. There will be many combatants leaving the army every year after they complete their tasks in the army and they will join the working class' contingent. Thus, our army can contribute to rapidly increasing the quantity and quality of workers of working-class backgrounds and contribute to effecting a change to the class structure in our country. This contribution is not only of great economic significance but of profound political and social significance.

[1430 GMT 2 Aug 77]

[Text] Our country's requirements in the new stage demand that the building of the fatherland be accompanied by its defense, and that economic construction be coordinated with national defense consolidation. All economic construction activities and productive labor achievements of our armed forces are significant to both the economy and national defense, and are intended to meet the requirements in building the rear [xaay dwngj haauj phwowng] and building the army. Let us give an example: in performing agricultural activities, our army contributes to positively resolving a very basic, long-range economic task in our national economy, particularly the task of the 1976-1980 Five-Year Plan. In performing this task, our army is indeed increasing the strength of our national defense, building the rear and building the army's material base.

An army is strong only if its troops have enough food. Only if we succeed in solving the food problem can we solve many other problems. Food is always a strategic matter for our people and army in the economic and military fields and in times of peace and war. In producing consumer goods such as clothing, shoes, sandals, medicine and other necessary commodities, our army not only carries out its economic construction task but builds the army's material base; carries out its rear service task; and resolves the troops' food, clothing and housing problems. In carrying out transport and communications activities, our army supports economic circulation activities and our people's needs to move around throughout the country and accelerate economic development. In so doing, our army also carries out military transportation and communications activities, and prepares to transport mobile troops, technical equipment and weapons whenever necessary. In carrying out national defense industrial activities, our army builds the material-technological base for a modern army and contributes to building the material-technological base of socialism.

Of course, different requirements exist for the economy and national defense. Therefore, we must closely coordinate economic activities with national defense and vice versa. This is an objective for building large-scale socialist construction in our country. Our army enjoys more favorable conditions than the other forces to accomplish this coordination.

In assigning economic tasks to the army, we must always pay attention to coordinating economic activities with national defense and coordinating the building of a prosperous and powerful country with building the army's material-technological base. At the same time, through economic construction, our army--together with the other economic sectors--will be able to contribute to implementing the coordination of economic construction requirements with those needed for consolidating national defense.

Through analyzing the aforementioned points, we realize that with the advantages enjoyed by the revolutionary military organizations shifting to

economic work, our army can make many positive contributions to building the country and to large-scale socialist production. These contributions to the state economic sectors in the different fields of social life--economic, political, national defense, cultural and social--will be ever greater. By so doing, our army also takes part in building a steadfast all-people's national defense, a solid rear base for people's warfare and the army itself. However, our army will encounter weaknesses and difficulties when shifting to economic work, particularly during the initial period. It must endeavor to overcome them.

Because army organizations are formed and developed according to the rules of armed struggle and fighting while economic organizations are built and developed according to economic and production rules, when part of the army shifts to economic work, some organizational inconsistencies appear. Therefore, the Political Bureau's resolution concerning the army's economic work pointed out, when the army is engaged in economic work, we must, in general, maintain it a military organization but some changes are also required to suit the situation. We must organize army units according to the tasks, requirements and characteristics of each type of force. Those forces primarily in charge of economic work must have an organization different from that of the combat-ready forces. Army units doing economic work and having different tasks in different sectors--agriculture; forestry; fishery; industry; capital construction; construction of factories, houses, municipalities and cities; building of roads, railroads; laying of pipelines; and construction of airfields, water conservance and hydroelectric projects--must have their own organizations which are suited to each task and each sector.

We must rapidly resolve the question of organizing leadership and command to do economic work and organizing production-support agencies and (?specialized, technical production agencies). Our army's weakest point and its greatest difficulty in economic work is that it lacks know-how, economic experience, knowledge of economic rules, organizational science and economic management science corresponding to large-scale socialist production and modern production science and technology. We still lack labor tools, particularly modern mechanized labor equipment. Crude labor tools are still prevalent.

The problem is that we must study harder. Economic studies will play a decisive factor in our army's fulfillment of its economic task. We must conduct studies in a revolutionary offensive spirit and with a "determined to fight and to win" will and practical methods. We must learn from the state economic sectors, strive to acquire assistance from various sectors and achieve solidarity with them in a spirit of comradeship and socialist cooperation. We must urgently and intensively produce many labor tools, including crude, improved, semi-modern and modern tools so as to rapidly meet the requirements of productive labor tasks, to increase labor productivity and economic efficiency and to produce great wealth for society.

Our army's difficulties during the first period of production and economic work are very great, but we certainly will be able to gradually overcome them. Previously, when we first launched the war of resistance against the French, our cadres' and combatants' level of knowledge in the military field was very limited and our army's weapons and equipment were crude and few. However, our People's Armed Forces, upholding the spirit of fighting and making sacrifices, endeavored to overcome difficulties; conducted military studies; resolved the weapons question; matured rapidly and, together with all of our people, successfully conducted the war of resistance against the French.

When we first unleashed the war of resistance against the United States, our army was inferior to the enemy's in terms of numerical strength, weapons and equipment, and our troops' knowledge of modern military science and technology was still limited. However, building their forces while fighting the enemy, our People's Armed Forces worked hard, studied diligently, learned how to use many types of modern weapons and technical equipment, made great strides in increasing their fighting strength and finally--together with all of our people--completely defeated the largest, mightiest, and most modern army of international imperialism.

Now that it is engaged in economic construction work, our army is facing difficulties regarding know-how, economic construction capabilities, material supplies and labor tools. However, many of our army units have rapidly and thoroughly grasped the determination of the party Central Committee and Political Bureau, have clearly realized their weighty but glorious task on the national construction front, have immediately and arduously embarked upon economic work in a very high, intense revolutionary spirit similar to that they displayed during the war and have scored meritorious initial achievements. These initial achievements prove the determination and great capabilities of our army on the new front. Despite great difficulties facing us, we will certainly be able to overcome them and will fulfill the tasks entrusted by the party, just as previously we outstandingly fulfilled the task of fighting the enemy to liberate the nation.

[1430 GMT 4 Aug 77]

[Text] 2. The Immediate and Long-Term Objectives of Our Army's Economic Construction Task

This is a very big question that must be carefully studied and considered in various aspects. In addition, it must be modified and readjusted through the army's actual efforts. The immediate and long-term objectives of our army's economic construction task must be closely linked to those of our country's socialist construction. Our army's economic construction plan is part of the state's short-term and long-term economic development plan. It is also linked to the army's task of building a material-technical base for itself.

The long-term objective in the army's economic construction plan is to make an important contribution to building the material-technical base for socialism by working with all the people to successfully fulfill the task of bringing our country's economy from small-scale to large-scale socialist production in accordance with the resolutions of the Fourth Party Congress. At the same time, the army must coordinate with the different state economic sectors to basically resolve the problems of the material-technical base. These two goals are closely connected and respond to the requirements for national construction and defense.

Our army can directly contribute to building the country not only by merely doing projects assigned it by the state. If it succeeds in supplying an ever greater part of its own essential needs, it will also be directly contributing to building the country. Proceeding from the economic construction line and the orientations and tasks for immediate and long-term economic development set forth by the Fourth Party Congress and on the basis of its present and future conditions and capabilities, our army must make efforts toward increasing contributions to the development of the national economic sectors. This will respond both to the country's pressing requirements after 30 years of war and destruction and to the basic demand of the building of a material-technical base for socialism in our country.

In the next few years, from now until the end of 1980, our army must deploy a great force on the agricultural, forestry and fishery fronts. At the same time it must engage in industry, capital construction, communications and transportation, and make important contributions to the successful implementation of the Second Five-Year Plan and supply its own needs in grain and foodstuffs and part of its needs in consumer goods and other necessities.

As we have only about 4 years to implement this Five-Year Plan, we must move very quickly. The guiding thought is to attack and be determined to win in this plan. Only by doing this can we create conditions and establish a base for strong development in subsequent plans. On the agricultural, forestry and fishery front, we must resolutely penetrate vast virgin areas to rapidly expand the cultivated and animal husbandry sectors. We must grow rice, subsidiary crops, industrial plants and forests on tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of hectares, exploit forest and maritime products on a large scale and raise domestic animals and poultry according to industrial methods. In this way, we will contribute to considerably increasing the country's grain and foodstuffs, supplying ever larger quantities of raw materials to industry and goods for exports and consumption and to expanding the state's accumulation.

Our army must positively participate in the capital construction front. We can and must mobilize a relatively large force so as to join with the state construction workers in building factories, water projects, hydro-electric plants, basic projects in the new economic zones, new state farms

and forest farms; rebuild cities, provincial capitals, towns, schools and hospitals destroyed by the war or build them anew--particularly in new economic zones and important and vital strategic areas in the mountains and forests having great economic and national defense significance. This is a basic and pressing task that must be performed very urgently, over a long period, with expanding volume, on an ever larger scale and using more and more modern techniques.

Our army must positively take part in the work on the communications and transport front. We can and must utilize a proper number of our troops along with the work force of the state construction and communications sectors to build an expanding network of roads, railroads and pipelines throughout the country and to streamline, perfect and expand the network of airfields, wharves and ports so that we will be able to meet escalating requirements in economic transactions among the various parts of our country and between our country and foreign countries--these requirements will be very great in the next several decades--and to meet national defense requirements in both peacetime and wartime.

Regarding our army's national defense enterprises, we must, on the one hand, continue to concentrate forces on building new installations and, on the other hand, along with carrying out production in line with national defense requirements, we must resolutely mobilize the largest possible amount of manpower, machinery and raw materials along with the work force of the state machine industry to produce large quantities of labor tools to meet production requirements and, together with the state light industry enterprises, to produce certain varieties of consumer goods for supply to the army and people.

Presently, on the path to large-scale socialist production, our country's economy is encountering many difficulties. These difficulties are objective ones because our country--whose material-technical base is basically very weak, was virtually destroyed during the war years. We must work positively in many economic sectors because the actual requirements of national economic construction demand this. This is aimed at contributing to the resolution of our country's and army's difficulties. We must begin our tasks. This is the only way to overcome difficulties. During the 1976-1980 period, if we do our work well and can overcome--we certainly will be able to overcome--the difficulties we are encountering, we will make very great, new progress in subsequent plans. Of course, new difficulties will arise, but they will be of a different nature.

When our troops' economic work has been gradually disciplined and when they have gained sufficient experience in this field, and when our country's economic and technological levels have developed to a fairly high level, our troops may have to concentrate on some particular sectors suitable to their skills, particularly key sectors, which are mostly related to national defense.

Thus, our armed forces must do economic work not only in the coming years and during the length of the current Five-Year Plan, but on a long-term basis, as I mentioned in part II. In any historic stage, as long as our army exists in peacetime, we must perform both military and economic tasks and stand combat-ready to defend our fatherland while building our economy and our country. In addition, on the basis of stepping up our country's industrialization, in coordination with various sectors of the national economy our army must strive to advance toward resolving on its own problems related to the building of its own material-technical base. This is a very new requirement.

[1430 GMT 5 Aug 77]

[Text] In the last war, our army had to concentrate on fighting. We had to rely on the aid of fraternal countries for a large part of our technical equipment and weapons and for part of the grain and food we needed. Our army's logistical tasks were carried out for a long time under such conditions. Since we now live in peacetime, we cannot continue to do so. Our army must strive to gradually meet, with its own means, its grain and food requirements as well as its requirements in essential consumer goods and, together with the various national economic sectors, particularly the industrial sector, build a modern national defense industry. We cannot continue to think and act in the style of "receiving goods from foreign countries and distributing them inside the country" and "receiving goods from higher echelons and distributing them in lower echelons" as we did before, but instead must produce our own goods.

By saying that our army must strive to resolve its own problems, we mean that we cannot distribute only to the troops what we get from the state. And by saying that the army must resolve its own problems and produce goods itself for its own use, we do not mean that production and utilization of goods by the army are done in a close cycle of a self-sufficient, self-supplying economy. Our army's economic work is a part of the socialist state's unified economic structure. The army's plan for developing production and for meeting its own demands must be integrated into a common state plan and policies under the party's leadership and under the concentrated and unified management of the government. Work assignments and cooperation with other state economic sectors must be achieved. There are some types of products and projects that the army must produce or carry out in cooperation with other state economic sectors for its own use such as military equipment, weapons and national defense projects. There are some types of products and projects that the army must produce or carry out for its own benefit and for the people's benefit such as grain, food, other essential commodities and economic and cultural projects in support of the people's livelihood.

In carrying out its work assignments and in cooperating with other state sectors, our army must strive to meet, in increasing proportion, its demands in food, clothes, houses, medical treatment and facilities for its spiritual activities in peacetime and must have reserves for use in wartime.

As for food, we must study and resolve problems regarding food resources, diet composition, and the way of cooking in peacetime and wartime inside and outside military camps. We must advance a step further in drawing on experience in order to contribute to formulating a dietary composition and our people's scientific way of cooking. Our army must not only produce enough grain for its troops in peacetime but create reserves for the state and strive to provide for our people's future grain needs. By so doing, we make very important contributions to the country not only in the economic field but in the military, political and social fields. Our troops' diet must be one based on modern scientific research which is suitable to our people's characteristics and to military organizations in peacetime and wartime. We must conduct studies to arrive at a suitable proportion of protein, rice and subsidiary crop products, and animal and vegetable protein in our army's diet and carry out industrial processing of this diet so that it is light and less cumbersome. We must positively resolve problems related to processing grain varieties such as corn, potatoes, cassava and so forth and conduct studies on field rations in modern warfare. The army's way of cooking must be improved to suit conditions of an industrialized country in peacetime and must be consistent with highly mobile conditions of wartime in a modern war. We must not prolong the situation wherein our army's companies, while on the move, must take along large cooking pans to cook their food. We must conduct studies for producing rations of dehydrated foods. In solving this problem, our army will make a very significant contribution to society by solving problems related to our people's diet for industrial workers and by minimizing the time households spend on cooking.

As for clothing, we must resolve problems related to the resources of clothing, the network of ready-made clothing enterprises, and styles, colors and quality of clothing items, shoes, sandals, caps, belts, knapsacks and military insignias so they are suitable for a modern army, the SRV army. We must participate positively in cultivating cotton and jute and produce natural and synthetic textile fibers. We must rapidly perfect the army's network of ready-made clothing enterprises and shoe and sandal enterprises. We must study available styles of military equipment in order to suit the activities of a modern Vietnamese army, according to the weather and climate of areas where our troops carry out their activities, and according to the characteristics of each armed service and branch and, at the same time, to insure neatness, simplicity, durability, beauty and reduction in expenses.

On the housing question, durable military camps must have sufficient facilities and must be solid and attractive. Military camps must be exemplary living quarters and must suit not only requirements for combat-readiness, meetings and studies in the immediate and long-range future, but must reflect the civilized life of new socialist men who are revolutionary combatants, knowledgeable in all fields, with a high level of political awareness and aesthetics and who have met requirements in both material and spiritual aspects.

Our army must strive to produce raw materials and building materials, including those that our troops can mainly produce themselves such as bricks, tiles, lime and cement and those whose production necessitates coordination with economic sectors such as chinaware, glassware, iron and steel. We must formulate plans that will be gradually implemented in accordance with the aforesaid long-range policy.

Regarding medical treatment and medicine, the army medical branch must make positive contributions in order that together with the state health sector it builds a modern national medicine, a modern Vietnamese military medicine. We must attach importance to training good physicians having good political qualities and a high level of scientific knowledge. We must gradually improve the material-technical base in line with the direction to modernization. We must, on a step-by-step basis, meet requirements of medicine, medical treatment and treatment of troops' wounds mainly with locally available medicinal products. Therefore, we must take steps right now for studies in this field. We must have a force of capable cadres to make specialized and profound studies in order to form and systematically build modern Vietnamese military medicine. We must provide guidance over and organize a movement to grow and exploit medicinal herbs and plants in all army units. Large army units must have drug production installations, using locally available medicinal herbs and plants and those which they can grow and exploit. We must conduct studies on treatment of diseases and wounds with modern Vietnamese medical methods. These methods must be worked out on the basis of our people's traditional experiences which are continually developing. At the same time, we must take advantage of and apply new knowledge and achievements of modern medicine. We must coordinate modern medicine with our people's traditional medicine.

Regarding consumer goods, we must make studies and strive to resolve for ourselves a major part of our army's needs of essential consumer goods such as soap, toothpaste, cigarettes, paper, cultural items and physical education and sporting goods. This is a relatively important requirement that must be fulfilled over a long period of time. In the immediate future, we can meet part of them, particularly in military regions and military provincial agencies which develop the advantages of each region and coordinate with local economic sectors.

Obviously, these requirements are very great and many difficulties will be encountered during the first phase of our implementing tasks to fulfill them, but our army must and certainly will be able to meet them.

[1430 GMT 6 Aug 77]

[Text] 3. Our Army's Method of Economic Construction: Utilize and Develop the Experience Gained in Leadership and Command in Combat in Leading and Managing Production

Methods play an important role in implementing any revolutionary task. In revolutionary struggle and war, after a correct policy has been formulated, methods for conducting revolution and methods for conducting warfare constitute a direct factor in deciding victory. The same holds true in economic construction. After the correct line and the objectives of struggle have been worked out, methods for carrying out the task constitute a decisive factor in achieving the set objectives. If our army carries out its work according to the style of small-scale production, in a scattered and fragmentary manner, doing work purely at its own convenience and with low productivity and poor quality, it can at best carry out simple production and meet only part of its requirements and will be unable to make any significant contributions to the state and society. On the contrary, if our army knows how to develop its advantage of being a revolutionary military organization, knows how to work according to the style of large-scale socialist production, its vast work force will be able to create large quantities of products, meet its essential requirements and meet the increasing requirements in building a prosperous and strong country.

We are determined to carry out the party's policy of letting the army do economic work. Of course, in the initial stages we will encounter difficulties and lack experience as mentioned earlier, but we are confident that we will be able to overcome step-by-step all these difficulties by our own effort and creativity and with the assistance and cooperation of the economic sectors.

At present and in the coming years, we can and must pay attention to satisfactorily resolving a number of questions related to our army's economic work. First, we must always follow closely both the short and long-range state plans and the tasks that the state entrusts to the army; firmly grasp the army's requirements and capabilities in the immediate and more distant future; and, on this basis, formulate concrete objectives, steps, plans and measures for the entire army and for each army unit. Each army unit must also firmly grasp and develop the economic advantage of its respective locality and closely coordinate with the local economies. In this way, our entire army will work according to a unified, balanced and uniform plan and work assignment, thus insuring cooperation among army agencies and between the army and the state sectors.

We must always formulate plans on the basis of requirements and capabilities for the immediate future--from 5 to 10 years--as well as for the more distant future--10 to 20 years. We must carry out our work in accordance with actual realities while anticipating future developments. We must achieve close coordination with the state economic sectors in the agricultural, forestry, fishery, industrial, capital construction, communications, transport, material supplies, trade, financial and banking fields as well as with local economic agencies of the provincial, municipal and district administrations so as to insure mutual assistance and activities according to a unified plan among the economic construction forces within and outside

of the army and at the central level as well as at the local level in order to produce the greatest wealth possible for society.

Our army must do its economic work in this manner, not only because the army carries out production as a part of the national economy but also because it cannot by itself resolve all the questions related to the production process.

In each production unit, we must attach particular attention to organizing management. This is a very important matter in large-scale socialist production. Particularly under the present conditions when labor tools are largely rudimentary, organization is of decisive significance in achieving greater productivity and greater efficiency. Recently, in carrying out water conservancy work, many army units achieved fairly high productivity and economic efficiency. This proves the great role and significance of labor organization.

Resolving the organizational question not only means resolving the question of organizing the work force for the respective production field, but also means resolving many other questions such as increasing the force directly engaged in production, decreasing the force indirectly engaged in production, supporting administrative activities, expanding the skilled work force, gradually decreasing the unskilled work force, organizing a unified and uniform production chain and managing the work force, man-days and man-hours, productivity and quality. We must go deep into economic production matters in order to resolve the organizational question in the most suitable manner and develop economic efficiency as best we can. We must resolutely overcome the situation in which workers work at their own convenience and thereby cause a large amount of waste.

A basic, pressing question that we must study and resolve now is how to improve and supply labor tools to the troops. This is a decisive factor for increasing labor productivity and also an important requirement in realizing the great objective of scientific-technological revolution in production and economic construction by our army.

Comrade Le Duan, general secretary of the party, once said: Our country's workers now number more than 20 million. If they are equipped with modern labor tools, their production capability will equal that of 200 million or more workers. Thus, by improving labor tools, a worker equipped with mechanized equipment can achieve a 10 times higher productivity than a worker equipped only with manual labor tools. Even a worker equipped with improved labor tools can achieve a labor productivity which is two or three times higher than that of a worker equipped with rudimentary labor tools. If we know how to concentrate our forces on resolving this question, our army's work force will be able to achieve higher labor productivity and greater economic efficiency.

In many army units, the question of workers is very serious. In some of the tens of thousands of hectares of army farms, our troops carry chemical fertilizer in their knapsacks to fertilize the soil and sow seeds and spray insecticides from baskets. In this way, how can we achieve high labor productivity, low production cost and large production? In many army units, our troops do not even have enough hoes and shovels for preparing the soil or enough large axes for reclaiming wasteland in forest areas. Therefore, for the immediate future, we must concentrate our efforts on supplying sufficient labor tools to our troops and on studying and solving--the sooner the better--the question of improving labor tools so as to achieve a labor productivity which is at least double the present one. At the same time, we must mobilize some of the modern equipment that we have, without affecting combat readiness and our strategic reserves, to support the economic construction task.

[1430 GMT 7 Aug 77]

[Text] A very important factor in developing the advantage of being a revolutionary military organization in doing economic work is that we must know how to develop the experience gained in leadership and command in combat and apply it to leadership and management of production. Recently, many army units satisfactorily performed this task and gained much good experience. They determined the direction of production in the same manner as they determined the direction of an attack--that is, in line with the requirements, tasks, actual production conditions and their units' capabilities. They prepared themselves for production in the same way they prepared themselves for combat on the battlefield. They conducted research and study, correctly assessed the objective situation and subjective conditions, learned how to seize opportunities, carried out production while developing it and utilized the proper work forces. They provided leadership and guidance over and managed production in the same way they provided leadership and command in a military campaign and attack. They resolutely and strictly directed their activities toward the objective, acted in a concentrated and uniform manner, insured close coordination among their component parts, adopted a clearcut attitude, formulated detailed plans and quickly completed the separate parts of the task at hand. They knew how to concentrate efforts on key tasks so as to bring about a favorable change in the production situation. They knew how to apply and develop the strength of their staff and their political, logistical and technical agencies in production.

In regiments and divisions, the staff actually served as an advisory body for production and worked out production plans in the same way they formulated combat plans. The logistical and technical agencies performed logistical tasks and insured that production was carried out in a technical-oriented manner, providing labor tools and material supplies to the production personnel in the same way they supplied equipment and weapons to the combat troops. They cared for the livelihood of the production personnel and insured sufficient food, houses and clothes for the various types of workers.

The political agencies provided guidance in implementing political tasks in line with production requirements, fostered education and motivated people to engage in production in the same way they educated and motivated them for combat. They launched emulation drives and turned the emulation movement to perform productive labor, develop innovations and improve management organization and techniques into a true motive power in production in the same way they launched movements to score achievements in combat. They carried out policies regarding production personnel and plunged deep into all production activities and scientific and technological matters.

Of course, by saying that we must develop the strength of being a military organization in economic work and must organize leadership and command and perform economic work in the same way we organize leadership and command in combat, we do not mean that economic construction work must be strictly patterned after combat. Economic rules differ from military rules. Therefore, in doing economic work we must thoroughly understand the economic rules. Army units engaged in economic work in various fields and trades must, on the one hand, maintain their military organization; on the other hand, they must know how to apply the experiences gained in carrying out military tasks to economic work in line with the economic rules for these various fields and trades.

We learned a valuable lesson in the revolutionary offensive spirit during the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation. It was a lesson in overcoming difficulties and obstacles. It teaches us that as soon as we adopt the correct direction and strategy, we should start working and the realities will help us further understand our work. Our army units that scored initial achievements on the economic front worked in the same spirit. The cadres and combatants of these units did not wait until they were in a solid position to start work, but daringly and resolutely started work and in the process gradually learned how to work properly. They can work well now.

Under the conditions in which we are advancing directly from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production, we must radically get rid of the old and build the new and must create a new production force, new economic installations and a new superstructure. Furthermore, we must be resolute in our acts and have a very high level of creativity and positiveness. We must not remain passive and refuse to act because of difficulties.

From now on and in the coming years, we must mobilize the largest force possible from among our troops to do economic work. We must concentrate our efforts on building at all costs typical production installations. To this end, general department agencies, military regions, armed services and branches and combat-ready forces must concentrate their respective forces on the assigned work according to their capabilities and duties. They must be daring in thought and action and know how to work to achieve the greatest benefit for the fatherland and make their country prosperous

and strong within the shortest possible time. They must strive to secure assistance from the various state sectors and agencies and at the same time positively contribute, together with these sectors and agencies, to overcoming all difficulties so as to speed national construction.

The pressing requirements of national construction now demand that we mobilize all forces, manpower and material resources for production. We must utilize all facilities that can be used for economic construction. Our army's property is the property of the state, of all our people. It is the common property of our country. It must be mobilized as much as necessary and as much as possible in support of the economic construction work. Therefore, we must guard against and overcome all manifestations of departmentalism and regionalism and must avoid a situation in which our scanty and scattered property is not rationally utilized and not properly maintained, thus causing damage and losses.

We must conduct an accurate and correct inventory of our property. We must properly maintain all property necessary for combat readiness, our army's development and our strategic reserves. We must have plans for timely, rational and efficient utilization of all that can be mobilized and utilized--particularly material supplies and machinery--for economic work and by the army's economic construction work force and the state.

[1430 GMT 8 Aug 77]

[Text] 4. Our Army Must Be a Big School That Contributes to Training Youths Into New Socialist Men Who Fight and Produce Well

Previously, during the war, our army was a big school which fostered and trained tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of youths to be combatants with revolutionary consciousness and combat skills to meet our country's then most pressing requirement: to fight to liberate the nation and advance to socialism. Now that we live in a peaceful period of national construction and defense, our army has again been entrusted by the party to serve as a large school which contributes to turning our youths into new socialist men, stalwart combatants who defend the fatherland and are at the same time outstanding workers enthusiastically building the country and socialism. This task of our army is consistent with our country's revolution in the new stage, with the aspirations of our cadres, combatants, youths and people and with the requirements of building our army.

With our army doing economic work, every one of our youths, while discharging his military obligations, can not only improve his knowledge in the military field but, through productive labor, acquire labor skills and gradually improve his professional skills.

In the immediate future, most of our cadres and combatants will have to do economic work under conditions in which manual labor still prevails. But

in the long run, when our army will do economic work with increasingly modern mechanized equipment, a large number of our youths will have conditions in which they can become technical workers.

Previously, during the war, with our country's survival at stake, our youths enlisted in the army to discharge their highest obligation at the time: to fight to liberate the nation and advance to socialism. They usually did not show any aspirations regarding their professions or lives. Now that we live in a peaceful period of national construction and defense, our youths in discharging their military obligations not only want to improve their military knowledge so they can perform well their duty of defending the fatherland during the time they are in the army, they also want to learn trades and to improve their professional skills so they will be able, at an early date, to contribute to building the country. Thus they want at the same time to broaden their knowledge and learn a trade so that later, when they complete their term of obligatory military service and leave the army, they will have secured the necessary conditions to satisfactorily perform the task of building the country in the various national economic sectors and to build their own lives.

Naturally, in order to satisfactorily perform the task of productive labor and economic construction, we must train and foster people and organize them in accordance with our production requirements. Our army is a revolutionary armed organization engaged in economic work. Therefore, on the one hand, we can develop its advantage of being such an organization to do economic work; on the other hand, we can, through productive labor, continue to consolidate and increase its strength in all aspects--organization, morale, determination and cultural, scientific and technological standards.

We must plan time for military training and forging combat skills and combat readiness for the combatants. But if we properly understand and know how to skillfully coordinate these activities, we can train these combatants even during the course of doing productive labor and organize the army to help meet not only production requirements but the requirements of building a modern, combat-ready people's army.

Since many of the requirements of large-scale socialist production are very much like those of building and training a revolutionary armed organization--for example, the army as an armed organization must have a very high level of organized discipline; to carry out productive labor in line with large-scale socialist production also requires a very high level of organized discipline--the establishment and enforcement of work discipline in doing economic work contributes significantly to consolidating and strengthening army discipline in military training, combat readiness and combat.

Productive labor carried out in line with large-scale socialist production must be technical-oriented labor carried out on an increasingly higher technical level. Therefore, before as well as in the course of doing labor

work, we must constantly increase the combatants' level of knowledge in the cultural, scientific and technological fields. Their knowledge in these fields generally increases in the course of doing productive labor. This is a very favorable condition enabling our combatants to better understand modern military science and technology.

Productive labor is also a kind of combat in which workers fight against nature and wage a bloodless war. Carrying out productive labor under our country's specific conditions at present, particularly in difficult but vital areas, obviously demands that we have a revolutionary spirit, the will to fight and a very strong determination to fight and to win. Training and fostering our troops in the will to fight so as to meet requirements of the productive labor task and building the economy under such difficult and harsh conditions will also help to keep up the troops' morale and help prepare them for the task of standing combat-ready and fighting successfully whenever necessary.

Turning the army into a truly vast school that contributes to fostering and turning tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of youths not only into excellent combatants, but also excellent workers, is a gigantic task that requires much effort. Its success depends on how well we carry out our tasks regarding leadership and command, political indoctrination, ideological and military training and productive labor and on our efforts in enhancing the combatants' knowledge and training them how to cope with actual combat and production, and to perform other tasks and activities.

These are the major problems concerning our troops engaged in economic work for the immediate and more distant future. This is a political task of extremely great strategic significance for our army, a task of tremendous and weighty responsibility for our whole army. With thorough understanding of the party's policy, we must resolutely organize our troops to implement this task at all costs.

[1430 GMT 10 Aug 77]

[Conclusion of Sen Gen Van Tien Dung address]

[Text] Strive To Advance Toward a Strong Socialist Vietnam Fatherland and Build a Powerful People's Armed Force

The application of the Fourth Party Congress resolutions to the building of the People's Armed Forces in the new revolutionary stage is a great task that demands that our party, army and people respond with intelligence. All army cadres, especially high-ranking cadres, must strive to study and implement the party resolutions and fulfill the duties of each unit and person. They must have an extremely positive and serious attitude, uphold their sense of responsibility and guard against and overcome the phenomena of lazy thinking, subjectivity, satisfaction with one's achievements and stagnation.

During the past half century, under the party's leadership, our people and army completed one big project: defeating the imperialist aggressors and their lackeys, recovering independence and freedom for the fatherland and creating conditions for taking the whole country to socialism, thus making a worthy contribution to the world revolutionary cause. During the next few decades, we must--and certainly we can--complete another big project: overcoming backwardness and poverty, fulfilling the task of building a material-technical base for socialism in our country and building a prosperous and strong socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

The aforementioned questions concerning the building of the armed forces to safeguard and build the fatherland are based on practical and scientific grounds. They reflect our party's correct leadership, the great creativity of the revolutionary masses, our cadres and fighters and the favorable conditions and circumstances for our country's revolution and the world's revolution now and during the next few decades. That is why we will certainly be able to complete that project.

While building our armed forces, we must see what lies immediately ahead as well as what is in the distant future. Only by visualizing the distant future can we formulate correct guidelines for current activities and correctly resolve immediate practical problems without being adventurous or deluded, or being conservative or old-fashioned.

Sometimes things develop in an orderly fashion and sometimes by leaps and bounds. The revolution sometimes moves rapidly forward, achieving in 1 day what would normally take 20 years; sometimes surpassing the greatest expectations. The rapid 10-day victory of the general insurrection in August 1945, 15 years after the birth of our party and its leadership of the national liberation struggle, the historic Dien Bien Phu victory after 9 years of anti-French resistance, and the lightning-fast victory in 55 days and nights of the general offensive and uprising of the spring of 1975 after 30 long years of armed insurrection and liberation war are examples of marvelous leaps forward of the revolution after years of orderly development.

The march of history and the victory of the revolution are objective necessities. However, victory does not come by itself. It is achieved only by the conscious actions of the whole party, army and all of the people struggling resolutely. The building of our People's Armed Forces with the aforementioned objectives is no easy task nor can it be completed within a short period of time. The history of mankind has developed according to objective laws independently of man's wishes. However, it is man who creates his history. It is the same with the development of the armed forces. According to their law, our armed forces must certainly advance to the summit of their development in the course of Vietnam's inexorable development into a powerful socialist country.

Realizing this, the cadres of all echelons in the army must uphold their responsibility, develop a revolutionary offensive spirit and strive to raise their levels in all fields. They must look ahead while remaining close to reality and the masses. They must strive to complete the tasks of their units in order to turn the party's correct, creative, independent and sovereign line into a practical victory.

Let us be worthy of the party and people's trust by continuing our revolutionary efforts, and maintaining our patriotism and intelligence as Vietnamese, our burning revolutionary ardor as communists, our rich experience gained during decades of fighting and growth as time-tested revolutionary soldiers under the party and the great Uncle Ho's glorious banner, and our wide knowledge in all fields as combatants, workers and peasants. As combatants, we must continuously improve ourselves in the current national reconstruction and defense activities.

Under our party's leadership, our nation has become the equal of other vanguard nations in the world in the great struggle and glorious victory against the U.S. imperialists, the Huns of the 20th century; against aggression, oppression and exploitation; for our fatherland's independence, freedom and socialism and for our international obligations. Our nation will also certainly advance to the ranks of other vanguard nations in the world in the work of peace and in building a wealthy and strong country, triumphing over backwardness and poverty, for our people's comfortable life and happiness and for our country's prosperity. We will surely succeed in building a socialist Vietnamese fatherland according to the line mapped out by the Fourth Party Congress. We will certainly build the Vietnam People's Armed Forces into the most powerful and modern armed force in our nation's history in order to safeguard and build our beloved Vietnamese fatherland.

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